Oral
Answers to
Questions

TREASURY

The Chancellor of the Exchequer was asked—

Young People

Helen Hayes: What steps he is taking to ensure that young people are not disproportionately affected by reductions in government expenditure.

Nick Thomas-Symonds: What steps he is taking to ensure that young people are not disproportionately affected by reductions in government expenditure.

Greg Hands: The Government have a long-term economic plan designed to help young people, which includes 3 million new apprenticeship starts, a 10-year low in youth unemployment, the lifetime individual savings account to help first-time buyers, 360,000 16-year-olds doing National Citizen Service and record numbers going to university.

Helen Hayes: The Chancellor has claimed that the Government
“put the next generation first.”—[Official Report, 16 March 2016; Vol. 607, c. 951.]
However, the Equality and Human Rights Commission’s “Is Britain Fairer?” report, which was published last year, found that younger people in the UK faced the worst economic prospects for generations. Young people in my constituency are bearing a disproportionate burden of the Government’s cuts. The abolition of the education maintenance allowance has made it harder for 16 and 17-year-olds to pursue educational opportunities; university tuition fees have trebled and are set to rise again; changes to the schools funding formula will see—

John Bercow: Order. All we need is a question with a question mark at the end of it in one sentence.

Helen Hayes: Oh!

John Bercow: Sorry, but that is the way it is.

Helen Hayes: Sorry, Mr Speaker. My question is, when will the Chancellor offer a fair deal to our young people, and stop closing off opportunities and driving them into debt?

Greg Hands: That was an extraordinary question. It ignored all the announcements that I made about what the Government have been doing for young people. Let us not forget the situation we inherited in 2010, when youth unemployment had gone up by 45% under Labour. The facts are these: a record number of young people are going to university, including a record number from disadvantaged backgrounds, and the proportion of young people struggling financially has almost halved since the hon. Lady’s days in 2010.

Nick Thomas-Symonds: The wages of 18 to 21-year-olds fell by about £1,000 a year during the last Parliament, yet under-25s are excluded from the national living wage. Will the Chief Secretary to the Treasury condemn what the Minister for the Cabinet Office said: that that is because people under 25 are simply not productive enough?

Greg Hands: The hon. Gentleman is ignoring our amazing record on youth unemployment since we took office six years ago. Youth unemployment has fallen by 102,000 this year. Youth employment is up 94,000 over the year and is close to the highest proportion on record. On why the national living wage does not apply to those who are under 25, I remind him that the national minimum wage does apply to those who are under 25 and is increasing under this Government. For younger workers, the priority is to secure work and gain experience. Youth unemployment remains higher than the unemployment rate for those aged over 25.

Alan Mak: Since 2010, nearly half a million fewer children and young people are in households where there is worklessness. Will the Chief Secretary confirm that the Government will continue to help households into work and to cut poverty?

Greg Hands: My hon. Friend is quite right, and we will continue to take action in this space. The number of households where nobody had ever worked doubled under Labour. Thanks to us, youth employment is up 94,000 over the year and continues to rise.

Huw Merriman: Does my right hon. Friend agree that the way to give a fairer deal to younger people is to make sure that they are not saddled with the debts of reckless spending? Will he assure me that he will do everything he can to ensure that this Government balance the books?

Greg Hands: My hon. Friend is quite right that it is future generations who would have to repay the debt that the last Labour Government left us and the even greater debt that the current Labour team want to give us with their reckless spending pledges. Household debt as a proportion of income has fallen since Labour’s financial crisis. We are in a much healthier condition in 2016 than we were in 2010.

John Bercow: Order. I must advise colleagues that  we are today visited by Mr Kadri Veseli, the Speaker of the Parliament of Kosovo, who is visiting the UK in the year in which that independent nation celebrates eight years of independence. My colleague and his team are warmly welcome in the House.

Northern Powerhouse

Stuart Andrew: What progress he has made on the establishment of the northern powerhouse.

Seema Kennedy: What progress he has made on the establishment of the northern powerhouse.

George Osborne: May I say that as a young Back Bencher I went to Pristina to help with the democracy-building programme in Kosovo? It is good to have the Speaker of that Parliament here.
Two years ago, we set out the plan to build a northern powerhouse by connecting up the cities and counties of the north of England so that the whole is greater than the parts. Since then we have committed billions in new transport investment, devolved powers to cities and promoted science and culture. The result is that investment projects in the north are up by more than 100%. But we have just started on this bold journey, and it is only by working together that we will transform the economic geography of this country.

Stuart Andrew: I am grateful for that answer. Severe flooding over Christmas caused huge problems for the city of Leeds, which is a major player in the northern powerhouse. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend for meeting me to discuss flood defences. Does he agree that the neighbourhood planning and infrastructure Bill will help deliver the commitment to invest £100 billion in such infrastructure and secure the economic prosperity of the north?

George Osborne: I agree with my hon. Friend, and congratulate him and other west Yorkshire MPs who spoke out powerfully on the need for further investment in flood defences in west Yorkshire and in Leeds. We have provided that, with around £350 million extra in flood defence investment over the coming years to protect the businesses and communities he represents. Our neighbourhood planning Bill will ensure that we have a national infrastructure commission on a statutory footing to look at the big national challenges that we face, whether transport investment, broadband or indeed flood defence.

Seema Kennedy: I thank my right hon. Friend for his answer. What benefits are there for infrastructure funding for the region outside the large cities?

George Osborne: My hon. Friend raises an important issue. In recent years there has been a focus on economic development in the big cities of the north, but we now want to support the counties and county towns of the north of England. In the area that she represents so well we have the new growth deal for the Preston, South Ribble and Lancashire city deal area. We are looking to devolve more economic powers to counties so that they too can see the benefits of securing economic growth. My door is always open to good, sensible proposals for investment in the counties of the north of England.

Rachel Reeves: The Chancellor speaks about investment in transport and in flood defences, both of which are crucial in my city of Leeds. Yet last  month the Government cancelled the Leeds trolleybus scheme, and in 2011 flood defences were cancelled in Leeds, which contributed to the flooding we saw in December. Earlier this year the Government announced some money for flood defences, but it was just a fraction of what was cancelled five years ago, so I am surprised by the complacency of the hon. Member for Pudsey (Stuart Andrew), and ask the Government to invest properly in flood defences in our city.

George Osborne: The hon. Lady is being a little churlish. We committed £6 billion to investment in transport in Humberside and Yorkshire, the area that her constituency is in. Specifically on flood defences, she raised on the Floor of the House very specific schemes that she wanted me to fund. I funded those in the Budget. As she well knows, the future phases do not yet have plans or a price tag, but I have said that in principle we are committed to those as well. If she works with us we will deliver those schemes, which of course were never delivered under a Labour Government.

Alison McGovern: The Chancellor mentioned transport investment, yet his Government have presided over a situation in which there is 24 times more transport investment in London than in the north. However, on this occasion, although it pains me to do so, I want to ask the Chancellor to agree with me that people in the north need our country to remain at the heart of Europe so that our cities will keep growing.

George Osborne: First, it is quite right that we invest in major transport infrastructure in our capital city, which we have done with Crossrail and Crossrail 2, but that has not been to the exclusion of investment elsewhere in our country. In the hon. Lady’s part of the north-west there has been massive investment in electrification of the railways—I note that under the Labour Government only 10 miles of the country’s entire railways were electrified. High Speed 2 will help with fast train journeys to Merseyside as well as to Manchester. Now, with the new Merseyside Mayor agreed, we can go on pouring more money into the infrastructure of Merseyside so that we support private businesses in that area in growing and creating private sector jobs.

Martin Vickers: This week is Humber business week. Despite the forthcoming opening of the A160 into Immingham docks, business leaders tell me that they feel somewhat disconnected from the northern powerhouse project. Will the Chancellor outline what future schemes might benefit them?

George Osborne: I remember that my hon. Friend championed that road when he first came into Parliament, and he sees the practical benefits for his constituency now that that work is almost complete. He also joined other east Yorkshire and Humber MPs in campaigning for lower bridge tolls. Those are examples of how we are delivering for his part of the country, but I am as passionate as he is about ensuring that east Yorkshire and Hull are connected to the northern powerhouse. We have made it very clear to all the core cities of the north that Hull and the surrounding area should be included. In the Budget, we announced specific support for the city of culture, which is near the area he represents.

Rebecca Long-Bailey: Recent figures showed a 9.6% drop in the value of new construction project starts recorded in the so-called northern powerhouse to the end of 2015. Interestingly, despite the Chancellor’s rhetoric on investment, much of the public capital invested thus far has been delivered by the EU. Does he therefore disagree with the Minister with responsibility for the northern powerhouse, the Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, the hon. Member for Stockton South (James Wharton), who said recently that Brexit will not affect Greater Manchester’s vision and access to funding?

George Osborne: As the hon. Lady well knows, I certainly believe that Britain is stronger in the European Union, and that it helps the northern powerhouse, but I make this observation: investment projects in the north of England are up over 100% in the last two years, which is in striking contrast to other areas. To give a sense of scale, investment projects in London are up 7% in the last two years. That is welcome, but in the northern powerhouse, they are up 127%. We are rebalancing the economic geography of this country. I am sure she will welcome the fact that the north of England now has the highest employment rate in the country’s history, and that we have seen the fastest falls in unemployment in the north of England.

Employment Trends

Chris Green: What assessment he has made of recent trends in the level of employment.

Michael Tomlinson: What assessment he has made of recent trends in the level of employment.

Damian Hinds: We have the highest employment rate on record, a record number of women in work, and the lowest claimant count since 1974. That means millions more opportunities for our fellow citizens. We must not now put at risk the security that has been brought about by our long-term economic plan.

Chris Green: From April to June 2014 to April to June 2015, the employment of British workers in the UK increased by a welcome 84,000, but the figures are three times higher for EU nationals. With respect to the national living wage, what assessment has been made of anticipated job growth in the UK? Does my hon. Friend believe that that will benefit the UK or EU citizens most?

Damian Hinds: Almost two thirds of the increase in employment over the past five years is accounted for by UK nationals. Today, nine in every 10 people in a job in the UK are UK nationals. As my right hon. Friend the Chancellor has said, Britain deserves a pay rise and  the national living wage delivers it.

Michael Tomlinson: I am sure the Minister and the whole House welcome the latest unemployment figure in my constituency—it stands at only 361, or less than 1%—but what more can be done to ensure that that trend continues, given that we are down to the last few and the most difficult cases, especially bearing in mind the over-50s and those in the 18 to 24-year-old bracket?

Damian Hinds: I welcome that news from Mid Dorset and North Poole, and by further increasing support for the hardest to help we share my hon. Friend’s keenness to ensure that no one is left behind. We have announced the new youth obligation and made it more cost-effective for employers to hire young people and apprentices. We are also helping older jobseekers to retrain through pilot schemes that began in April 2015.

Helen Goodman: This morning, the head of Hitachi warned that a Brexit vote means that jobs will be lost. What is the Treasury’s estimate of the number of jobs that will be at risk if we leave the European Union?

Damian Hinds: Our projection is that, following the immediate economic shock that would follow from Brexit, 500,000 jobs would be lost and there would be an increase in unemployment. Part of that is from the initial impact on foreign direct investment, but that effect continues thereafter.

Stephen Timms: It is not just a concern of Hitachi but of any non-European company that has its European headquarters in the UK. The UK is much the most attractive location for them currently, and they would be in great difficulty if we left the European Union. Has the Department made an assessment of what that group of employers contributes and will contribute in future to UK employment, which would be at risk if we left the EU?

Damian Hinds: We have modelled the effect on foreign direct investment. One does not have to believe that people currently in the UK would leave. All one has to consider in relation to the detrimental impact on the UK is what will happen to foreign direct investment  in the future. There are many good reasons to invest in Britain, but we know that 72% of firms that invest in this country say that our membership of the European Union is a key factor.

Andrew Percy: Alongside genocide and war, we hear all about the threat to jobs of leaving the European Union. Will my hon. Friend tell me what will be done if we vote to stay in and continue to have unlimited immigration from 27 foreign countries? What will be done to protect my constituents, low-paid workers who have seen their wages flatline because of unlimited immigration?

Damian Hinds: We have already taken steps to ensure that people cannot just come here and claim benefits from day one. The renegotiation the Prime Minister secured addressed the unnatural draw of our in-work benefits system. I should also say that one should not assume that the effect on immigration would be quite as great as is sometimes supposed, particularly when we look at the other models of agreements with the European Union, a number of which include free movement.

Margaret Ritchie: Does the Minister agree that a vote to leave the European Union on 23 June could have a negative effect on employment trends, particularly in Northern Ireland where 50,000 jobs are related to exports to the EU? The Chancellor saw the effect of that directly yesterday in Warrenpoint in my constituency.

Damian Hinds: I know that my right hon. Friend was in the hon. Lady’s constituency yesterday. Northern Ireland is of course in a particularly sensitive position because of the land border with the Republic of Ireland, which would be a land border with the EU if we left. There are more people in work in Northern Ireland than ever before and we need to protect that.

Business Support

Robert Jenrick: What fiscal steps he is taking to support business.

George Osborne: The Government are backing small and large businesses as part of our long-term economic plan. Our corporation tax rates are the lowest in the G20 and will fall even further to 17%. In the Budget, we cut the business rates burden in England for all rate payers and ensured that 600,000 businesses permanently pay no rates at all. This is a Conservative Government who support businesses and the jobs they create.

Robert Jenrick: In towns such as Newark, where 11,000 new jobs have been created under this Government, the task ahead is to attract not just any businesses but those that ensure that people are well paid. With that in mind, does the Chancellor acknowledge and agree that not only have 900,000 new businesses been created since 2010, but that the latest research by NatWest shows one in four working people are now in high-skilled, well-paid jobs?

George Osborne: My hon. Friend is right to point out all the good things that are happening in Newark. Across the east midlands, we have seen the creation of 53,000 new small and medium-sized businesses since we came into Downing Street—a remarkable achievement. We have to ensure that we continue to move people up the job scale and that their wages continue to grow. The good news is that of the jobs being created at the moment 80% or so are full time and the majority are in skilled occupations.

Stewart Hosie: We all know the benefits of innovation to business and to the economy, so why does the Chancellor think his decision to change innovation support from grants to loans is anything other than a bad idea that will increase cost and risk to companies seeking to innovate?

George Osborne: I think the hon. Gentleman would accept, as I would, that it has been a challenge for the UK to turn good inventions in the laboratory into good inventions in the workplace that sell around the world. Our innovation support has had to be updated and modernised. The idea of loans is actually borrowed from a French initiative that has worked well in that economy, in terms of turning scientific invention into good products in the marketplace.

Stewart Hosie: That is a rather unconvincing answer. Of course it is not simply about innovation, but exports. We all understand the benefits to business and the economy of exporting more, so why does the Chancellor think it is a remotely good idea to take the decision to cut the UK Trade & Investment budget by £42 million  over the next four years, making it more difficult to export and more difficult for him to meet his own target of doubling exports by the end of the decade?

George Osborne: Over the past five or six years, we have greatly increased the UKTI budget, but as with every Department, since it is paid for by the taxpayers that the hon. Gentleman and I represent, we need to make sure we get value for money. The new head of UKTI is ensuring that the money is going to the frontline to support small and medium-sized Scottish exporters and others in selling around the world. He should welcome the enormous success of many Scottish businesses, from the whisky business to agricultural industries and manufacturing, in exporting around the world, with the support of UKTI—the clue is in the first two letters.

Andrew Tyrie: The Chancellor has introduced a subsidy for peer-to-peer lending tax relief on ISAs, which is a high-risk, high-return market. Most people support the intention, which is to increase competition in the SME lending market, but many are becoming concerned that some of these loans are being marketed to those who cannot reasonably be expected to understand the risks. What is the Treasury doing to ensure that the taxpayer does not end up encouraging the marketing of schemes to people who can least afford to lose the money?

George Osborne: At its own request, the peer-to-peer lending industry is now regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority, which is alert to the risks that my right hon. Friend identifies, but I wish to make a broader observation. In the financial crash, we saw the limitations of the UK’s credit system, where many companies were reliant on bank finance. In the last few years, we have tried to broaden the range of financing options for small and medium-sized businesses, in terms of not just capital markets but innovative new products such as peer-to-peer lending. Using things such as ISA wrappers to encourage this new form of finance for small businesses is a good thing for our economy.

Valerie Vaz: To help Welsh businesses, will the Chancellor consider abolishing the Severn crossing tolls in 2018, rather than just halving them?

George Osborne: By halving the tolls, we have taken a significant step to help Welsh businesses and businesses on the other side of the border, while ensuring we have the resources to maintain the bridge without having to draw on the same taxpayers through their tax bill.

Kevin Hollinrake: I have had business and broadband events at Easingwold, in my constituency, and this Friday we have invited several providers, including fibre and satellite providers, as well as providers of point-to-point wireless, which, in our experience, is the best solution for those in the hardest-to-reach areas. Will the Chancellor consider extending the excellent satellite voucher scheme to point-to-point wireless or allowing communities to pool vouchers to facilitate and fund community-based schemes?

George Osborne: I am happy to take a close look at my hon. Friend’s proposal—I know what a rural constituency he represents. We have piloted support in north Yorkshire for rural businesses and their broadband links, and as announced in the Queen’s Speech, we are considering  using the digital economy Bill to make broadband a universal service obligation, because we know what a transformative effect it can have on the rural economy.

Seema Malhotra: The Chancellor talks about supporting business, and like Labour I am sure he will want to see long-term sustainable business growth in Britain. After his six years at the helm, what is the forecast for business investment growth this year?

George Osborne: According to the forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility, business growth this year and in the years ahead will be positive, whereas it was negative when I became Chancellor, so things are improving.

Seema Malhotra: The OBR has revised down business investment growth by a huge 4.9% since November, even after taking into account the fiscal measures the Chancellor has introduced, and we know that growth could fall further if we leave the EU. The acting head of the British Chambers of Commerce recently highlighted frustration among businesses over infrastructure projects, the huge skills gap, childcare, housing and the uncertainty around the apprenticeship levy. It almost sounds like gruel today without the jam tomorrow. Does the Chancellor agree with him?

George Osborne: Where was Labour’s apprenticeship levy—before they complain about what we are doing? If Labour wants to contribute to this important debate about how we make our economy more productive, we will need a better contribution. The hon. Lady’s Parliamentary Private Secretary has been in an email exchange with the hon. Member for Bishop Auckland (Helen Goodman) in which the latter complained about these questions at Treasury Questions, saying that the brief she had just been sent was a disgrace and demonstrated that the Labour Treasury team—

John Bercow: Order. The Chancellor should remain seated. If that is the sum total of what he has to contribute on his feet in response to that question, frankly it was not worth the breath. It was utterly feeble and constitutionally improper. Learn it—it is very simple!

Brexit

David Hanson: What assessment he has made of the potential effect on the economy of the UK leaving the EU.

Jim Cunningham: What assessment he has made of the potential effect of the UK leaving the EU on the economy of (a) Coventry and (b) the west midlands.

Damian Hinds: The projected rise in unemployment of 500,000 that I mentioned just now includes 24,000 people in Wales and 44,000 people in the west midlands. In the long term, the Treasury’s central estimate is that GDP would be lower by around £4,300 per household by 2030 than it would be otherwise.

David Hanson: The head of the World Trade Organisation said yesterday that the process of negotiating deals outside Europe would take decades. Is that not one of the reasons why confidence would be hit, currency would fall and jobs would be lost, including the 24,000 in Wales that the Minister has mentioned, and why companies such as Hitachi have mentioned today that they would pull out of the United Kingdom? Do we not agree on this one, Minister?

Damian Hinds: I think we do agree on the turmoil that uncertainty can bring, and the uncertainty about future trade deals that the right hon. Gentleman raises is part of that. There is much more uncertainty as well, of course, for businesses that currently trade with other European countries and people who are employed in those countries or might be thinking of going to them. All these things generate uncertainty, which creates economic turmoil in the short run. There is a real danger of missing out on a very large number of third-party trades in the long run, when all the EU trade deals currently under negotiation are finished, which will account for some 80% of our trade.

Jim Cunningham: Can the Minister say what the economic benefits are of us being in the European Union, particularly in places such as Coventry and the west midlands, and more importantly what the impact on manufacturing is?

Damian Hinds: The automotive sector in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency and elsewhere is particularly important. It is a high value-added sector that has been a great British success story in recent years and it has complex cross-border supply chains, so it is unsurprising that those speaking out in favour of remain include the chief executives of Jaguar Land Rover and Rolls-Royce and the chairman of the Coventry and Warwickshire local enterprise partnership.

David Nuttall: Considering that the UK has been a member of the EU for over 40 years and we still do not even have a trade deal with the United States of America, the largest economy in the world, does my hon. Friend not agree that our economy would benefit from the United Kingdom being able to negotiate our own free trade deals?

Damian Hinds: The businesses that I speak to say overwhelmingly that they feel they would get a better deal with the increased economic clout—five times the economic weight—that comes from being a member of the EU as opposed to Britain being on its own. All these trade deals take a long time, but when all the current EU negotiations are completed, the EU will have more trade deals with the rest of the world—so we will, too—than the United States and Canada combined.

Philip Hollobone: The living wage is a very attractive economic policy, especially in eastern Europe. Given the extensive financial modelling that my hon. Friend has conducted, can he tell the House his official estimate of the number of unskilled migrants coming to this country from eastern Europe in the first five years after a vote to remain?

Damian Hinds: The national living wage makes sure that British workers who are low paid cannot be undercut by people coming from other countries. It will be of   great benefit to our economy. It is also the case that as our legal minimum pay increases, we will still be within the middle range internationally.

Sammy Wilson: Yesterday the Chancellor told the people of Northern Ireland that house prices would fall by 18% if we voted to leave the EU, even though the day before he said that housing costs would go up by 9%. He told us that 14,000 jobs would be lost in export industries, even though the exchange rate, which would help exports, was set to plummet, and made an uncanny prediction about incomes in 14 years’ time. Does the Minister not realise that the Chancellor is expending his own credibility and that of the Government, given the panic that has now set in, by trying to sell the threadbare economic case for remaining in the EU?

Damian Hinds: Saying that house prices would come down but housing costs would go up is not inconsistent at all, as the cost of borrowing would go up. Northern Ireland is a special case when it comes to the housing market, but in many parts of the country people might say that while it would be a good thing for house prices to come down, that should not be a result of crashing the economy and making it more difficult for people  to borrow.
As for the long-term forecast, it is, of course, difficult to predict what will happen 15 years hence. What the Treasury analysis seeks to do is say, other things being equal, what will happen to the 15-year forecast whether we are in or out of the European Union, and the answer is clear: in the central scenario, GDP will be hit to the tune of £4,300 per household.

Neil Carmichael: Does the Minister agree that, given that so many international firms—including, most recently, Hitachi—have made it very, very clear that being in the European Union and in a single market means that this is a good country in which to invest, the obvious thing to do for the purposes of investment and jobs is remain in the European Union?

Damian Hinds: I do agree with that. The United Kingdom has the third highest stock of foreign direct investment in the world, coming behind only the United States and China. We are the biggest recipient of foreign direct investment in the European Union, and also from the EU. The experience of accession countries shows that the move into the European Union really does make a difference, and that it is not just about tariffs, but about membership of a customs union. Some, indeed most, of the alternative models do not include that, but it is very important in relation to, for example, the cross-border supply chains about which the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) asked earlier.

Geraint Davies: Only two countries, Germany and the Netherlands, run a surplus with Britain; the rest run a deficit. Does the Minister agree that in the event of a Brexit, those other countries would vote for tariffs—as, indeed, would Germany, in order to stop Japanese car imports? Has he created a model to assess what impact those tariffs would have on employment levels in the short and medium terms, and on inward investment? I suggest that the impact would be disastrous.

Damian Hinds: Different countries will have different interests, and no doubt they would come to the surface during the two years of the article 50 negotiations. A very large majority of other countries using enhanced qualified majority voting would be needed to agree a deal. Fundamentally, however, I do not think that this is about the deficit that one country has with the EU, or vice versa; I think that it is about the relative size of the export market to that country. While 44% of our exports go to the EU, the EU figure is 8% in the other direction, which means that in any negotiation, the other side will have the better hand.

Philip Davies: Can the Minister explain why we are paying more than £10 billion net this year for a £68 billion trade deficit with a declining part of the world’s economy, when anyone with even an ounce of common sense knows that it is possible to have a £68 billion trade deficit with a declining part of the world’s economy for nothing?

Damian Hinds: I think that I detected a revised figure in my hon. Friend’s assessment of our net contribution to the European Union. The fact is that for every pound that is paid in tax in this country, a little over a penny goes to the European Union. That is a cost—it is not a trivial cost, and I do not belittle it—but what comes with it are the trade benefits, the enhancement of our economy and the protection of jobs and investment that we want to see.

Exports

Alan Brown: What steps he is taking to increase exports.

Harriett Baldwin: Over the last six years, UK Trade & Investment has more than doubled the number of businesses that it helps. It now aims to help a further 100,000 firms to export by 2020.

Alan Brown: I thank the Minister for her answer, but it did not make it clear what is actually being done to increase exports. The Chancellor promised that his growth strategy would be underpinned by a doubling of exports to £1 trillion by the end of the decade, but to date his targets have been missed, and the export figures are moving in the wrong direction. What will the Government do to turn that dire performance around?

Harriett Baldwin: My right hon. Friend the Chancellor mentioned earlier the important work that UKTI is doing in not only promoting the Exporting is GREAT brand around the world, but, now—across the whole Government—encouraging all our embassies around the world to focus their resources on increasing the potential opportunities for our world-class exporters.

Henry Bellingham: Is the Minister aware that more than 25% of small businesses in France and Germany export, whereas the figure in the United Kingdom is about 20%? Does she agree that not just UKTI, but chambers of trade and business organisations such as the Federation of Small Businesses, can play a role in encouraging more small firms, in particular, to export?

Harriett Baldwin: My hon. Friend is absolutely right that there is an important role to be played by not only our embassy network, but our chambers of commerce and the Federation of Small Businesses. I also welcome the fact that some of our larger banks have also set themselves targets for getting additional customers to start to export during the next five years.

Barry Sheerman: Is the Minister aware that Huddersfield and Yorkshire are already a northern powerhouse in terms of manufacturing and the quality of partnership with universities? Is  she aware that my universities in Yorkshire and the manufacturing sector are terrified that we will leave the European Union? It will bankrupt the universities and the manufacturing sector.

John Bercow: Did we get a reference to exports? I am sure that the hon. Gentleman meant to mention it.

Barry Sheerman: We have great exporters as well.

John Bercow: Well done.

Harriett Baldwin: The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right to highlight the fact that the UK’s universities are unanimous in expressing the value that they put not only on higher education, but on the potential for those educated in universities to export in due course. He is absolutely right to highlight the fact that all other trade deals would be worse than the current zero-tariff trade deal that we have as a member of the EU.

Capital Gains Tax/Corporation Tax

Clive Lewis: What assessment he has made of which groups within the UK population will benefit from planned changes to (a) capital gains and (b) corporation tax.

David Gauke: Changes to capital gains tax will provide greater incentives to invest in companies. Up to 130,000 individuals a year, including up to 50,000 basic rate taxpayers, are estimated to pay lower tax as a result of the changes to CGT. The further cut to the corporation tax rate to 17% announced at the Budget will benefit over 1 million companies, large and small, supporting UK companies to invest, grow and create jobs.

Clive Lewis: Treasury figures show that just 200,000 individuals will benefit from capital gains tax to the tune of £600 million in the first year—a giveaway of £600 million. On corporation tax, we have the lowest in G7—lower even than Saudi Arabia, Russia and China. At the same time, the Resolution Foundation found that the poorest 20% of families in this country will lose £565 over the course of this Parliament because of the Government’s policies. Where is the social justice in that?

David Gauke: One of the hon. Gentleman’s hon. Friends asked earlier about encouraging business investment, which we want to encourage because it is through having an environment in which businesses invest that we see improved productivity, the conditions for growth and people benefiting from higher wages. I say to the  hon. Gentleman, and to the House as a whole, that pursuing policies that favour business investment and encourage businesses to invest, such as cutting CGT and corporation tax, is important for all our constituents.

Richard Burgon: In 2010, the Chancellor told this House that raising capital gains tax was necessary to
“create a fairer tax system.”—[Official Report, 22 June 2010; Vol. 512, c. 178.]
Given that the Chancellor is now cutting capital gains tax—overwhelmingly to the benefit of the richest 0.3% of people—what does he think has changed?

David Gauke: As I outlined a moment ago, the purpose of the tax measures is to encourage people to invest in businesses. The changes are specifically targeted at companies—the cut in CGT does not apply to residential property—and put in place an environment in which businesses can grow and prosper. That is absolutely the right approach to follow. I remind the hon. Gentleman that there are other countries that have taken different approaches, of which he has been full of praise. It is not quite working out in Venezuela, is it?

Disabled People: Government Expenditure

Barbara Keeley: What steps he is taking to ensure that disabled people are not disproportionately affected by reductions in government expenditure.

Damian Hinds: The Government have protected the value of disability benefits, exempting such payments from the uprating freeze and exempting those in receipt of them from the benefit cap. Disability spending will be higher in every year to 2020, relative to both 2010 and today.

Barbara Keeley: That may the case, but a 40% reduction in core Government funding to local authorities has led to cuts that affect services. Local authorities are required to provide short breaks for children with disabilities, but 58% of local authorities have cut their short break funding by 15% or more. It is Carers Week. What will Treasury Ministers do to reverse the trend and ensure that there is money for local authorities to fund those important short breaks?

Damian Hinds: We have provided funding for respite breaks. The hon. Lady is right to identify this as an important thing for carers in this, Carers Week. There are 200,000 more people now receiving carer’s allowance in this country. The Care Act 2014 extends rights to assessments, and the Government are launching the new carer strategy in recognition of how important a role this is for millions of people throughout the country.

David Burrowes: Recognising the risks of homelessness for disabled people, may I welcome the financial commitment in the Budget to prevent homelessness? But does the Minister recognise the risks of a local housing allowance cap on supported housing?

Damian Hinds: I, in turn, acknowledge my hon. Friend’s welcome for the additional money for tackling homelessness that was in the Budget—and, indeed, that has been   provided previously. On the LHA cap, we now have a joint evidence review being conducted by the Department for Communities and Local Government and the Department for Work and Pensions, and the one-year exception, to make sure that we get this right, so that we can have a long-term, sustainable funding solution for this sector.

Contingencies Fund

Diana R. Johnson: In what circumstances the use of his Department’s Contingencies Fund is authorised.

Greg Hands: The Government seek parliamentary authority for their spending plans through supply procedure. Occasionally, expenditure on some services is so urgent that it cannot await normal procedure. The Contingencies Fund enables the Treasury to make repayable cash advances to Departments for urgent services, and Treasury officials assess cases on the basis of criteria set out in Treasury guidance.

Diana R. Johnson: Extra support being consulted on for contaminated blood victims is coming from the Department of Health’s budget, where there is simply not enough money, yet previously central contingency funds have been used to deal with national scandals such as Equitable Life. Before the spending review, 18 MPs, from six parties, wrote to the Chancellor suggesting that the £230 million the Treasury was getting from the sale of the blood products company could fund a fair settlement for contaminated blood victims. We have had no reply, so will the Minister look at this again?

Greg Hands: I thank the hon. Lady for that question. I will ensure that she gets a reply, which she deserves, because this is a deeply distressing issue and the Government take it very seriously indeed. I do not believe it is appropriate to use the Contingencies Fund in this particular case. She will know that the consultation on the reform of financial support to those affected closed on 15 April, and we will be replying in due course. Meanwhile, the Department of Health has identified additional money—£100 million from its budget—for these purposes. This is in addition to the £22.5 million that it spends on this annually, as well as the further £25 million announced in March 2015. These steps will more than double the support.

Tax Transparency

Owen Thompson: What steps he is taking to improve tax transparency.

David Gauke: The Government have played a leading role in driving forward international action on tax transparency. The introduction of country-by-country reporting has increased the transparency between multinationals and tax authorities, and we are pushing for this to be made public on a multilateral basis. We led the way throughout the development of the common reporting standard, which will see more than 100 countries automatically exchange information on financial accounts, and on a similar initiative for the automatic exchange of beneficial  ownership information. We have consistently advocated for public registers of beneficial ownership, with the UK’s going live as of this month.

Owen Thompson: The planned closure of 137 HMRC offices has clearly been affecting employees, their families and communities. What steps has the Minister taken to look into introducing a moratorium on these closures, to support the wider work of improving tax transparency?

David Gauke: I commend the hon. Gentleman’s ingenious ability to raise this issue. It is important that HMRC’s funds are spent efficiently, to ensure that they are spent on delivering the tax being collected that we want, rather than on buildings. The savings from buildings are being spent on collecting more tax.

Nigel Mills: The Minister will have seen the different approaches that the French and UK authorities have taken towards cases such as Google’s. What more can he do to ensure that Parliament and the public have faith that HMRC is getting good deals in such situations? For example, will the National Audit Office be allowed to review those most high-profile cases and give some assurance that a good deal was achieved?

David Gauke: rose—

Robert Jenrick: rose—

John Bercow: Order. Let me gently mention that we have already heard from the hon. Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick)—I remember very well his question, and I rather hope he does. It is one per session—[Interruption.] He can try again at topicals, but not in substantives.

David Gauke: Thank you, Mr Speaker. What I say to my hon. Friend the Member for Amber Valley (Nigel Mills) is that, some years ago, HMRC brought in an assurance procedure to ensure that all such settlements are properly scrutinised. HMRC is very confident that it has reached a fair and proper settlement with Google. It is worth pointing out that, in recent years, we have seen increases in revenue collected by HMRC and increases in yield from its compliance activities including from large businesses.

John Martin McDonnell: If we are to tackle tax evasion and avoidance effectively we need to remain within the EU. Will the Chancellor and the Minister join me in calling on all MEPs to support the new anti-tax avoidance directive being voted on in the European Parliament tomorrow? Conservative MEPs abstained at the Committee stage, and this morning there are worrying noises that they may be thinking of abstaining once again. Will the Minister make it clear now that Conservative MEPs will be voting for the directive?

David Gauke: The anti-tax avoidance directive was discussed a couple of weeks ago at the ECOFIN meeting, which I attended. The UK made the case for us taking strong action and working through an anti-avoidance tax directive. What we suggested and proposed was taken on board. The matter will also be addressed at the ECOFIN  meeting next week. The UK is pushing for progress and it is working co-operatively with other member states to ensure that we do make progress.

John Martin McDonnell: I am mystified as to whether Conservative MEPs will be voting for the directive tomorrow. I just live in hope that they will. The European directive did show the value of European Union co-operation in tackling tax avoidance and evasion. As part of that co-operation, following the raids on Google’s Paris offices, will the Chancellor inform the House what arrangements are in place with the French authorities for sharing information from the raid? If new evidence comes to light, will the Chancellor stand ready to reopen his deal with Google?

David Gauke: The first point of which I must remind the shadow Chancellor is that all settlements are reached by HMRC. Operational matters are rightly for HMRC, and not for Treasury Ministers. Of course if there is new evidence, HMRC will take it into account. The position is that HMRC has made it very clear that, under the law that existed between 2005 and 2015, it believes that it has reached a settlement that ensures that the right amount of tax has been collected—and that is what its job is. Our job is to ensure that it has the tools and the rules, and that is what we are delivering.

Topical Questions

Flick Drummond: If he will make a statement on his departmental responsibilities.

George Osborne: The core purpose of the Treasury is to ensure the stability and prosperity of the economy.

Flick Drummond: We are all extremely grateful that the Treasury was able to have funding for local infrastructure projects, which clearly shows the success of the Government’s policies. However, there has been no major investment in rail infrastructure in Hampshire for nearly 60 years, and that is holding back our productivity. Will my right hon. Friend meet me, local councils and local enterprise partnerships to sort out this issue  as a matter of urgency, as we have committed to build 102,000 new homes by 2030 and our roads are already full?

George Osborne: My hon. Friend is absolutely right to raise the issue of investment in infrastructure in Hampshire and in her constituency of Portsmouth. There is money going into the road infrastructure, such as the M27, and some investment in rail infrastructure, such as Southampton Central station, but, clearly, there is room to do more. As someone who has some experience of the rail services from Portsmouth, I know that they are not as good as they could be. I am very happy to meet her, her colleagues and local businesses to see what more we can do.

Martyn Day: In Scotland, we have introduced robust anti-avoidance rules—they are among the toughest in the world—on devolved taxes. The Scottish National party   has repeatedly called on the Chancellor to embolden compliance by guaranteeing that the beneficial ownership of companies and trusts is made public. Has he taken steps to assure the people of the UK that this progressive step will happen?

David Gauke: The UK is bringing in a register of beneficial ownership for companies. On trusts, where there are tax consequences that will also be included. So, yes, the UK is leading on that, and we are pretty much the first country to do so.

Maggie Throup: I have been contacted by a number of constituents who are having difficulty with this year’s online HMRC self-assessment system, particularly with the level of customer service they are getting from the helpdesk. Will the Minister look into this issue as a matter of urgency so that we can get a speedy resolution to the problems and ensure that my constituents are not penalised?

David Gauke: I would be very happy to meet my hon. Friend to discuss the specific points, but I would also say that the customer performance of HMRC last year was clearly not at an acceptable level. In the run-up to the self-assessment deadline at the end of January 89% of calls were getting through first time and the average waiting time was less than five minutes. That can be improved on, but we should note that it is a much higher performance than has been achieved in HMRC’s previous history.

Cat Smith: I note that the Minister has yet to respond properly to the shadow Chancellor’s question about the new anti-tax avoidance directive in the European Parliament, which is being voted on tomorrow. In light of Conservative MEPs’ abstention at the committee stage, will someone now confirm whether they will support it tomorrow?

David Gauke: Just to be clear, the text of the anti-tax avoidance directive has not been finalised. It was discussed at the ECOFIN meeting a couple of weeks ago and will be discussed again in a week’s time, on 17 June. It has not been finalised. What I can say is that the UK Government’s position is very clear: we want something strong and effective, and that is the case that we have been advocating in the Council of Ministers.

James Berry: The devolution of business rates, allowing local areas to shape their own future, will be of a real benefit to my constituents in Kingston, who pay some of the highest council taxes in the country and receive one of the lowest Government grants in return. Will my right hon. Friend confirm when the first business rate devolution deals will be rolled out and whether Kingston can be at the front of the queue?

George Osborne: My hon. Friend and his local council have been at the forefront of calling for this major reform of local government finance, which is, of course, now being undertaken across the whole country. I can   confirm that London will be moving ahead of many other areas and we will start the retention of business rates in local areas from April 2017.

Michael Weir: The eye-watering costs of the proposed new nuclear power station at Hinkley Point C will put public finance at risk, as well as the strike price, pushing up energy bills for businesses and consumers. Will the Chancellor redirect this investment to cleaner, safer and cheaper energy sources such as renewables and carbon capture and storage?

George Osborne: The first thing I would say is that there were those remarkable figures recently showing that 25% of UK electricity generation is now from renewable energy. That is second only to Germany and is an amazing transformation in our energy supply under this Conservative leadership. Secondly, we need to renew the next generation of nuclear power stations, starting with Hinkley Point, but the deal we have signed makes sure that taxpayers are not exposed to the construction risk.

Bob Blackman: I note that the Government will publish a report on the progress of payments to Equitable Life policyholders who are victims of the great scam, and I congratulate the Government on the progress that has been made to compensate those individuals. Will my right hon. Friend undertake to review the amount of money paid to victims of the scam so that we can fulfil the debt of honour that we owe them?

Harriett Baldwin: I can announce that although the Equitable Life payment scheme is now closed to new claims, payments being made under the scheme to with-profit annuitants are not only tax free but will continue for the life of the relevant annuity.

Steven Paterson: June’s OECD economic outlook revised down its prediction for UK GDP growth. This latest fall arises in the aftermath of the International Monetary Fund’s health check of the UK economy, which concluded that GDP growth was also paltry. When will the Chancellor listen to the experts and offer much-needed investment instead of ideologically driven austerity?

George Osborne: Both the downward revisions to which the hon. Gentleman refers—from the OECD and the IMF—are specifically for this year and in both cases the organisations attribute that to the referendum on our membership of the EU and the potential exit from the EU. They say that if the country votes to remain, however, they expect activity to bounce back and they have not revised down growth for next year.

Chris Philp: Does the Minister share my concern about the activities of ambulance-chasing law firms which encourage fraudulent whiplash claims, of which I have had personal experience? Can the Minister update the House on the Government’s plans to clamp down on this outrageous practice?

Harriett Baldwin: I hope that my hon. Friend has experienced only the ambulance chasers, not the whiplash. He is right to highlight the cost that this puts on motorists, which we estimate is about £90 a year for every motorist in the country. That is why we have already taken steps to reform this area. Last year in the autumn statement we announced further reforms, which will remove the right to cash compensation for minor whiplash injuries, while ensuring that genuine claimants are rehabilitated.

Greg Mulholland: Genuine tax avoidance must be tackled, but HMRC pursuing people who invested legally in schemes, not to avoid tax, and who are now being hit with accelerated payments, is an affront to natural justice, treating them as guilty until proved innocent. Will the Chancellor meet me and a group of people who are seriously detrimentally affected by this?

George Osborne: I am afraid I completely disagree with the hon. Gentleman. He is opposing a measure that we have introduced which says to people who are in dispute with HMRC about the money they pay because of their potential use of tax evasion or avoidance schemes that they should pay up front and, if they win their case, they get their money. Every other taxpayer has to do that. As a result of the measure, we have raised hundreds of millions of pounds for public services and won some key court judgments. I find it remarkable for a Liberal Democrat to be siding with those who want to try to evade their taxes.

Michelle Donelan: Does the Chancellor agree that we need to work with our businesses to tackle our productivity gap and especially to ensure that we have a skilled workforce in engineering and design and technology to boost our economy further?

George Osborne: I completely agree with my hon. Friend, and I know how much she champions skills in her constituency in Wiltshire. The apprentice levy, which has now been legislated for, will ensure that we are able to increase the number of apprentices in this country towards the 3 million that we committed to in the manifesto. Crucially, more money will go into skilled apprenticeships in fields such as design and engineering. She wants to see more of those, and so do I.

Chris Evans: Many constituents of mine, including those working at RF Brookes, tell me that their employers are attacking their terms and conditions because of the national living wage. Does the Chancellor agree that this abuse should not go on as it is giving constituents of mine an overall pay cut?

George Osborne: We certainly expect businesses to pay the national living wage and to honour not just the letter of the law—we have increased enforcement of the living wage through HMRC—but the spirit of it, which means that employers should pay that wage and not find ways to cut other allowances to make good on the pay bill.

Ben Howlett: I welcome the Government’s support for the reporting of gender pay gap figures. What steps is the Minister taking to reduce the gender pay gap in the financial services sector?

Harriett Baldwin: I welcome this question because our financial services sector is not only our highest-paid sector, but the one with the widest gender pay gap. That is why we launched the Women in Finance charter, and we are asking all financial services firms to implement the recommendations in the excellent review by Jayne-Anne Gadhia, the chief executive of Virgin Money, on the representation, or rather the under-representation, of senior women in financial services.

Debbie Abrahams: The Government have made significant public spending cuts affecting disabled people, including nearly £30 billion of cuts in social security to 3.7 million disabled people. Given that disabled people are twice as likely as the general population to be living in poverty, how many more disabled people will be living in poverty by 2020?

Damian Hinds: In fact, spending on disability benefits is going up, not down. There are many more personal independence payments claimants getting the highest rate than there were under disability living allowance; 200,000 more people are getting carers allowance; 22,000 more people are getting help through Motability, and we have a firm commitment to work towards halving the disability employment gap, which is so important for driving up incomes. The gap has remained stubbornly wide, but the most recent quarter showed a small decrease.

David Morris: In 1945 there was a dream of a link road from what is now the M6 to Heysham port, through which 10% of our GDP comes in. That link road will soon be opening. Does my right hon. Friend the Chancellor agree that part of the long-term economic plan is to show that this area of Lancashire will be regenerated? More to the point, would he, diary permitting, like to open the road?

George Osborne: I remember visiting the road with my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister just days before the general election. Because our hon. Friend had been such a champion of his constituency, his constituents said, “Let’s have him back in Parliament championing more investment in Lancashire.” Diary permitting, I would be delighted to open the link road. Indeed, when I was at Warrenpoint in Northern Ireland yesterday, I met the company that trades between Heysham and Warrenpoint, and it is investing in new jobs there.

Jonathan Edwards: The Wales Bill being introduced later today will leave Wales with a vastly inferior fiscal settlement to those for Scotland and Northern Ireland. Why cannot Wales have full income tax powers like Scotland, corporation tax powers like Northern Ireland and air passenger duty powers like both those countries?

Greg Hands: I totally agree with the hon. Gentleman that we need to get on with income tax devolution. I will be having further meetings with the Welsh Government to ensure that we do that. At the same time, we need to look at questions such as how to adjust the block grant, which of course will depend on what is devolved and when. We have also set the funding floor at 115% for the duration of this Parliament.

James Morris: The black country economy in the west midlands has been one of the fastest growing sub-regions in the UK over the past few years, with new jobs and investment. Does the Chancellor agree that we need to continue to focus on investing in growth in the black country and avoid the economic risk that would come from us leaving the European Union?

George Osborne: I agree with my hon. Friend on both points. First, I think that there is an enormous amount of exciting news in the black country, with businesses there growing and creating jobs, and more investment is coming into the part of the country he represents so well. Secondly, I think that economic growth would be at risk if we left the European Union. We have today heard warnings from the chairman of the Federal Reserve, the head of Hitachi and the head of the World Trade Organisation, all telling us that there is a real economic risk for the UK if we vote to leave.

Fiona Mactaggart: What assessment has the Chancellor made of the impact on the British economy of overcrowding in airports in London and the south-east, and how much will further delay cost us?

George Osborne: It is absolutely clear that we need additional runway capacity in the south-east of England. That is what the Davies report suggested. Of course, the Government now need to come forward with a conclusion to that report, but we wanted to address the issue of air quality. When we raised that issue, some people asked whether it was necessary to look into it. If we look at the debates in the mayoral contest over the past few months, we see that air quality is an important issue to get right. We are close to finishing that work, and then we will report back on the Davies commission and future airport capacity.

John Bercow: Order. Before I call the hon. Member for Denton and Reddish (Andrew Gwynne) to put his urgent question, I should explain that, on account of the subsequent business, its importance and the likely level of subscription to it, the UQ will run for a maximum of half an hour, so the limits on the Front Benchers and Back Benchers involved do need to be observed.

NHS COMMISSIONING (PRE-EXPOSURE PROPHYLAXIS)

Andrew Gwynne: (Urgent Question): To ask the Under-Secretary of State for Health if she will make a statement on NHS commissioning in relation to HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis.

Jane Ellison: I am grateful for the opportunity to respond to this urgent question. As the House knows, HIV can be a devastating illness, and we know that pre-exposure prophylaxis—PrEP—can make a difference to those at risk of contracting HIV and to those who are already HIV positive. However, it is crucial that we have a full understanding of all the issues surrounding PrEP.
As with any new intervention, PrEP must be properly assessed in relation to clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness. That is why we have today asked NICE to conduct an evidence review of Truvada for PrEP of HIV in high-risk groups. This evidence review signifies the next step forward and will inform any subsequent decisions about commissioning. It will look at the evidence for effectiveness, safety, patient factors and resource implications. The NICE evidence summary will run alongside a pilot scheme in which we are investing up to £2 million. Public Health England is currently identifying the most effective places for the pilot to take place.
It is also important to remember that Truvada, the drug used for PrEP, is not yet licensed for this use in  the UK. That is why, as well as the pilot scheme, the Government want to see the evidence review, which  will help to inform future commissioning decisions about PrEP.
PrEP is only one of a range of activities designed to tackle HIV, which is of course a Government priority. It is also important to stress that the challenge remains of tackling high rates of some sexually transmitted infections, particularly in high-risk MSM—men who have sex  with men—communities. Our £2.4 million national HIV prevention and sexual health promotion programme gives those at highest risk the best advice to make safer choices about sex.
The UK has world-class treatment services and is already ahead in reaching two of the three UNAIDS goals of ensuring that we have 90% diagnosed infection, 90% of those diagnosed on treatment and 90% viral suppression by 2020. In 2014, 17% of those living with HIV had undiagnosed infection, but 91% of those diagnosed were on treatment, of whom 95% were virally suppressed. We are determined to continue to make real progress to meet these goals, and we are considering carefully the role that PrEP can play in helping us to get there.

Andrew Gwynne: I thank the Minister for that reply. This is a subject we do not debate enough in the House, and I am grateful to Mr Speaker for giving us the opportunity to debate it today.
Seventeen people are diagnosed with HIV every day. Each year, there are thousands of new infections. In the UK, there are more people living with HIV than ever before. We know that PrEP has the potential to be a game-changer—it has proved effective in stopping HIV  transmission in almost every case—yet as a result of this latest decision, this life-changing drug will remain inaccessible to people at risk of HIV. Does the Minister therefore share my concern about the precedent this decision sets in terms of NHS England shunting other preventive costs on to local government? Will she explain why pre-exposure prophylaxis is being dealt with differently, compared with the correct commissioning model for PEP, or post-exposure prophylaxis?
I want to ask the Minister three specific questions. First, does she accept that, under section 7A of the National Health Service Act 2006—a mechanism by which the Secretary of State can delegate power—the Health Secretary can give NHS England the power to commission PrEP? If so, why has he not done so? Secondly, if the Government expect local authorities to commission PrEP, how much additional funding will the Minister make available to them? Can we assume that there will be no further cuts to public health grants, or is this just a case of passing the responsibility and the financial buck? Thirdly, on the next steps, I understand that key stakeholders, including the National AIDS Trust, have written a joint letter to the Public Health Minister requesting an urgent meeting. Will she today agree to meet them to see whether a way forward can be found without the need for costly, protracted legal action?
PrEP has been described as the beginning of the end for the HIV epidemic. It is time for the Minister to show some leadership, to use the section 7A powers she has and to think again.

Jane Ellison: Some of the shadow Minister’s questions are simply ahead of the moment, as it were. As I said clearly in my statement, NHS England has made clear how it feels about being the commissioner, based on a legal argument that it has published. No decision has been made about who the commissioner is. Clearly, we need to reach a decision, and we discussed that earlier today in the Health Committee. However, there are a number of stages we have to go through—as I say, the drug is not even licensed for use as PrEP in the UK.
We have set out a series of stages we will go through, which will help to inform a final decision. On the questions the hon. Gentleman posed, we are not in a position to make a judgment. There is more we need to know about clinical effectiveness and cost-effectiveness and about the pilot—

Andrew Gwynne: We know.

Jane Ellison: No, that is not the case. There has been an important study—the PROUD study—but that looked at clinical effectiveness. There is a wider piece of work to be done—of which the pilot programme that we have announced is part—to enable us to understand where PrEP fits in in terms of clinical and cost-effectiveness, and how it fits into the HIV prevention landscape more broadly, alongside other HIV interventions that are commissioned. There is work yet to do, but we are not standing still. We have announced this important pilot and committed money to it, and we have asked NICE for an evidence review. All this will go into our consideration.

Mike Freer: I agree with the shadow Minister apart from on one thing, which is his asking my hon. Friend the Minister  to show leadership. Having campaigned on many male sexual health issues as chair of the all-party parliamentary group on HIV and AIDS, I can say that this Minister has been unfailingly supportive in addressing many of the issues facing not just men’s sexual health, but particularly gay men’s sexual health. I therefore take issue with that call for leadership.
Having said that, I have lost too many friends to AIDS over the years not to challenge NHS England’s decision not to fund PrEP. HIV infection rates in this country are on the increase and existing strategies are not working. It is not acceptable to suggest that we simply continue to do the same. I have a meeting with the Minister on 13 June. Will she agree to widen that to other stakeholders?

Jane Ellison: I thank my hon. Friend for his kind words. I take this issue extremely seriously. He is right to say that we face a challenge in relation to HIV rates, and particularly, as I said, STI rates in the high-risk MSM community. I stress again that while it will no doubt have an important part to play, PrEP is not a silver bullet for sexual infections, particularly in some of those high-risk groups. It is important to understand that.  We have to continue to look at a whole range  of measures. When I recently met the chief executive of the Terrence Higgins Trust, we touched on this.
As my hon. Friend says, we have a meeting coming up. I apologise for not responding to the shadow Minister’s question about meeting stakeholder groups. Of course I will meet all the key stakeholder groups. I have already had some formal and some informal discussions on this, but of course I am very open to having further such discussions. Stakeholders were involved in the process that NHS England has been involved in. NHS England has made its position clear, and there is a matter due to go before the courts on which I will not comment further. Yes, I will engage on this. Yes, of course I accept that we need to do more, and of course we all share the concerns about rising HIV infection rates, particularly among the MSM community. I too lost friends to the AIDS epidemic that my hon. Friend mentions. I take this issue extremely seriously, but we have to follow a sensible process, and that is what the Government are doing.

Philippa Whitford: Anyone in this House will be glad to see the results of the PROUD study and the 85% reduction in new infections. However, there is more to understand, in that we did not see a good response in heterosexual women. While over 40,000 HIV sufferers in the UK are men who have sex with men, 60,000 are heterosexual or bisexual, predominantly of African origin, and we need to think of them in this regard.
My main complaint is on the failure to go through a process of looking at clinical evidence and cost-effectiveness and then making a decision. Why was the company not encouraged to get through this earlier and go to NICE? I do not understand why we are only going to NICE now, because that gives the answer that we need. It is relatively poor of NHS England to have made the decision on the basis of, “It’s not our job—it’s your job.” That is the most insulting bit for the community. In Scotland, our Cabinet Secretary asked it to go through the European Medicines Agency, which it applied for in  February, and then the Scottish Medicines Consortium. It is on the right path now, but that is where we should have gone first.

Jane Ellison: It is probably worth clarifying that we asked NICE to undertake an evidence review, not a technology assessment. What drugs are licensed for are matters for drug companies to address. The Government do not initiate the process on whether a drug is licensed— the drug company must initiate it. It also worth noting that when a drug is licensed for a new purpose, as would be the case for Truvada in PrEP, the company could apply for the patent to be extended to cover this new use. Again, that is something that the drug company would do.
On the hon. Lady’s first point, I agree that we need to consider the impact on women in the circumstances she described. That is one of the arguments for carefully planning this pilot programme and taking those sorts of factors into account.

Andrew Murrison: The process that the Minister has outlined is correct, but does she recognise that the French Government have already approved Truvada for pre-exposure prophylaxis, and does she understand the urgency in this? The results of the UK PROUD study, funded by the MRC, are quite unequivocal, so we really need to get this going. Will she also reflect on the fact that the study showed no difference in the incidence of other sexually transmitted diseases, because Truvada does not protect against them, so the message has to go out that a condom is absolutely essential?

Jane Ellison: My hon. Friend is quite correct on his latter point about the impact of PrEP. Whether it was commissioned or not, and whoever it was commissioned by, we would still have the significant challenge that he describes around STIs. Drug-resistant gonorrhoea, for example, is a problem that we are increasingly aware of.
There are international comparisons that we can look at, as my hon. Friend mentions. I have looked at the matter in some detail, and the picture across the world is that many countries are in broadly the same position as the UK. They are trying to understand, leaving aside the question of clinical effectiveness, more about how PrEP can be used as part of an HIV prevention programme in broader cost-effectiveness terms, and how it compares in cost-effectiveness terms with other available interventions. My hon. Friend is right that there is work to do, and we are not resting easy on this. We are moving forward, and we are working on and planning these pilots now.

Ben Bradshaw: When does the Minister expect the damaging buck-passing between NHS England and local authorities, which is one of the disastrous results of the Health and Social Care Act 2012, to be resolved? Does she agree that it would be far more appropriate for NHS England to be the commissioner of something like PrEP than for local government to commission it? Finally, will she be very cognisant of the danger that we are going back to the bad old days when certain groups were stigmatised? Stigma is disastrous for public health policy, and it will result in an explosion of sexual disease in this country if we do not always  bear in mind the danger that decisions by NHS England—not just on this, but on drug treatment for hepatitis C —may have a disastrous impact on public health.

Jane Ellison: The NHS England position is based on a legal argument, and as the matter is likely to go before the courts, it is not really appropriate for me to comment further. There was a little discussion this morning on this subject in the Health Committee, for which some Members were present. I have laid out a process by which we will work out how and where this is commissioned. Clearly, we need to identify the commissioner.
I do not accept the right hon. Gentleman’s challenge about fragmentation, simply because if we look around the world at a series of very different health systems, we see that they are all going through broadly the same process of understanding where PrEP sits. There are a number of options, but first we need to go through this work. On his latter point about stigma, he is right to identify that it is a significant concern, but I do not accept that that is what this represents. He knows my personal commitment to tackling stigma, and we could not have made it clearer that addressing rising HIV rates, addressing STIs in the MSM community and looking at the challenges surrounding things such as chemsex are all very much front of mind, and we have given considerable time and thought to them. We must challenge stigma wherever it rears its head.

Philip Hollobone: Given the challenges of HIV, I think that my constituents would be excited by the prospects that PrEP offers. They would, however, be a little disturbed by the fact that every country in the world seems to be going through the same process, and duplicating, replicating and holding up what could be a very exciting development to combat the spread of HIV across Africa. Many countries are suffering from this far worse than we are, and they would be horrified by the thought that the process could get bogged down in a court when this treatment, if it were available, could do very real good.

Jane Ellison: My hon. Friend is right to recognise that PrEP has potential. It is, in fact, being used in some places internationally. The point I was making was that there is no simple, one-size-fits-all solution. Different countries have different challenges. For example, the level of HIV prevalence and the services available to manage that prevalence, and to manage testing, are very different in different countries. That forms different landscapes into which PrEP might fit. To give an example from Africa, PrEP was licensed last year, and it will be available for sex workers in selected sites. HIV prevalence among female sex workers is estimated to be just under 60% in South Africa. There are different contexts in which PrEP is being taken forward, and that is just one of them.

Helen Hayes: Local authorities’ public health budgets are being stretched to breaking point, and this is arguably one of the false economies of this Government’s approach, in terms of its impact. Does the Minister agree that in the context of such stretched budgets, the implication that local   authorities should fund PrEP is simply unworkable, and will she make it clear that her position is that NHS England is the natural commissioner of PrEP?

Jane Ellison: I have been very clear about NHS England’s position, and I have said that no decision has yet been made about commissioning. I do not accept the hon. Lady’s challenge about spending on public health. We have committed to spend £16 billion over the next five years on the public health grant. In addition to that, we have committed more than £1 billion this year alone in the section 7A agreement and £300 million on vaccines that we buy in the Department of Health, plus system-wide leadership through things such as the sugary drinks levy and the forthcoming childhood obesity strategy. All in all, this is the radical upgrade in prevention that was talked about in the NHS “Five Year Forward View”.

Ben Howlett: I join my hon. Friend the Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Mike Freer) in thanking the Minister for her work, and in particular for engaging with the LGBT community. I know that they are quite concerned about last week’s statement by NHS England. Given the disappointing outcome of NHS England’s PrEP review and the fact that we have the worst of all scenarios, which is effectively a legal challenge, will the Minister commit to finding a way round the NHS England decision while a new trial is under way? Does she agree that the accelerated medicines pathway could provide a perfect platform for bypassing the frustrating system that we are talking about?

Jane Ellison: I will reflect on the latter point with my hon. Friend the Minister for Life Sciences, who is sitting alongside me. I have made clear the NHS position on commissioning. The measures that I have announced today—the NICE evidence review and the trial that we are planning for, which we will move forward with later in the year—are all part of understanding how we get to the right decision. It is not something on which I will make a snap decision now, but we have set out a process by which we can get to that point.

Stephen Doughty: As a vice-chair of the all-party group on HIV and AIDS, I share many of the concerns expressed by the chair, the hon. Member for Finchley and Golders Green (Mike Freer). Many people in the LGBT community share our concerns about the current situation. Much as I respect the Minister, I was a little disappointed that she appeared to cast doubt on the efficacy of PrEP. As well as the PROUD study, there have been two other major studies, and 30,000 people are using PrEP in the US. There is clear evidence of its efficacy. Can the Minister give hope to people out there that this is not a political decision or a cost decision? Will she reverse it? Will she use her section 7A powers and take the right decision on this issue?

Jane Ellison: We have not made a decision on commissioning yet. We have laid out a pathway. Let me be clear: I completely understand and accept the point about clinical effectiveness. The point I was making was that there are wider considerations about how we commission something in the context of a whole series of HIV prevention services. That is slightly different  from clinical effectiveness, on which the PROUD study showed very good results. I am not saying that it is not clinically effective; we just have to understand more about how it sits in the context of everything else that we do, and we have to understand more about its cost-effectiveness. The modelling work that was undertaken indicated that PrEP can be cost-effective for some high-risk groups, but the period over which that cost-effectiveness pays back needs to be more broadly understood.

Stewart McDonald: I do not doubt the Minister’s commitment to this issue, but she has to understand how it looks to the outside world. This is a Government who brought forward legislation to ban poppers, for goodness’ sake, but it looks as though they have got their head in the sand over PrEP. Israel, Kenya, Canada, France and the United States all get it. Why are we so far behind?

Jane Ellison: The first point is a red herring, because I understand that the matter has been resolved. I do not accept the hon. Gentleman’s criticism. It is slightly disappointing, although I understand the reason for it in the context of this urgent question, that Members are forgetting that the UK has a world-leading position on HIV treatment in all the ways that I laid out in my response to the urgent question. Our movement towards the UNAIDS goals is very significant, so to say that the UK is somehow not a leader in HIV treatment and prevention is not right. We have clearly acknowledged that PrEP has a role to play, but we need to understand more about what that is.

Chris Elmore: Will the Minister clarify her previous answer in which she said that she is putting aside the clinical significance of this? I find it quite confusing that she can do that. Does she agree that although the UK has been a leader in HIV prevention for decades, our progress is under threat because of her decision? Will she now think again?

Jane Ellison: Not for the first time, may I clarify that no decision has been made about the commissioning of PrEP? I am therefore not sure why the hon. Gentleman would say that. I have been very clear about the clinical effectiveness. What I am saying is that there is more work to do to understand the wider cost-effectiveness of this in the context of the commissioning of HIV prevention more broadly.

Neil Coyle: My constituency falls wholly within the borough of Southwark, which has the second highest HIV prevalence in the country. What assessment are the Minister and the Department making of the potential impact of this policy change not only on my constituents, but on the long-term costs for the NHS if PrEP is not available?

Jane Ellison: There is no policy change and I have laid out the position. It is important to understand that even in the modelling work that has been done, PrEP is not a silver bullet. It has an important part to play, but it is not a silver bullet in terms of HIV prevention and it does not affect some of the broader issues that I mentioned in my response, for example in respect of STIs.

Greg Mulholland: This is another example of the over-cluttered, over-bureaucratic and confused system for approving drugs in this country.  May I draw the Minister’s attention to the fact that NHS England promised £2 million to allow 500 people to be treated in this way? Does she understand people’s dismay that it is now passing the buck and saying that it is down to local authorities, which we all know are incredibly cash-strapped?

Jane Ellison: The NHS is seeking clarity through the courts on its own position. No decision has been made about who will be the final commissioner for PrEP, so what the hon. Gentleman said is not quite right. The £2 million that has been committed to the pilot is important and will inform our understanding of this important intervention.

Fiona Mactaggart: Slough has an extraordinarily high incidence of HIV and AIDS, much of it undiagnosed. Our local authority is the smallest unitary authority in the country and has faced cuts to its central Government funding of 50%. It has no prospect of being able to fund a challenge of this size. Does the Minister understand that this delay in sorting out who will pay for PrEP will lead to the deaths of hundreds of people in Britain?

Jane Ellison: As I have mentioned, Truvada is not yet licensed for use as PrEP in this country. We have set out a process by which we can understand far more about how PrEP might fit into the landscape. The right hon. Lady mentioned undetected HIV. The Government have invested significant effort and funding into detecting HIV. We have the world’s first home testing service and last year we launched the major HIV innovation fund, which has come up with some new and extremely cutting-edge ideas on how to improve HIV detection and diagnosis. I fully accept that this is a major challenge in her area, but PrEP is only one part of a wider programme of work. [Interruption.]

John Bercow: I think his Whips are pleased to see the arrival of the right hon. Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Mr Hayes). He has never knowingly been keen to be hurried on anything.

Debbie Abrahams: Will the Minister clarify the timescale for the decisions? Evidence reviews and trials can take months and years, but clearly, as other Members have said, people do not have months and years. Will she tell us what the process and the timescales will be, so that we can be reassured—or not?

Jane Ellison: We would expect to get the evidence review that we have called for in the autumn. NHS England is already working on plans for the pilot programme, which will happen over a two-year period. We hope to get that under way towards the end of this year. Both those pieces of work are under way. We expect the pilots to be informed by the review, hence we want to get it back in a relatively short time.

Diana R. Johnson: I am flabbergasted that the Minister has come before the House today to say that the legislation that her Government introduced on the reorganisation of the NHS was so incompetent that NHS England is having to go to court  to work out who is entitled to commission these services. Can she tell us how much public money will be spent on the legal case?

Jane Ellison: I am not in a position to comment on that. I do not accept the hon. Lady’s central criticism. If she had been present at the Health Committee this morning, she would have heard an hour of evidence from myself, Duncan Selbie and Simon Stevens on how the new arrangements are making a significant difference to public health in this country and to the health of  the public.

POINTS OF ORDER

Andy McDonald: On a point of order, Mr Speaker. As you know, the SSI plant on Teesside closed, with the loss of 9,000 jobs. Lord Heseltine, the Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and the northern powerhouse Minister, the Under-Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government, the hon. Member for Stockton South (James Wharton) are in my constituency at the Riverside stadium, launching the noble Lord’s much-awaited report in response to that crisis. I received notification of that by email at 3.33 yesterday and a copy of the report at 6.20 this morning. In fairness, having contacted the Secretary of State, I accept that he is under the impression that I was contacted properly. However,  I assure the House that I was not. I have searched  for those emails. Colleagues have received them, but I  have not.
All I am asking for is some guidance, Mr Speaker. A report about my constituency is going to be delivered in my constituency. Can better direction be given to Ministers on how best they can communicate such activity to Members of Parliament, rather than assuming that it has been properly communicated through emails?

John Bercow: I say to the hon. Gentleman and the House that there is a firm convention that if a Member intends to visit the constituency of another Member on official business, as opposed to purely private or personal business, the Member whose constituency is being visited should be notified in advance. Nothing is written down anywhere, but it would be a courtesy to notify the Member sufficiently in advance that he or she could be present, or at least in the vicinity, in his or her constituency if it was so wished. That would rather depend on the circumstances of the event, but there should be proper notice.
In the case of Ministers, the requirement is stipulated in the ministerial code. If that has not been complied with in this case, it is regrettable. The hon. Gentleman has made his point and it will have been heard by those on the Treasury Bench. Doubtless it will be communicated, in the forceful terms in which he typically expresses himself, to the Secretary of State.
I hope that it will not be necessary for this point constantly to be raised and then underlined by me from the Chair. It is an elementary courtesy and I think that a lot of people who are listening to our proceedings will think, “Surely colleagues can treat each other in a civil and grown-up way, as would happen in other institutions.” Indeed, I note in the distance some agreement with the point I have just made.

Melanie Onn: On a point of order, Mr Speaker. I fear that I am going to disappoint you, because my point of order follows on from that exact point, although it does not relate to Ministers. I discovered that the hon. Members for Wellingborough (Mr Bone) and for Corby (Tom Pursglove) were in my constituency last week with the Grassroots Out campaign. They were not on official business, but were campaigning, and they failed to advise me in advance. Will you  remind all Members that, by convention, we notify each other in advance? I might not have wished to be there alongside them, however.
Another issue is that factually incorrect information was shared with my constituents. I am sure that the hon. Member for Wellingborough would be horrified to learn that he misled my constituents, in the same way that I am horrified. How can he correct that?

John Bercow: I am very grateful to the hon. Lady for her point of order. With reference to her last point about allegedly factually incorrect information being disseminated to her constituents, I am bound to say to her that that is a matter of politics. Although I do not know the people of Great Grimsby, I dare say they can bear with stoicism and fortitude the proffering of views to them with which their locally elected Member of Parliament may disagree. That is not a matter for the Chair. [Interruption.] I do not think it is fishy. However, a visit was undertaken, admittedly not by Ministers, but by Members engaged in professional business, and the hon. Lady should therefore have been notified.
Given the context of the EU referendum campaign, I recognise that there will be Members—including doubtless the hon. Members for Wellingborough (Mr Bone) and for Corby (Tom Pursglove)—who may well visit a great many constituencies in a concentrated period. Nevertheless, the convention is an important courtesy and should continue to apply. It is not very difficult or time consuming to comply with it, so I hope that colleagues on both sides of the House will do so from now on.

Stewart McDonald: On a point of order, Mr Speaker. The issue we have just discussed in the urgent question on pre-exposure prophylaxis is one that I and many other Members consider to be of huge national importance. Despite the effect of the drug, the numbers of people involved and the great national interest, Parliament has not actually substantially debated the issue aside from that urgent question. As a new Member of the House—I confess that I am still trying to get my head around this place, although I suspect I never will—may I ask whether it would be in order to seek a debate on PrEP under Standing Order No. 24 and, if it would be in order, how one might go about that?

John Bercow: It is certainly open to the hon. Gentleman to seek such a debate—there is nothing improper about it—but I know that he would not seek advance agreement from me in respect of an application that has not yet been made, the terms of which therefore cannot be  known to me and upon which it would therefore be wholly unreasonable to expect me to adjudicate. Apart from that, his point was all right.

Jane Ellison: It is devolved.

John Bercow: I also say to the hon. Gentleman that, as the Minister mentioned perfectly properly from a sedentary position, the issue is a devolved matter and can therefore be considered elsewhere, as well, but it is perfectly proper for it to be considered here. There are a range of opportunities for its consideration. The mechanism he mentions is a possible approach; there are also Backbench Business Committee debates, Adjournment debates and debates in the name of the relevant Opposition party. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman is on very good terms with the powers that be in his own party; if they judge it a sufficient priority, they might choose to nominate it as a subject for such a debate. Knowing the Minister as I do, I am sure that she would very courteously come along, if it was her responsibility to do so, to listen to the hon. Gentleman’s sonorous tones and speak as appropriate.

Stephen Doughty: Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker. You might be interested to know, as might other Members, that the all-party parliamentary group on HIV and AIDS is holding its own debate and inquiry on the issues under discussion in the urgent question this afternoon and tomorrow. I encourage all Members to attend.

John Bercow: What a helpful soul the hon. Gentleman is. He is a purveyor of public information, and we owe him a debt of gratitude.

BILL PRESENTED

Wales Bill

Presentation and First Reading (Standing Order No. 57)
Secretary Alun Cairns, Secretary Stephen Crabb, Secretary David Mundell, Mr Oliver Letwin and Greg Hands, presented a Bill to amend the Government of Wales Act 2006 and make provision about the functions of the Welsh Ministers, and for connected purposes.
Bill read the First time; to be read a Second time tomorrow, and to be printed (Bill 5) with explanatory notes (Bill 5-EN).

INVESTIGATORY POWERS BILL

[2nd Allocated Day]

Consideration of Bill, as amended in the Public Bill Committee
Clause 119

Bulk interception warrants

Anne McLaughlin: I beg to move amendment 390,page95,line27, leave out clause 119.

John Bercow: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 391,page96,line36, leave out clause 120.
Amendment 392,page97,line15, leave out clause 121.
Amendment 393,page98,line20, leave out clause 122.
Amendment 394,page98,line38, leave out clause 123.
Amendment 275,in clause 123, page99,line10, leave out from “must” to end of line 11, and insert
“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners.
Amendment 395,page99,line19, leave out clause 124.
Amendment 396,page99,line24, leave out clause 125.
Amendment 9,in clause 125, page99,line33, leave out subsection (4) and insert—
“(4) The operational purposes specified in the warrant must be ones specified, in a list maintained by the heads of the intelligence services, as purposes which they consider are operational purposes for which intercepted content or secondary data obtained under bulk interception warrants may be selected for examination.”
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to amend the Bill to provide for a designated list of operational purposes, such that only a purpose on that list may be specified in a warrant relating to bulk powers.
Amendment 10,page99,line37, leave out from “issued” to end of line 39 and insert
“are specified in the list mentioned in subsection (4).
(5A) An operational purpose may be specified in the list mentioned in subsection (4) only with the approval of the Secretary of State.
(5B) The Secretary of State may give such approval only if satisfied that the operational purpose is specified in a greater level of detail than the descriptions contained in section 121 subsections (1)(b) or (2).”
To make clear that the Secretary of State must approve all operational purposes specified on the list.
Amendment 11,page99,line39, at end insert—
“(5C) The list of operational purposes mentioned in subsection (4) must be reviewed at least annually by the Prime Minister.”
To ensure that the list of Operational Purposes is reviewed at least annually by the Prime Minister.
Amendment 12,page99,line39, at end insert—
“(5D) The Investigatory Powers Commissioner and Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC) will be kept informed of any changes to the list of Operational Purposes in a timely manner.
(5E) Subject to subsection 201(7), the Investigatory Powers Commissioner must include in his Annual Report a summary of those Operational Purposes which, during the period of his report, have been specified in any warrants issued under Parts 6 and 7.”
To ensure that the ISC and Commissioners are kept informed of changes to the list of Operational Purposes. To ensure that a summary of the Operational Purposes are published each year.
Amendment 397,page100,line2, leave out clause 126.
Amendment 398,page100,line10, leave out clause 127.
Amendment 22, in clause 127,page100,line12, leave out
“before it would otherwise cease to have effect”
and insert “during the renewal period”.
See amendment 20.
Amendment 23,page100,line34, at end insert—
“(2A) ‘The renewal period’ means the period of 30 days ending with the day at the end of which the warrant would otherwise cease to have effect.”
See amendment 20.
Amendment 153,page101,line9, leave out clause 128.
Amendment 154,page102,line25, leave out clause 129.
Amendment 401,page103,line8, leave out clause 130.
Amendment 402,page103,line31, leave out clause 131.
Amendment 403,page104,line19, leave out clause 132.
Amendment 404,page105,line44, leave out clause 133.
Amendment 405,page106,line24, leave out clause 134.
Amendment 406,page108,line1, leave out clause 135.
Amendment 407,page108,line29, leave out clause 136.
Amendment 408,page108,line39, leave out clause 137.
Amendment 409,page109,line16, leave out clause 138.
Amendment 410,page110,line40, leave out clause 139.
Amendment 212,in clause 139, page110,line42, leave out
“review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to the following matters”
and insert “determine”.
Amendment 213,page111,line7, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 278,page111,line7, leave out from “must” to end of line 8, and insert “subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners. This amendment is an alternative to amendments 212 and 213 (which are a package).
Amendment 411,page111,line16, leave out clause 140.
Amendment 412,page111,line21, leave out clause 141.
Amendment 413,page112,line2, leave out clause 142.
Amendment 414,page112,line10, leave out clause 143.
Amendment 155,page113,line9, leave out clause 144.
Amendment 156,page114,line19, leave out clause 145.
Amendment 417,page115,line2, leave out clause 146.
Amendment 418,page115,line25, leave out clause 147.
Amendment 419,page116,line7, leave out clause 148.
Government amendments 44 to 47.
Amendment 420,page116,line35, leave out clause 149.
Amendment 421,page117,line11, leave out clause 150.
Amendment 422,page118,line39, leave out clause 151.
Amendment 423,page119,line8, leave out clause 152.
Amendment 424,page119,line36, leave out clause 153.
Amendment 425,page120,line10, leave out clause 154.
Amendment 426,page121,line33, leave out clause 155.
Amendment 427,page122,line4, leave out clause 156.
Amendment 428,page123,line1, leave out clause 157.
Amendment 214,in clause 157, page123,line3, leave out
“review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to the following matters”
and insert “determine”.
Amendment 215,page123,line15, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 281,page123,line15, leave out from “must” to end of line 16, and insert
“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners.
Amendment 429,page123,line24, leave out clause 158.
Amendment 430,page123,line41, leave out clause 159.
Amendment 431,page124,line34, leave out clause 160.
Amendment 432,page125,line3, leave out clause 161.
Amendment 433,page125,line25, leave out clause 162.
Amendment 434,page126,line3, leave out clause 163.
Amendment 157,page127,line1, leave out clause 164.
Government amendments 127 and 128.
Amendment 158,page128,line14, leave out clause 165.
Amendment 437,page129,line1, leave out clause 166.
Amendment 438,page129,line25, leave out clause 167.
Amendment 439,page130,line14, leave out clause 168.
Amendment 440,page131,line33, leave out clause 169.
Amendment 441,page132,line3, leave out clause 170.
Government amendment 129.
Amendment 442,page133,line30, leave out clause 171.
Amendment 443,page134,line12, leave out clause 172.
Amendment 444,page134,line19, leave out clause 173.
Government amendment 130.
Government new clause 14—Health records.
New clause 3—Restriction on use of class bulk personal dataset warrants—
“(1) An intelligence service may not retain, or retain and examine, a bulk personal dataset in reliance on a class bulk personal dataset warrant if the head of the intelligence service considers—
(a) that the bulk personal dataset includes a large quantity of sensitive personal data, or
(b) that the nature of the bulk personal dataset, or the circumstances in which it was created, is or are such that its retention, or retention and examination, by the intelligence service raises issues which ought to be considered by the Secretary of State and a Judicial Commissioner on an application by the head of the intelligence service for a specific BPD warrant.
(2) An intelligence service may not retain, or retain and examine, greater than twenty distinct bulk personal datasets in reliance on any class BPD warrant.
(3) In subsection (1) ‘sensitive personal data’ means personal data consisting of information about an individual (whether living or deceased) which is of a kind mentioned in section 2(a) to (f) of the Data Protection Act 1998.”
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to place greater restrictions on the use of Class BPD warrants in relation to the retention/examination of sensitive personal data (relating to race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, health, or sexual orientation). To cap the number of datasets which may be covered by any Class warrant.
Amendment 445,page135,line4, leave out clause 174.
Amendment 446,page135,line21, leave out clause 175.
Amendment 447,page135,line37, leave out clause 176.
Amendment 448,page136,line9, leave out clause 177.
Amendment 303,in clause 177, page136,line44, at end insert—
“(5) Subsection (6) applies where a warrant application under this section relates to ‘patient information’ as defined in s.251(10) of the National Health Service Act 2006, or relating to ‘mental health’, ‘adult social care’, ‘child social care’, or ‘health services’ as defined by the Health and Social Care Act 2012.
(6) The Secretary of State may issue the warrant only if—
(a) there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the retention, or (as the case may be) the examination, of material referred to in subsection (5); and
(b) specific arrangements have been made for the handling, retention, use, destruction and protection against unauthorised disclosure of such material”.
An amendment to restrict the retention of patient information obtained under provisions in this Bill.
Amendment 449,page137,line1, leave out clause 178.
Amendment 24,in clause 178, page137,line17, leave out “and” and insert—
“(aa) a statement outlining the extent to which sensitive personal data as defined by section [Restriction on use of class BPD warrants] is expected to be part of the bulk personal dataset, and”.
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to require specific BPD warrant applications to set out the extent to which datasets may include sensitive personal data (relating to race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, health, or sexual orientation), in order that the Secretary of State may properly assess the proportionality of obtaining the dataset.
Amendment 304,page138,line2, at end insert—
“(8) Subsection (6) applies where a warrant application under this section relates to ‘patient information’ as defined in s.251(10) of the National Health Service Act 2006, or relating to ‘mental health’, ‘adult social care’, ‘child social care’, or ‘health services’ as defined by the Health and Social Care Act 2012.
(9) The Secretary of State may issue the warrant only if—
(a) there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the retention, or (as the case may be) the examination, of material referred to in subsection (5); and
(b) specific arrangements have been made for the handling, retention, use, destruction and protection against unauthorised disclosure of such material.”
An amendment to restrict the retention of patient information obtained under provisions in this Bill.
Amendment 450,page138,line3, leave out clause 179.
Amendment 216,in clause 179, page138,line5, leave out
“review the Secretary of State’s conclusions as to the following matters”
and insert “determine”.
Amendment 217,page138,line22, leave out subsection (2).
Amendment 284,page138,line22, leave out from “must” to end of line 23, and insert
“subject a person’s decision to issue a warrant under this Chapter to close scrutiny to ensure that the objective in issuing a warrant is sufficiently important to justify any limitation of a Convention right”.
An amendment to clarify the role of judicial commissioners. This amendment is an alternative to amendments 216 and 217 (which are a package).
Amendment 451,page138,line31, leave out clause 180.
Amendment 452,page139,line4, leave out clause 181.
Amendment 453,page140,line1, leave out clause 182.
Amendment 454,page140,line15, leave out clause 183.
Amendment 455,page141,line4, leave out clause 184.
Amendment 456,page141,line26, leave out clause 185.
Amendment 159,page142,line13, leave out clause 186.
Amendment 160,page143,line22, leave out clause 187.
Amendment 459,page144,line7, leave out clause 188.
Amendment 460,page144,line25, leave out clause 189.
Amendment 461,page146,line2, leave out clause 190.
Amendment 462,page147,line5, leave out clause 191.
Amendment 463,page147,line21, leave out clause 192.
Amendment 305,in clause 192, page147,line42, at end insert—
“(4A) A direction under subsection (3) may only be made for material relating to ‘patient information’ as defined in s.251(10) of the National Health Service Act 2006, or relating to ‘mental health’, ‘adult social care’, ‘child social care’, or ‘health services’ as defined by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 if the Secretary of State considers that—
(a) there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the retention, or (as the case may be) the examination, of such material; and
(b) that specific arrangements have been made for the handling, retention, use, destruction and protection against unauthorised disclosure of such material.”
An amendment to restrict the retention of patient information obtained under provisions in this Bill.
Amendment 464,page148,line37, leave out clause 193.

Anne McLaughlin: Part 6 of the Bill, on bulk powers, is perhaps one of its most controversial parts. The Scottish National party is calling for part 6 to be shelved along with part 7 until such time as an argument for their inclusion has been demonstrated by an independent review of their proportionality and operative necessity—that is to say that we believe that the powers in part 6 should be removed from the Bill until a satisfactory operational case is made for them.
The review the Government have agreed to is most welcome but they must get it right. It must be conducted properly if it is to be of any value to the process of parliamentary scrutiny or is to secure the public’s confidence in its conclusions. Yesterday we had sight of some more detail about the review, in a letter from the Minister  to the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer). We were particularly pleased to note that one of the review team will be a barrister who has a great deal of experience working as a special  advocate acting against the Government in terrorism cases. That degree of balance is good and is to be welcomed.
The review needs to be given the time to do a thorough job, however, and we simply do not believe that three months is long enough. Even if it were, it would not be the first time we have been promised a date by which a report will be published, only then to be given another, and another.

John Hayes: I thank the hon. Lady for the warm words she is offering, which reflect the spirit in which this debate has been conducted throughout. The review will be conducted in the timeframe she describes because the Government are clear that it should take place while the Bill is live and is enjoying its passage through both Houses of Parliament. It would have been quite inappropriate to have a review once the Bill had passed into law.

Anne McLaughlin: I would argue that the review should have happened before now. Even if it is completed within three months, that will not be while scrutiny of the Bill is taking place here by elected Members; the scrutiny will be in the other place by Members of the House of Lords, who are not elected.
We are also confident that the review’s findings will not be significantly different from those of the reviews carried out by other countries, which I will come on to in a moment. In other words, it is likely to find that bulk powers are not necessary and give us no unique information that could not be garnered by other investigative techniques. Regarding those other techniques, the Government are arguing that new clause 5 will mean that bulk powers will be used only when other investigative techniques show up nothing, because the new clause recognises the importance of privacy to the individual—indeed, new clause 5 has been dubbed the privacy clause.

Simon Hoare: Although I served on the Bill Committee, the hon. Lady must forgive my ignorance. She mentioned other means aside from bulk powers. Is she going to delineate those to the House?

Anne McLaughlin: If the hon. Gentleman would care to exercise a little patience, he might get the answer to that. He might not, mind you. [Laughter.] No, he will. I am joking.
I understand that the Government are arguing that new clause 5 is a privacy clause, but how can we trust their commitment to privacy when between the publication of the draft Bill and the publication of this Bill the significant change to deal with the need for privacy to be of primary importance entailed simply changing the name of part 1 from “General Protections” to “General Privacy Protections”? This is not about words, but about intent, action and commitment, and inserting one word appeases no one.

Lucy Frazer: First, is the hon. Lady aware that there is a sunset clause? Secondly, if the powers are not available to be exercised but it is found that they are necessary, there will be a gap in our security services’ ability to combat terrorism and in the police’s ability to combat serious crime.

Anne McLaughlin: I will come on to that point shortly.
The fundamental point is this: why should we as Members of Parliament be expected to vote through legislation that is to be reviewed? That seems an unprofessional way—to say the least—to do business, and I would feel very uncomfortable crossing my fingers and hoping for the best. I also appeal to Labour colleagues to be a little more circumspect about trusting this Government with their votes today.
Let us take a look at one of the countries I mentioned earlier that has already reviewed bulk powers—the USA. The Snowden revelations revealed that the National Security Agency was running a bulk domestic telephone records programme. The NSA and others put up a strong case for maintaining it. The NSA produced a dossier of 54 counter-terrorism events in which, it said, bulk powers contributed to success in countering terrorism, but two entirely independent American bodies reviewed all 54 counter-terrorism cases and determined that only 12 had any relevance to the use of bulk powers under section 215 of the USA Patriot Act 2001.
One of those groups—the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies, which is a very well respected, high-powered and independent body, set up under the auspices of President Obama—concluded:
“Our review suggests that the information contributed to terrorist investigations by the use of section 215…was not essential to preventing attacks and could readily have been obtained in a timely manner using conventional section 215 orders.”
The other body—the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board—concluded similarly. It said that it had
“not identified a single instance involving a threat to the United States in which the program”—
meaning the use of bulk powers—
“made a concrete difference in the outcome of a counterterrorism investigation.”
It went further, saying that it was
“aware of no instance in which the program directly contributed to the discovery of a previously unknown terrorist plot or the disruption of a terrorist attack.”
Whatever I think the outcome of the review will be—none of us knows, because it has not happened—it is none the less a recognition that the Government have failed to convince both the House and wider society of the necessity of the powers.

Joanna Cherry: Does my hon. Friend agree that it is vital that the independent review looks at the American experience, given that America is one of our chief allies? Does she also agree that the Opposition should seek an assurance from the Government that the independent review will do so?

Anne McLaughlin: It would be very helpful if the Opposition secured that. We should not just follow suit—we support the review, but will not say, “Do as America does.” We must conduct our own review. Given the extent to which the Americans have looked at this, we need the same access.

Lucy Frazer: Will the hon. Lady give way?

Anne McLaughlin: May I continue? I have already given way to the hon. and learned Lady and am conscious of the need to let other Members speak. I will possibly give way a wee bit later.
The review is welcome—of course it is, not least because it is hoped that David Anderson QC will do what Liberty and others have called for and use the opportunity properly to challenge the evidence and produce a thorough, comprehensive and unbiased examination of the necessity of all bulk powers in the Bill. However, the review was called for long ago by Liberty and other respectable organisations. The Government could and should have completed it before asking MPs to vote for the Bill.
When we are dealing with proposals that are so broad—the proposal is effectively for bulk data harvesting from mainly innocent citizens—it is incumbent on the Government to prove that there is an operational case and that the powers are necessary, and to ensure that the safeguards in place are rigorous. The Government have neither proven the operational case for the powers nor have they delivered safeguards and oversight of sufficient calibre to make the powers justifiable.

Dominic Grieve: Will the hon. Lady give way?

Anne McLaughlin: I will give way to the right hon. and learned Gentleman but I am trying not to give way too often.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the hon. Lady. As I indicated when I spoke on Second Reading, I appreciate that bulk powers are controversial, but I am absolutely sure that we do not conduct data harvesting in this country. It simply does not happen. The use of bulk powers is not for that purpose, but for the purpose of examining material. Even though that may be done in bulk, it is done in a way that does not amount to the generalised harvesting of data for their examination. It simply is not.

Anne McLaughlin: My answer to that is simply that if the Bill allows for bulk data harvesting, it can still happen. We cannot sit here and say, “No, it will never happen.”
The SNP argument is not to do down our security services or anyone else working to keep our constituents safe. We argue that we would fail as a Parliament if we assert our power on behalf of our constituents and fail to place proper limitations on the scope of the state to interfere in the lives of innocent private citizens.

Andrew Murrison: Will the hon. Lady give way?

Anne McLaughlin: I will not give way at the moment—I have given way too many times and others want to speak.
To use an illustrative analogy, if we were to authorise the opening, scanning and retention of all mail via a particular post office in the hope that one day we could go back once we had found, via another investigative technique, a suspicion about a certain user of that post office, our constituents would rightly be marching on this place demanding that we stop such an outrage. Do the Government really believe that people using that post office would be content to believe that all was well as long as the letters were stored in a big safe to which only the good guys had the key, or that they would be  read only after a warrant was required? I do not believe so—people are not that daft and, strangely, for some unknown reason, they are not that trusting—yet the Government are asking us to focus on the issue of access and examination, and to ignore the massive combine harvester in the room, meaning bulk data collection. Government Members may well groan, but we are entitled to express our opinions on the Bill and to scrutinise the legislation rigorously.
On the Government’s own terms, that abuse of public privacy is of very limited use anyway. Targeted powers are far more effective and could resolve many of the privacy concerns. If we have a justifiable case to access information, we already know who we should be targeting for data collection. Why are we wasting time and resources using bulk techniques for that collection?

Seema Kennedy: Will the hon. Lady give way?

Anne McLaughlin: I will give way because the hon. Lady asks so nicely.

Seema Kennedy: The hon. Lady referred to known targets, but surely one advantage of bulk data gathering is finding those unknown people out there who wish to do us harm.

Anne McLaughlin: I wonder how the hon. Lady believes we will do that. The evidence reviewed by the Committee showed that bulk powers are counter-productive because the sheer scale of the data makes them impossible to analyse adequately. In fact, I believe the Government used the limited capacity of the security services to analyse bulk quantities of data as a form of assurance, which was strange to say the least.

John Hayes: I say this to be helpful to the hon. Lady. I fear that the debate has moved on and she has not. The truth of the matter is that the bulk powers she describes were considered by the Intelligence and Security Committee, which is chaired by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). It established that there was both validity and necessity. She is arguing a general case on bulk rather than the case for safeguards. The debate we ought to be having is about safeguards, is it not?

Anne McLaughlin: I thank the Minister for that advice and will pass it on to my constituents, who have the same concerns as I do and whose concerns I am expressing.
As we know, the Bill is supposed to be a basis for the use of those techniques for quite some time, and we are not future-proofing the Bill if we say that it is absolutely fine to have intrusive bulk techniques because now, in 2016, we do not have the technical capabilities to analyse all the data. Some present-day practices are reliant on 32-year-old laws—they date back to 1984, of all years. If we get the measure wrong, there is every possibility that we will enshrine in law invasive practices that will become feasible only at some point in the next 32 years.
Perhaps the most worrying powers of part 6 refer to bulk equipment interference, which the Government helpfully outline as follows:
“bulk equipment interference is not targeted against particular person(s), organisation(s) or location(s) or against equipment that is being used for particular activities”.
It is therefore an indiscriminate form of interference that leaves systems vulnerable, not only to our own security services using their powers sparingly and proportionately, but to those looking to cause harm and to profit from broken security. If the front door of someone’s house has been kicked in by the police, criminals are not prevented from entering after their departure.
Our concerns regarding the bulk powers provisions in part 6 are connected to many of our concerns regarding the use of bulk datasets. At the heart of the matter is the retention of intimate personal details regarding the tens of millions of ordinary citizens of this country who do not merit such information being held by the state. We welcome the review of the use of bulk powers and recognise that other parts of the Bill impact on part 6 —it cannot stand in isolation. If bulk datasets are acquired by other mechanisms in the Bill, how are they to be dealt with and properly handled? Therefore, as we have stressed throughout, the Bill should be easy to understand, and should clarify what is permitted and what is not. We should not provide a mechanism whereby we rubber stamp practices that were never previously debated.
Again, the offline analogy is instructive. If we were asked by the state to deposit our membership forms for various organisations—political parties, campaign groups, golf clubs—or forms with our direct debit details, health records and other such bulk information into a big safe on the understanding that only the security services would have access to it, we would rightly baulk at such a proposal. Just because such a system is being proposed online and without the consent of the individuals concerned does not make it acceptable—in many ways, it makes it much worse. I hope the Minister will address that comparison.
There are also very real dangers that the analysis of bulk personal datasets may lead to suspects being wrongly identified, based on stereotypical or discriminatory assumptions. Some of the biggest miscarriages of justice in these islands, including that of the Birmingham Six, have been carried out on precisely the assumptions that predicate the analysis of bulk datasets—people who ticked all the right boxes and yet just happened to be entirely innocent.
It is not that the Government are not aware of the problems they are creating. The principles of targeting and specific warranting appear in various guises throughout the Bill. The Government need to fully embrace both principles and apply them to the collection, storage and analysis of data. If they fail to do so—and so far they have failed—and if they still cannot prove the operational necessity of these intrusions into the private lives of everyday citizens—and so far they have not proven that—then they should not expect the support of this House for those measures. It is not acceptable, or it should not be acceptable, for any Government to ask for proposed legislation that is about to be reviewed to be nodded through.
Every year in this and the other place, these Houses play out, in all their finery, the historic role of Parliament in limiting the powers of the Executive. Let us remember that role when we vote on the unprecedented extension of powers in the Bill.

Dominic Grieve: It is a pleasure to be able to participate in today’s debate. I will move the amendments standing in the name of the Intelligence and Security Committee in a moment, but I would not be doing justice to this afternoon’s debate, on a matter of great and legitimate public interest and importance, if I were not to seek briefly to respond to the perfectly reasonable fears expressed by the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin).
Those fears highlight the difficulty we have in this country—certainly for Members of Parliament, but I dare say also for members of the public and certainly for non-governmental organisations interested in civil liberties—in reconciling an assessment of what the agencies may be doing in relation to bulk powers, with what those of us who have become privy to classified information by virtue of our work actually see is happening in reality. I am not sure that this is a gap that is very easy to bridge. I can only do my best to explain to the House and to the hon. Lady how I see the system working.
In an ideal world, it would always be better if we used targeted interception. If we know what it is we are trying to intercept and have reasonable grounds that are necessary and proportionate for doing so, then clearly that is what we should be aiming to do. The reality, however, is that the use of the internet today, in respect of the transfer of information, is of such an order that if there were not bulk powers to enable the agencies to look to intercept bulk and then search it to find what they are looking for, it would in practice be very difficult for the agencies to defend our security against espionage and, in particular, terrorism. That is the reality.
That point has been made repeatedly, including in public by agency heads. When Sir Iain Lobban gave evidence to the Intelligence and Security Committee, the only time it held a public hearing, he explained that the idea that there is bulk harvesting of data in order to carry out a detailed examination of them is, in fact, fanciful. That is not what is happening. What is happening is that there may be the retention of a bulk group of data in which in reality the vast majority—in fact, probably over 99%—will never be looked at, except in so far as it exists as a few digits on a screen. Ultimately, the agencies are interested in the nugget—or, as he described it, the needle in the haystack—that they are actually looking for. The idea that the privacy of an individual will be compromised if it just so happens that their internet traffic is caught in that particular net is simply not real. That is the reality of what goes on.
If I may say so to the hon. Lady and to the House, I do not really think that that is very different from what was probably going on 100 years ago when somebody suspected there might be a letter in a mailbag coming down from Glasgow to London. They could identify some of the markers on it and the handwriting, so they took an entire mailbag, tipped it out and looked to see if they could find the letter they were looking for. They then put all the other letters back in the mailbag and sent it on. The only realistic difference is that at the moment we do not have to stop the mailbag, because the mail can be transferred and we can simply retain the data somewhere else.
I appreciate that this is an area where people will legitimately be anxious that this could be capable of misuse. Of course, the hon. Lady is right that it could be capable of misuse. Anybody in this House who wants to  raise concerns about misuse is raising a perfectly legitimate point. The question is what safeguards we can properly put in legislation, and through the framework we create in a democratic and free society, to try to ensure that that misuse will not and does not occur. The Intelligence and Security Committee, of which I am the Chairman, is part of the process of trying to ensure that there is no such misuse.

Joanna Cherry: I am listening very carefully to the right hon. and learned Gentleman, because he is very knowledgeable in these areas. Is he aware that during the currency of the Public Bill Committee, The Guardian published an internal newsletter from MI6 from September 2011, which said that individuals within MI6 had been
“crossing the line with their database use…looking up addresses in order to send birthday cards, checking passport details to organise personal travel, checking details of family members for personal convenience…check the personal details of colleagues when filling out service forms on their behalf”?
Is he aware that there is internal recognition of misuse of data within the security services?

Dominic Grieve: Yes, I was aware of that. That has, I think, been public knowledge for some time. So far as I am concerned, as the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, we take that very seriously. Indeed, I believe the agencies took the matter very seriously as well, and that those involved were disciplined. The point was made that however innocent the activity of looking up one’s friend’s address might appear, it was not an acceptable thing to do. I certainly agree. That was one reason why, yesterday, I highlighted the issue of offences and was pleased to get the response from my hon. Friends on the Treasury Bench that they were taking this issue seriously. I worry that the penalties attached to some of the potential offences appear to be insufficient. I fully understand the point the hon. and learned Lady makes, but we must be a bit careful before we translate what appears to have happened in such cases into a belief that there is systematic abuse of the data sets that may be held—that is what we are talking about—by agencies, and that the material in them is being misused or put to some nefarious purpose that is not legitimate for the purposes of national security.

James Cleverly: Is it not the case that there are many things in public life—the police, computers, firearms and so on—that have the potential for misuse, but that the potential for misuse is not a reason to eradicate them from public life? It is a reason to ensure there is a robust framework and—this is the point my right hon. and learned Friend is making—a proper system of penalties for misuse, rather than just scrapping a whole capability because of potential future misuse.

Dominic Grieve: Yes, I agree entirely. I am afraid that, because human society is not perfect, eradicating every instance of misconduct by public servants is likely to be impossible. We therefore have to ensure proper safeguards and ethics. Here I simply repeat what I said before. My own experience is that the ethical standards of the agencies are very high; that is not to say that one does not have to be vigilant about maintaining those standards, or that there might not have been instances where their ethical standards slipped, but everything I and, I think,  my fellow members of the ISC have seen has constantly reassured us that those ethical standards are at the heart of what they do. I recollect Sir Iain Lobban saying that if he had asked his staff at GCHQ to do something unethical, they simply would not have done it. He said they would have refused, had he made the request of them.
I simply say that about the framework. I now turn to our amendments, the first group of which consists of amendments 9 to 12 and deals with an issue that goes to the heart of bulk powers: operational purposes. In the ISC’s report on the draft Bill, we were critical of what appeared to us to be the lack of transparency around operational purposes, which are of the utmost importance—this picks up on what the hon. Member for Glasgow North East said—as they provide the justification for examining material collected using bulk powers. If it falls outside legitimate operational purposes, one cannot examine it. We therefore recommended that in some form and in a manner consistent with safeguarding security—the two things are often difficult to reconcile—the list ought, so far as possible, to be published. We also recommended that the ISC have a role on behalf of Parliament in scrutinising the full classified list of operational purposes.
We were also concerned, when we investigated the matter further, that in some cases the nature of the list of operational purposes lacked clarity, as did the procedures for managing it, which seemed largely informal, particularly those for adding an operational purpose to the list. As matters stand now, that can effectively be done by a senior officer in the organisation. Our amendments  are therefore intended to give effect to our original recommendations for greater scrutiny and transparency, while also trying to create a formal mechanism for the establishment, management, modification and review of the list of operational purposes.

John Hayes: I anticipated that my right hon. and learned Friend would raise this matter, given that he puts such emphasis on his report. I am absolutely committed to considering the matter in the way he describes, and I am prepared to say now that we will go away and consider his amendments, with a view to introducing further amendments to the Bill to satisfy him and his Committee on this issue.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister and will keep that in mind, but so that the House might understand, I will just take it through what we proposed.
Amendment 9 sets out:
“The operational purposes specified in the warrant must be ones specified, in a list maintained by the heads of the intelligence services, as purposes which they consider are operational purposes for which intercepted content or secondary data obtained under bulk interception warrants may be selected for examination.”
That is to formalise the process, which at the moment we think is too informal. Under amendment 10, an
“operational purpose may be specified in the list…only with the approval of the Secretary of State.”
We think that when an operational purpose is added to the list, it should go through the Secretary of State and be signed off by her. My understanding—I hope that  the Minister will confirm this in due course—is that the Government do not see any significant problem with introducing such a system.

John Hayes: indicated assent.

Dominic Grieve: I see the Minister nodding; I am grateful to him.
Amendment 10 also states:
“The Secretary of State may give such approval only if satisfied that the operational purpose is specified in a greater level of detail than the descriptions contained in section 121”.
That is to ensure that the Minister understands what the agency is asking for in adding an operational purpose to its list.

Tom Elliott: Going back to amendment 9, is the right hon. and learned Member confident that the list will not be too prescriptive—in other words, that those who want to find a way around it, will be able to do so?

Dominic Grieve: I do not think the list should be too prescriptive. It will clearly be flexible. From my understanding of the list and what I know about the existing lists, they do have flexibility and can be added to and subtracted from. They are the day-to-day operational purposes for examining bulk data. That is what should be there. At the moment, it is something of an informal process; there is no suggestion that it is not being followed properly, but I think it needs to be formalised a bit more, which is what the amendments are intended to do. Amendment 11 states:
“The list of operational purposes…must be reviewed at least annually by the Prime Minister.”
Amendment 12, which has caused the Government greater—and understandable—difficulty, would put in place the following requirement:
“The Investigatory Powers Commissioner and Intelligence and Security Committee”—
that is us—
“will be kept informed of any changes to the list of Operational Purposes in a timely manner.”
I always stress that the Committee is not there to monitor the activities of the intelligence agencies in real time; it is outside our remit to do so, as the Executive has to get on with its decision making, but we have the power to look at virtually everything we want—unless the Prime Minister denies us access, which has never happened in my time as Chairman—and the right to ask for material and to be briefed on what has happened in the past.
My impression is that the Government have no great objection to letting us see, on an annual basis, how the list has been reviewed, but we took the view that “timely” meant a bit more frequently than that. To make our position clear to the Minister and the Treasury Bench, we think that we ought to be kept informed of any changes not necessarily the day after they happen but certainly within a reasonable timeframe so that we might follow the changes that take place. The merit is that because we can, if necessary, call an evidence session and ask the head of an agency to come and explain to us what has been going on, we could provide  reassurance to the House that the system was being operated correctly. I want to emphasise that that is the purpose of the amendment.
I do not expect the Minister to give me a completely positive response to amendment 12 today—he has kindly intervened already—but I would like him to provide an assurance that the Government will give this careful consideration and come up with a solution that enables the ISC to do its job. If he cannot, I might have to press the amendment to a vote, which I do not particularly want to do

John Hayes: My right hon. and learned Friend is right to anticipate that this is the issue that has troubled us most of all his Committee’s many sensible proposals. From what he has said, I know he will understand that the balance to be struck is between that kind of proper scrutiny and ongoing security operations, which clearly require that consideration of operational purposes be a dynamic matter. It is critical that we strike that balance, but I hear the tone and tenor of his remarks and I am happy to say that the Government will consider the matter carefully and continue our discussions with him.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister. On that basis, I think that these will be probing amendments, but I hope the matter can be properly resolved as the Bill goes through another place.
Amendment 12 states that the
“Investigatory Powers Commissioner must include in his Annual Report a summary of those Operational Purposes”.
Those would likely be more limited than the full list, but it would help to have some broad understanding.
I must take a moment on new clause 3, given that it deals with such an important matter. In the ISC’s report, we recommended that class bulk personal dataset warrants be removed from the Bill on the basis that the potential intrusion into privacy was sufficient to require that each distinct dataset should require specific approval by Ministers. However, we then had further evidence—as has happened in the dialogue with the Government and the agencies—in particular from the Secret Intelligence Service, about the rationale for retaining class warrants in the Bill. In particular, the evidence highlighted the fact that many of these datasets covered the same information or type of information. In those circumstances, we considered that a class warrant would be appropriate, as the privacy considerations were identical.
However, were we to accept class warrants for bulk personal datasets, we would need safeguards to ensure that their use was limited. We therefore proposed three restrictions. The first relates to the most sensitive personal data, using the definitions in the Data Protection Act 1998, and would prohibit the retention of any dataset containing a significant quantity of data relating to a person’s race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, physical or mental health, or sexual life. The second restriction relates to bulk personal datasets that are somehow novel or out of the ordinary. In those circumstances, we would not consider a class warrant to be appropriate, so subsection (1)(b) of new clause 3 is designed to ensure that such cases will be referred to the Secretary of State and the commissioners by way of a specific warrant.
Finally, we express concern that we should not end up with bulk personal dataset inflation and have suggested that bulk personal dataset warrants should be limited to 20 individual datasets. I emphasise to the House that that is a completely arbitrary figure in many ways. If the Government have an alternative approach, I am more than happy to listen. I accept that if we impose a limit of 20, it is possible that the Home Secretary might be asked to sign two identical bulk personal dataset warrants in one go, if they are expecting to pick up 40. However, it seems to me that there needs to be some numerical cap, above all to ensure that the Home Secretary or Foreign Secretary, depending on who it is, is aware of what is being collected.
I would emphasise that we have seen the entire list of bulk personal datasets and we have never been of the opinion that anything is being collected that is not legitimate, and some of it, I can tell the House, is pretty mundane as well. That said, it is right that the House should exercise some caution about the expansion of those datasets, because one can see that in some circumstances they could touch upon information that is regarded as highly sensitive.

John Hayes: I hesitate to intervene again, but I hope these exchanges are proving helpful to the House, as well as to my right hon. and learned Friend and me—and to you, Mr Deputy Speaker. My right hon. and learned Friend touches on an important issue. I think he will acknowledge that it would be undesirable to set an arbitrary figure, but it is certainly the case that the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary and the Northern Ireland Secretary would want to take into account the numbers. It seems to me that the numerical case that my right hon. and learned Friend is making is not without merit. I am not sure that this is a matter to be dealt  with on the face of the Bill, but it certainly should be dealt with.

Dominic Grieve: I am again most grateful to the Minister. I entirely accept that if he can produce, for example, an assurance before the passage of this Bill through Parliament that there will be a protocol in place—which we, for example, have access to—that sets out exactly how the process will be managed in practice and that we can provide the House with the reassurance that that is being followed, that would satisfy my concerns.
However, I do think there is an issue here, because frankly the world is made up of more and more bulk personal datasets, largely being collected in digital form, and there needs to be a process in place to ensure that what is there is legitimately held and is not just being added to in a way that could be outside Ministers’ line of vision altogether, unless they specifically started asking questions. That is the sort of approach I am talking about, so on that basis I am happy to accept the Minister’s assurance.

Gavin Robinson: I am less perplexed by the arbitrary nature of subsection (1)(b) of new clause 3 and more interested in subsection (1)(a). What is meant or intended by the word “large”? Can the right hon. and learned Gentleman say what proportion or quantum would be considered large when considering a personal dataset? There may be some helpful read-across   from the 1998 Act, but it would be useful in considering this amendment to know what is intended by that entirely non-arbitrary and open suggestion?

Dominic Grieve: Like everything else, I tend usually to say that we give the word its ordinary English meaning. I can accept that one may collect a dataset whose content is entirely innocuous and not really sensitive personal data at all, but which for some reason might contain a nugget of sensitive personal data that has crept in in some strange and perhaps unintended way. I accept that in those circumstances the protections we introduce are unnecessary; indeed, the truth is that the agencies would not even know that that information was there at the time they were acquiring it.
However, if we focus on the points I raised earlier—the Data Protection Act describes sensitive personal data as relating to a person’s race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, physical or mental health, or sexual life—we are probably in quite a good place. I do not think a court would have too much difficulty being able to tell what falls one side of the line and what falls the other. However, like everything else, it is all open to a degree of interpretation, so I do not offer that to the hon. Gentleman as 100% perfection, although it is a good way forward and I think most of us would understand what sort of collected bulk data are likely to contain that sort of material.
Amendment 24 concerns specific warrants for bulk personal datasets. We are far less concerned about these, but again this provision would cover data relating to a person’s race, political opinions, religious beliefs, trade union membership, physical or mental health, or sexual life, and would ensure that the Secretary of State authorising the warrant would have the sensitivity of the data highlighted for them as part of their overall consideration of the necessity and proportionality of retaining and examining the dataset. I believe this may well be completely acceptable to the Government. Amendment 24 would mean that if there was an intention, for example, to acquire a dataset that clearly contained a great deal of information about people’s religious or political opinions, that would be specifically drawn to the Secretary of State’s attention in asking her or him to sign off the warrant, so that they were aware that that was being sought.
Finally in this list, I want to mention amendments 22 and 23, which are really carryovers from yesterday and concern the renewal of warrants to prevent two warrants from extending over a 12-month period, which I believe the Government have accepted, although that could not be considered yesterday.
I apologise for taking up so much of the House’s time, but I hope these amendments may help to clarify some of these areas of the Bill.

Keir Starmer: We made good progress in the House yesterday. We now have clarity about the terms of the independent review of bulk powers, which we are looking at today; and we have an overarching privacy clause, a stricter test for the judicial commissioners, protection for trade union activities, and an undertaking from the Solicitor General to consider how to amend the Bill to make it absolutely clear that  whistleblowers can make disclosures to the Investigatory Powers Commissioner without fear of prosecution. I hope we can make as good progress today.
One of the amendments made to the Bill yesterday concerned the requirement for judicial commissioners to consider necessity and proportionality with a sufficient degree of care to ensure that they comply with the general duties in relation to privacy—this is the tighter judicial review test. That amendment was made to clause 21, which relates to intercept warrants. Today we are dealing with bulk powers. The judicial commissioners have an important role in relation to bulk powers and are an important safeguard in respect of warrants involving bulk powers. It is therefore important that we have clarity in the House today that the tighter scrutiny that is now in clause 21 applies equally to all other exercises of authorisation or approval carried out by judicial commissioners, including where they are exercising their powers in relation to bulk warrants. I think that otherwise there will be a risk of two tests, one under clause 21 and one under the other clauses applying to bulk powers. There is a real danger relating to combined warrants, in respect of which judicial commissioners would be asked to carry out different tests. It is important for the bulk powers to be scrutinised every bit as closely as the intercept warrants. Perhaps, in his response, the Minister will make it clear that the test applies generally across all the functions of the judicial commissioners, whether in respect of the specific warrants referred to clause 21 or in respect of the warrants relating to bulk powers and other provisions in the Bill. That, I think, would be a helpful extension of the safeguards relating to bulk powers.
Let me now deal with the bulk powers themselves. As has been pointed out by the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin), they are very wide. What concerns her constituents and mine—and, indeed, many other constituents—is that inevitably the bulk powers will be applied to, and will have an impact on, people who are not themselves suspected of any wrongdoing. That worries everyone who has spoken to me, and I am sure that it worries members of the public who have spoken to many other MPs.

John Hayes: I sense that the hon. and learned Gentleman is about to move on to wider issues. Before he does so, let me deal with the issue of the application of the content of the manuscript amendment, which, as he said, specified a part of the Bill. He is right to say that the principles that underpin the amendment should apply to the whole Bill, and I will ensure, as the Bill proceeds, that that is the case legislatively. If we need to table further amendments to make the position categorically clear, we will do so.

Keir Starmer: I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying the position, because that is an important additional measure in relation to bulk powers. We will, of course, support whatever amendments are necessary to achieve that end.
As I have said, the bulk powers are very wide. They will inevitably have an impact on people who are not suspected of doing anything wrong, and they will inevitably have an impact—or, at least, it is impossible to ensure  that they will not—on legally privileged material, or material that involves journalistic material or journalistic sources, or, indeed, MPs’ correspondence. It would be good if a way could be found of excluding such material from the operation of bulk powers, but it is not possible to do so, and that is why there is concern about bulk powers. [Interruption.] I will give way to the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) in a moment.
Bulk powers involve ordinary members of the public who have never done anything wrong, and they involve the potential to capture legally privileged material, journalistic material and MPs’ correspondence. I shall come on to the safeguards, but it is important to understand first why there is that concern about the bulk powers.

David Davis: rose—

Lindsay Hoyle: Order. I know that the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (David Davis) is very good at whistling, but I am sure that shadow Ministers do not respond to whistles, and that the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) wanted to give way to him anyway.

David Davis: I was not intending to be discourteous, Mr Deputy Speaker.
The hon. and learned Gentleman said that it was not possible to screen out the correspondence of the various privileged groups he described. The issue arose at the Investigatory Powers Tribunal in respect of one of the Wilson doctrine cases, and that was the assertion made by the Government barrister at the time. However, I consulted a number of experts, including Ross Anderson at Cambridge, and they said that it was perfectly possible. A great deal of screening is already done to take out dross—issues such as pornography—and it is perfectly possible to screen out targeted groups as well.

Keir Starmer: Obviously, I should be very interested to hear how that could be done at the outset, and I am sure that the Minister would as well.
Let me make two points to emphasise why there is such concern about bulk powers. It may well be possible, depending on the parameters that are set, to reduce the likelihood of obtaining through bulk powers material that is sensitive in one shape or form, but I do not think it is possible to eliminate it. It may well be that most of that is done at the filtering stage, rather than at the stage of the initial exercise of the bulk power. I am not seeking to explain why bulk powers inevitably capture such information, or to justify that; I am simply explaining why I think so many people are concerned about the bulk powers. That is why Labour has made it clear that, given the breadth of the powers, the operational case for them must be properly made and properly reviewed, and that is why the safeguards must be reviewed.
The issue of the safeguards may need to be revisited when the Bill is in the other place. As the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden knows, the Tom Watson and David Davis case is currently midway between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the Court of Appeal. Although it touches on existing legislation and retention powers, it may have implications in relation to the Bill when it is given further consideration, and will certainly be important when it comes to consideration  of safeguards. Let me also, in passing, echo the concern expressed by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) in relation to operational purposes, an issue which also arose in Committee.
As for the review, the first stage is to ask whether the operational case has been made. I referred yesterday to an exchange of letters between the Minister and me. I hope that copies of the letters have been made available; I think that they have been made available to the House, and that every Member has them. However, I want to put on record what was being asked for, and what the response was. Let me say at the outset that this was a constructive exchange, which moved a significant issue significantly further forward.
I wrote to the Minister that the review to be carried out by David Anderson should be
“supported by a security cleared barrister, a technical expert and a person with experience of covert investigations”,
that it should
“Examine the operational case for the bulk powers in the Bill, not merely in respect of the utility of the powers, but also their necessity”,
that it should
“Have access to all necessary information as is needed to undertake the review effectively, including all information provided to the Intelligence and Security Committee”,
and that it should
“Take about three months to complete and…report to the Prime Minister in time for the findings to inform Lords Committee considerations of Parts 6 and 7 of the Bill.”
The Minister’s reply is important, as Members who have had an opportunity to read it will appreciate. He wrote:
“I can confirm that the basic framework for the review will be as set out in your letter…David Anderson has hand-picked this team and we are confident that together they have the range and depth of knowledge needed to undertake a comprehensive review.”
I was very anxious that David Anderson should pick as members of his team people whom he considered to have the necessary competences to help him with the review that he has been asked to carry out independently, and I am pleased that he has done so. I have been assured by him that he is very happy with his choices, and with the skills from which he will benefit as a result of that exercise.
The Minister’s letter continues:
“In relation to your second point”—
this is really important—
“it is absolutely the case that this review will be assessing the specific question of whether the bulk capabilities provided for in the Bill are necessary. The review team will critically appraise the need for bulk capabilities, which will include an assessment of whether the same result could have been achieved through alternative investigative methods.”
That goes to the heart of the issue. If that is the focus of the review, it will give comfort to the Labour team—and, no doubt, to members of the Scottish National party, notwithstanding their concerns—and to all our constituents as well.

Joanna Cherry: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that the timetable for this independent review is such that, whereas the House of Lords will have time to scrutinise and debate it, the House of Commons will not? Does he agree that that is not acceptable in a democracy?

Keir Starmer: I am grateful for that intervention. I have been asking for the review for some time and my preference was always that it should have been earlier and available to us now. In fairness, and in keeping with what I said yesterday about the exercise that we have been conducting, I recognise that it was a big ask of the Government at this stage, particularly in light of the pre-legislative scrutiny. I am always inclined to look on the positive side and the fact that there is a review, under the terms for which we asked, is important. Of course, when one looks back at anything, one can always make the argument that it should have been done earlier and, usually, differently. I accept that it would have been good if we had had the review by this stage, which is why I put forward my argument as I did before, but I emphasise just how significant this is and what a significant change of position it is for the Government. It is constructive and positive, for which we are grateful.

David Davis: The powers mostly already exist and this is an avowal of existing powers, so in some sense the question of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) is different from what it would normally be. We have powers and may not change them as result of the delay, but there is an implication for how soon we review the whole package and how soon we come back and re-legislate. It has long seemed to me that this is a piece of legislation that lends itself to almost annual review, renewal and reform. The way to deal with the problem may be to ensure that we get a relatively rapid review and reform of the legislation in another part of this business.

Keir Starmer: There is a case for frequent review, but what form that would take is a matter for us to discuss during the debate on the next group of amendments. I take the point that, in many senses, most of the bulk powers are currently available and being used. As I said yesterday, however, that does not mean that we should not scrutinise them now through the passage of the Bill. This is the first time that Parliament has had the chance to examine and scrutinise the provisions, because they simply were not avowed. The change of position on the avowal of the powers over the past three or four years and the fact that they are in statute are quite extraordinary. It would be wrong to say that as they existed and were used under more general provisions in the past, we should not ask for the operational case to be made now and have that properly scrutinised. This is the right way of doing things, even though one might say that it should have been done five, 10 or 15 years ago when things were different.

John Hayes: That is why the focus on necessity and not merely utility is so important. It would have been easy to have focused on utility. As the hon. and learned Gentleman emphasised earlier, this is about establishing to the satisfaction of independent people that the powers are necessary.

Keir Starmer: That word necessary is important in  all of this. As I say, the review team’s ability to assess whether the same result could have been achieved through alternative investigative methods is important to that exercise and the confidence that we can have in  the outcome.
Pressing on, the letter goes on to say that
“all necessary information, access and assistance as is needed for the review”
will be provided. It then states:
“We are absolutely clear that there is nothing to be gained, and much to be lost, by in any way restricting the review team’s access to sensitive and classified material where this is necessary to inform the review process.”
On timing, it states
“you are correct that the review will be concluded in time to inform Parliament’s consideration of Parts 6 and 7 of the Bill at the Lords Committee.”
There is a complete and instructive response to the request in my letter and that will help a great deal in how the review is received.
The review is important. It is not just an exercise for us in this House or those in the other place; it is for the public. As the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield said, some Members of this House have had access to some of the powers and have seen them in operation either in previous roles or in briefings to the members of various Committees. However, it is no longer enough, nor should it be, for members of the public for politicians to stand up and say, “I have had it demonstrated to me that these powers are necessary or have been used in a particular way.” They have the right to as much information as possible to make decisions for themselves.

Anne McLaughlin: If the review comes back and says that the bulk powers are not necessary, what will the Labour party do then?

Keir Starmer: I will assess that at the time. It depends on what the report says, because if it calls any of the powers into question or makes any recommendations about their exercise, we would all want to consider that. It would be difficult for anybody in this House or the other place to make a case for a bulk power that an independent review has deemed unnecessary. Let us wait until we get to that stage and let us see what the review actually says.
As for confidence in the review, there is a question of publication. It is important that the review’s report is publicly available. I obviously understand that David Anderson and his team will see highly sensitive material, to which they will have unrestricted access, so the detail that can be put in any public report will inevitably be limited. I think everybody understands that. It is important that the report is published in some form, as most of David Anderson’s report have been, so that they can be read not only by Members of this House and of the other place, but by members of the public seeking assurances about and confidence in the review.

Fiona Mactaggart: This issue goes to the heart of one reason why the Bill is particularly difficult. This House depends on the members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, who find out in private sessions how the powers are being used, to report back to the House, in a way that ends up being redacted, about their confidence in the powers. We have a duty to ensure that the public are as well informed as possible, in concert with our need to protect national  security, about how these things work. That is the challenge and is one reason why the House has found the Bill quite difficult to deal with.

Keir Starmer: I agree with those sentiments. Conventions and attitudes change. To take an example from my past, it was once a convention that a prosecuting authority would not give reasons for its decisions, but that has changed and for the better. The days of politicians with access to particular information assuring the public simply by saying that they have had access and that they are satisfied are well and truly over. That presents problems and difficulties in relation to what must be put in the public domain.

John Hayes: The intervention of the right hon. Member for Slough (Fiona Mactaggart) has been helpful in aiding me to frame my own. She is right that operational concerns are sensitive, delicate and, of course, secret matters. The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) is absolutely right that we should put as much information as possible in the report. He is also right that there will be access to security-cleared information of a highly sensitive nature, but that should not prevent us from being as clear as we can to this House, and more widely, about why it has been decided whether certain powers are necessary.

Keir Starmer: I am grateful for that intervention, which I will take in the spirit with which it was put forward. We want maximum publicity within the constraints that apply when highly sensitive information is considered. The first point of the review is to inform their lordships so that they can perform their scrutiny function, but they will be unable to do that if the report is not available to assist them in their deliberations. The review and its terms are a material and important step forward, and I am grateful for the indication about its publication when it is complete.
That takes me to the subject of medical records, which I can deal with swiftly.

Alex Chalk: Does the hon. and learned Gentleman agree that this review on the necessity of bulk powers is welcome, not just to give the public confidence, but to give confidence to the intelligence agencies that must use them? In my experience, they are scrupulous about acting within the law, and we owe it to them to award powers that they can be satisfied are both necessary and enjoy public support.

Keir Starmer: I do agree with that, and I have emphasised to the security and intelligence services that there is value in this exercise from their perspective, in making the operational case for the powers that they exercise and wish to continue exercising. That is another good reason for the review.
There has been an ongoing concern, raised first by the Scottish National party and then by Labour in Committee, about access to medical records. The concern for Labour, which I am sure is the shared position, has been about “patient information”, as defined by section 251 of the National Health Service Act 2006. That means information relating to mental health, adult social care, child social care and health services. I do not need to spell out for the House why many members of the  public—my constituents and, I am sure, those of many Members—are deeply concerned about the very notion of the security and intelligence services having bulk access to those sorts of sensitive records. We tabled an amendment in Committee proposing a high threshold for the exercise of powers in relation to those records, and this is reflected in amendments 303 to 305 before the House today.
The Government have tabled new clause 14 in response to our demands. Although it does not take the same form as amendments 303 to 305, on my analysis, because of the way subsection (6) is framed, it would cover mental health, adult social care, child social care and health service records. If, either now or at some convenient point, the Minister could indicate that his understanding is that it would cover those records, I will not press amendments 303 to 305 to a vote.

Simon Hoare: There is a golden rule in the Hoare household that when in doubt we turn to Kipling—not the exceedingly good baker, but our rather excellent writer. I pray in aid Kipling in order to summarise.
I was not intending to speak on this grouping until I heard the cases deployed by the SNP and by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer). On the latter point, I concur and support what he said entirely, but the approach of the SNP, which we have heard since Second Reading—it was certainly a golden thread running through Committee—is one of serious annoyance to me, as I am pretty certain it is to colleagues. I am absolutely certain it is of huge anxiety to our constituents. The hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin) obviously has constituents who are very different from mine. She and I served on the Immigration Bill Committee, as did the shadow Minister, some little while ago. According to her, no constituent of hers had ever raised the issue of immigration, yet all constituents have raised with her these huge Glasgow concerns about bulk powers.

Anne McLaughlin: Will the hon. Gentleman take an intervention?

Simon Hoare: In a moment, because I want to give the hon. Lady the benefit of the words of Rudyard Kipling. I do not personalise this to her; rather I make it as a general point to her party. The SNP has demonstrated:
“Power without responsibility—the prerogative of the harlot throughout the ages.'”
The SNP is using a position of power to malign and undermine, as it has continually sought to do, the confidence of this House and of the country in the robustness and ethics of those in our security services, who, day in, day out, seek to use—I agree with the point made by the shadow Minister that they also require this—the public confidence that they have in order to make sure they have the right skills and tools to keep our constituents safe.

Joanna Cherry: I very much resent what the hon. Gentleman is saying. Is he aware that one of the founding members of the SNP, Sir Compton Mackenzie, was a member of the British security services? Is he aware that in Scotland we have one of the best records of crime prevention in the world? Is he aware that we have responsibility in Scotland—we run the Scottish Government  and are now into a successful third term? Will he please reconsider his remarks, which SNP Members and most people in Scotland will find deeply offensive?

Simon Hoare: All I will say to the hon. and learned Lady, once she has calmed down from her faux anxiety, is that Compton Mackenzie must be turning in his grave, because there is a significant dereliction of duty here. One would think—this may be the case in Scotland, and if so, SNP Members must forgive my ignorance—that there is no organised crime, and that there are no paedophiles, people traffickers, terrorists and drug dealers. One would think there are no people who are trying to do us ill. Perhaps, to use the analogy of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), it is the view of the SNP that a quick rifle through a mail sack and the identification of a particular hand in a quill pen will be sufficient to interrupt some terrible deed. That may very well be, and SNP Members may be right that that will satisfy their constituents. I can tell them that it will not satisfy mine. My constituents look for the Government of the day, irrespective of the stripe, to carry out with seriousness and with democratic accountability the first duty of the state, which is to protect the realm and its citizens.

Alistair Carmichael: I hope that the hon. Gentleman will accept that I hold no brief for the SNP—I struggle on many days to hold any affection for it. But may I offer him the opportunity to reflect on what he has said about the duty of the SNP Members and others of us, including a substantial number on his Benches? None of us would seek to undermine the work of the security services, but it is our duty to ensure that the powers given to them by this House are necessary and proportionate. That is the work in which we are engaged here, and if we are talking about a breach of duty, it would be a breach of our duty if we were not to do that.

Lindsay Hoyle: Order. The right hon. Gentleman wishes to catch my eye very shortly, and of course I want to hear him speak, but I do not want to hear the speech twice. We need short interventions.

Simon Hoare: The right hon. Gentleman has offered me an invitation and I hope he will not be offended if I do not accept it. I do not wish to reflect on or reconsider how I have positioned this. Everyone in this House has to be incredibly careful not only what we say and how we say it, but how it can be understood or construed. The Labour Front Benchers have been very clear, and I welcome their position. For the past 12 months, almost since we debated the Anderson report in this place on that Thursday last July, it has seemed that those who are bringing together the collective wisdom of the SNP have watched just a few too many reruns of “Enemy of the State” and have read too many books where they presuppose that those honest men and women who, under the rule of law, are trying to keep us safe are, in some way or another, insidious, acting in an underhand and duplicitous way, and wish us ill. As I understand it, that is essentially what they are saying. Whether they have said it implicitly or explicitly, that is my interpretation. We heard it in Committee, which is why I will be opposing their amendment later on.

Keir Starmer: Let me put it on the record that I and the Minister said at the end of the Bill Committee that the SNP had played a significant role in ensuring that this Bill reached this stage of its proceedings in much better shape than it was when it was in Committee. It was a very constructive exercise by the SNP. SNP Members took different approaches on issues to us, but to suggest that they have not played an important part in this is not to reflect the views at the end of the Committee stage.

Simon Hoare: I am inclined to agree with the latter point, but at every step and turn, every SNP amendment, on my reading and on my hearing and my understanding, has been designed to delay and frustrate. We have had the canard that has run through the debate that we have not had adequate time to debate and discuss these issues. I will not rehearse the times, Mr Deputy Speaker, because you know them. You know how many Committees of this House have looked at the matter. The Bill Committee stood for a long period of time. We had a long debate on Second Reading. The Government, and the Ministers in particular, have bent over backwards to ensure that they can land this Bill in a shape and form that is acceptable to the vast majority of Members of this House and, one would hope, of the other place.

Joanna Cherry: If the hon. Gentleman thinks that all the amendments laid by the SNP were designed to delay or frustrate the Bill, how does he explain why his own Government accepted new clause 6 on “Civil liability for certain unlawful interceptions”—I do not know whether he was in the Chamber yesterday—which was an amendment tabled by me on behalf of the Scottish National party? I say again, perhaps he would like to reconsider his comments carefully.

Simon Hoare: Heaven rejoices when a sinner  repents. Of course, Mr Deputy Speaker, it is marvellous news that there has been one amendment out of about 127,000 amendments that the SNP has tabled throughout this process that has been acceptable to Her Majesty’s Government. [Interruption.] Oh, it was just 1,000. It felt like 127,000. Forgive me. This is the fundamental point. The hon. and learned Lady is right, and that is why I find it surprising. The SNP is clearly a grown up and mature party. It is now in its third term of government in Edinburgh. It will be discharging some of these duties. It will be consulted on different things by Ministers and by those responsible for appointing commissioners and all the rest of it. There seems to be a rather peculiar disconnect between the seriousness with which the SNP takes the duties of governance north of the border and this impression of flippancy it gives when it comes to national security.

Lindsay Hoyle: Order. May I just help the hon. Gentleman? I know that he likes to bring the Chamber alive, but he needs to start to speak to the amendments. We have heard his antagonistic bits. Now I want to hear something about the amendment, because I also want to hear his colleagues, and I am sure that he does too.

Simon Hoare: Mr Deputy Speaker, you are absolutely right. I hope that I continue to be in order—

Lindsay Hoyle: Let me reassure you that you were not in order, which is why I want you to be in order.

Simon Hoare: Let me reiterate something that might have got lost in some of the steam. I am speaking because I oppose the amendment that has been tabled.

Lindsay Hoyle: Order. I really do not need much advice. In fact, I will give a little bit of advice, which is that we speak to the amendment—we do not speak around it or leading up to it. It is the detail of the amendment that we want. I am sure that the hon. Gentleman wants to be back on track, and I welcome that.

Simon Hoare: I oppose the amendments because they would delete very significant powers that are required. I have—as I believe the Government have—confidence in our services to deploy in an accountable way. If the hon. Member for Glasgow North East presses her amendment to a Division, I will oppose her, even if no one else does. I am content with the arguments deployed by Ministers that those bulk powers are required. We cannot dodge our responsibilities on this. We may find that it infringes and impinges on the sacred flame of civil liberties but, to keep our country safe, so be it.

Alistair Carmichael: I can only regret the tone of the remarks of the hon. Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare). Had he said anything about the content of the Bill or the amendment, I might have regretted that as well.
There are a number of matters on which I wish to touch today. I should like to speak first of all in relation to the review, which has formed so much of today’s debate. I very much welcome the appointment of David Anderson, QC. He commands respect and confidence in all parts of the House. As the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) said earlier, it is significant and important that, first of all, he has a remit that looks at the necessity of these provisions and also that he has been able to select for himself the team with which he will be working.
I very much hope that the report will be produced in time for the Bill to be given the benefit of it when it is considered in the other place. I say to the Minister that if it is a question of a week or two here or there, notwithstanding the deadlines to which we are all working, it would be proper for the Government to take the view that it is best to get this report right rather than to get it out quickly. For my part, I am disinclined to think that David Anderson would have taken on this job if he were not able to do it in the time that is allowed to him, but, as we all know with these matters, sometimes the unexpected happens and sometimes it is not always easy to get to the truth of things. I do hope that there will be a degree of flexibility among the Government’s business managers, not least if we need a Government day to debate the report, so that the House has its voice heard.

John Hayes: I will, if I may, suggest to the right hon. Gentleman, whom I worked with in government and whom I know very well, that the scope of the report should be a matter for David Anderson. For example, if he were to want to take into account the experience of  other countries—this is something that the right hon. Gentleman and the SNP spokesperson called for—that would be a matter for David Anderson. We are not attempting to tie his hands in any way. As the right hon. Gentleman knows, it is my view that we need to get this review completed, so that we do not pass something into legislation without the information that emanates from it.

Alistair Carmichael: I am grateful to the Minister for that. We are now best served by allowing Mr Anderson to get on and do the job that we have given him. I merely say in passing that it would have been better if we had given him that job some time ago, so that this House might have had the benefit of his conclusions when debating this whole matter. None the less, I welcome the conversion of the Government, however late in the day it may have come, to the need and to the acceptance of what even the Labour party has said, which is that the operational case for the extent of the bulk powers that the Government have sought to introduce in this Bill has not yet been made. The operational case that they have published has been vague, to be kind to it, and it has certainly been lacking in any persuasiveness.
We will look very closely at David Anderson’s conclusion with regard to the necessity of these powers, because that should have been the first test that was set and that was required to be met. I take very little issue with the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), or indeed the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, when they talk about the protections that they think should be built into the Bill. Protections are necessary only if the powers are first judged to be necessary, which comes to the very heart of the points made by the hon. Member for North Dorset. The Bill has very much been a work in progress and I wonder whether we would have had the 104 Government amendments we had yesterday and the 20 that we have today, never mind those tabled by the Intelligence and Security Committee, by those on the Opposition Front Bench and by the Scottish National party, if the House had taken the approach to the Bill and its scrutiny that was being urged on us a few minutes ago.
On the question of bulk personal datasets, I share the substantial concerns that have already been expressed. That brings me back to the objection that I have already spoken about—to the operational case. That is another aspect of the Bill that the Government have failed to explain. The operational case is perhaps even more opaque than anything else in the Bill. Although the abuses—let us use that term—outlined by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and acknowledged by the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield might be at the lower end of the scale, I have a strong suspicion that it was because they were at the lower end of the scale that they came into the public domain in the first place. When we are dealing with something that strikes in such a fundamental way at the relationship between the citizen and the state, there is, frankly, no such thing as a trivial abuse. Any abuse is serious, any abuse is to be taken seriously, and that is why I thought that the hon. and learned Lady was right to bring them to the House’s attention.

Joanna Cherry: I thank the right hon. Gentleman for his generous and measured comments earlier about the SNP’s role in the Bill. To pick up on his point, is not the  problem that once the warrants have allowed bulk data to be scooped up there is no legal regulation of how it is analysed, which is why these individuals within the security services were able to break the rules—there are no warrants; it is about internal regulation?

Alistair Carmichael: The hon. and learned Lady is absolutely right, and I draw on my own experience when I say that in giving power to public authority in this way it is important that we should be as specific and prescribed as possible.
To draw on my experience, I recall the passage of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995. At that time, I was a procurator fiscal depute in Aberdeen and one of the innovations introduced in the Act was the ability of a prosecutor to comment on previous convictions before a jury in Scotland. I have no doubt that at that time all sorts of undertakings were given at the Dispatch Box, but when we as prosecutors—and, I like to think, fairly measured prosecutors in the public interest—saw that provision, the discussion did not centre around how the undertakings had been given at the Dispatch Box but how we could use it, its extent, where the boundaries would lie and what would constitute a step over the line and a step just inside it. There were always some in the office who were quite keen for the line to be a little bit elastic.
That is a much more trivial example, because of course it was a measure for which there would have been obvious and immediate judicial scrutiny. If any depute were to overstep the mark in court, it would be immediately obvious and they would be pulled up on it. There will not be the same scrutiny, there is not the same oversight and we ask a great deal of those who serve in our security services if we give them such a wide range of powers with so little definition. The lack of definition, the lack of proportionality and the lack of necessity underpin my concerns, which, I think, are shared in other parts of the House.

Wendy Morton: It is a privilege to speak on the second day of consideration of this very important Bill and to follow hon. and right hon. Friends and colleagues, as well as the many learned friends and colleagues—[Interruption.] I did not quite expect to hear that noise from the skies during my opening comments; I do not normally have this sort of impact.
I do not wish to disappoint people, but unlike my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) I sought neither inspiration nor cake from Kipling. Instead, I turned to the American scientist and author Neil deGrasse Tyson, who wrote very perceptively:
“Any time scientists disagree, it's because we have insufficient data. Then we can agree on what kind of data to get; we get the data; and the data solves the problem. Either I’m right, or you’re right, or we’re both wrong. And we move on. That kind of conflict resolution does not exist in politics or religion.”
Very wise words, I think.
I believe that the advantage scientists have over the rest of us who base our judgments on instinct or hope should also be available to the people who keep us safe,  our security personnel and the agencies in which they so importantly serve. I appreciate the sensitivities and difficulties with this topic of bulk powers, but I feel that the Bill has had a lot of scrutiny. It has been a long time in gestation, and rightly so.
Our security services need data, the raw information—perhaps from dozens of sources. They need the hundreds, perhaps thousands of pieces with which to build a picture of the threats that face us, and they then have the knowledge to take the right action against them. In today’s world in which data are all around us, our security personnel need to be able to collect them and to have the right, with safeguards, of course, to pull them all together.
There was a good deal of discussion on Second Reading, in Committee and now on Report on the nature of bulk powers and bulk review. It saddens me that a notion seems to have developed among some that the security services, given the chance, will use new powers to hoover up all the information on us all without any control at all. I think that that perception is false. Why? As we have been told, the bulk powers referred to in this Bill are already provided for in existing legislation. The Bill brings them together and, importantly, makes them subject to robust statutory safeguards.

Kevin Foster: My hon. Friend is making an excellent speech. Does she agree that, as mentioned by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), having one Bill that brings consistent tests to this area and to the use of this power makes eminent sense and that that is why it should be supported?

Wendy Morton: I am grateful to my hon. Friend for his helpful intervention. He is absolutely right; it makes sense to bring these powers together and, while doing that, to consider the safeguards.
Yes, the Bill provides our security and intelligence agencies with the ability to obtain data in bulk in order to identify new threats and to learn more about existing threats, but I feel that it does not confer on them new and sweeping powers. Our intelligence agencies have bulk collection powers but they do not conduct analysis of the data in an indiscriminate manner without reasonable suspicion—it would not be lawful for them to do so. In the modern world these powers, which already exist, are crucial. Bulk capabilities are crucial.
To investigate a target, our agents need to be able to acquire its communications in the first place. When a target is overseas, bulk interception is one of the key means, and may be the only means, by which we can obtain communications that would otherwise not be available. This is especially so if that potential threat is operating in an area where we have no strong diplomatic link or where the governing authority is not in control of all its own territory. We know from yesterday’s debate that bulk powers and their use have been instrumental in keeping us safe from threats abroad and, indeed, at home. It is worth noting that the bulk powers in the Bill have already played a significant part in every major counter-terrorism investigation of the last decade, including in each of the seven terrorist attack plots disrupted since November 2014. They have been essential in identifying 95% of the cyber-attacks  on people and businesses in the UK discovered by the security and intelligence agencies over six months. Here at home the existing powers have been used to identify serious criminals who were seeking to evade detection online and could not be pursued by conventional means, supporting the disruption of more than 50 paedophiles in the UK in the past three years.
I would like to quote the words of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who is no longer in his place but who has been contributing to today’s debate. He is a former Attorney General and not, if I may say so, a man who lightly allows liberties to be chipped away. He said of the Bill:
“The present Committee and its predecessor are satisfied that the Government are justified in coming to Parliament to seek in broad terms the powers that the Bill contains. None of the categories of powers in the Bill—including the principle of having powers of bulk collection of data, which has given rise to controversy in recent years—is unnecessary or disproportionate to what we need to protect ourselves.”—[Official Report, 15 March 2016; Vol. 607, c. 836.]
Of course, some will disagree with the former Attorney General and they rightly have the opportunity to do so, but I happen to agree with him on those points.
Finally, I want to touch on calls from Labour and the SNP on Second Reading and in the Public Bill Committee for independent validation of the operational case. We should recognise that the Government have listened and, in response to those calls, have confirmed that David Anderson QC will undertake a review to inform the passage of the Bill through the House of Lords. Parliament will then be able to decide.
I will support this Bill as one that codifies the law as much as it extends it, and that builds robust safeguards against intrusion while at the same time safeguarding the public. I believe that it is an extremely important Bill—important to our country, important to the people of our country, and important to our constituents.

Gavin Robinson: It is great to follow the hon. Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton), who made a powerful speech and a lightening-inducing one, it seems, to judge from the weather outside.

Wendy Morton: Not for the first time.

Gavin Robinson: Indeed.
I commented in the Tea Room earlier that I probably would not get the opportunity to contribute on Third Reading because the debate yesterday and today has been dominated by heavyweights. When I said that to a Government Member, he looked oddly surprised that I would not satisfy that criterion. I am pleased to have the opportunity not only to speak at this point on consideration, but to make the point that it would have been wholly worthwhile to have had just one Northern Ireland voice on the Bill Committee.
Members will have recognised just how considered and detailed the process has been. On Second Reading I focused my remarks solely on the prison officer, Adrian Ismay, who had been murdered in my constituency and died that very day. I made the point that we cannot continue to have abstract conversations about the impact of terrorism or about the protection that we as a state  need on national security grounds, because in the here and now it is a matter of protecting us today, tomorrow and for every day to come.
I pay tribute to the Security Minister, the Solicitor General and all those Members who have so collegiately engaged in making sure that what, in years gone by, was a difficult process with the Draft Communications Data Bill—the snoopers charter—has been set aside during what I believe has been a very encouraging debate and thoughtful consideration of the Bill. Credit is due to the Minister and his team.
A point was made by the shadow Home Affairs Minister in arguing for amendments 303 to 305, and I would be grateful if the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) considered this issue. We have had contributions from the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) on new clause 3 and he made the point that it would not be appropriate to retain the datasets—personal data—that engage mental or physical health issues. In the light of that, I would be keen to hear from the shadow Minister on how he believes that deals with amendments 303 to 305. If new clause 3 were passed, would those amendments be necessary?
I understand that it may not be possible for the shadow Minister to respond, although I am happy to give way. It would be useful to know whether those three amendments are likely to be pressed to a Division or whether he believes that new clause 3 deals adequately with the protections for personal health data.

Keir Starmer: I hope I made it clear that I will not press those amendments to a vote because of the new clause tabled by the Government in relation to health records, which covers the same categories of data. I am sure that that will be dealt with by the Minister when he responds.

Gavin Robinson: I am grateful to the shadow Minister for that clarification, which is very helpful.
On bulk data collection generally, the correspondence that was shared yesterday was incredibly useful. I do not recall getting correspondence between a shadow Minister and the Minister, which was shared with us all and made available in the Vote Office so quickly. It was useful and defused many of the fears and concerns that had been raised with Members of Parliament about  the consequences of passing the Bill. It is important, as  the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) said, that we let that process commence and that we engage in it thoughtfully.
Having made the point that there was no Northern Ireland representation during scrutiny of the Bill in Committee, I hope there is a mechanism whereby Members, be they Democratic Unionists, Ulster Unionists, Social Democratic and Labour party Members or others, get the opportunity to engage thoughtfully and purposefully in the conversation because, as we all know in the House, the history and legacy of Northern Ireland means that these are acutely live issues for us daily.

John Hayes: Just before the hon. Gentleman finishes, I am more than happy to give him the assurance that my door is open to him, his colleagues and other parties during the whole passage of the legislation.   When it leaves this House it will go to the other place, but I will continue to be engaged and involved with all parties who want to contribute in the way that he has described, and I thank him for it.

Gavin Robinson: I am extremely grateful to the Minister. With that—

Ian Paisley Jnr: Will my hon. Friend give way?

Gavin Robinson: Of course.

Ian Paisley Jnr: I want to follow up on what the Minister said. He made the point that his door is always open and we appreciate that. That has always been the case, but it probably has more to do with the personal relationships that he has built over decades in this place with Unionists, and it is highly regarded on the Ulster Bench, if I can put it that way. However, there will come a time when members of this party and Members on this Bench should be considered all the time when it comes to selecting Members for Public Bill Committees, and it should not be matter on which we need a private arrangement.

Gavin Robinson: I am very grateful for that. No more interventions.

Seema Kennedy: It is a great honour to follow the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson).
Many right hon. and hon. Members have spoken with great experience and expertise through the various stages of the Bill. Listening to the high quality of debate, especially yesterday, I was struck by the thought that if we conducted all our business in this Chamber in this manner, our stock and our currency as Members of Parliament might rise a little with our constituents and other members of the public.
I feel humbled to speak on this crucial piece of legislation and, specifically, against the amendments tabled by the SNP. This Bill is designed above all to keep our constituents safe from harm. Some hon. Members may know that I grew up in the Tehran of the 1970s. Though now fondly remembered for its nightclubs and miniskirts, it was a city pervaded by the fear of SAVAK, the brutal secret police whose agents infiltrated every factory, every school and every park, so I am compelled to say that I have witnessed, and my family has witnessed, mass surveillance, and this is not it.
The SNP amendment would effectively remove parts 6 and 7 of the Bill, which deal with bulk warrants and bulk data sets. These show our adversaries that we will use every technological tool to keep ourselves secure, but we will not compromise on our principles.

Joanna Cherry: I do not know whether the hon. Lady was present at the time, but on Second Reading I made it very clear that the SNP was not calling the Bill mass surveillance; we described it as suspicionless surveillance. Does she agree that parts 6 and 7 permit suspicionless surveillance?

Seema Kennedy: I am afraid that I have to disagree with the hon. and learned Lady. Again, as I mentioned in an intervention, these bulk powers are absolutely crucial for our security and intelligence agencies. Let us remember that they are the only agencies that are allowed to use these powers. The reason is that some of these things are unknown. I do not want to sound like Donald Rumsfeld, but there are unknowns out there, and bulk powers are the way to deal with them.

Thomas Tugendhat: My hon. Friend is making an extremely powerfully argument. Of course, one of the elements we constantly remind ourselves of when looking for terrorism or for these forms of abuse is that we are looking for a needle in a haystack. That is true, but without the haystack there is no possibility of even starting the search. These bulk powers are essential for building up that network in order to be able to search.

Seema Kennedy: I thank my hon. Friend for that intervention; he speaks with great experience.
Bulk powers are not novel. The powers already exist, but they are being given better oversight, scrutiny and transparency here. Some Opposition Members have spoken about the lack of necessity for these powers, but the necessity arises from an absolute obligation on our intelligence services to be as flexible and nimble as our enemies. Other Members, including my hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton), have set out the operational necessity of bulk data collection. It is about collecting information on overseas targets and providing that first sift of information—like a haystack, as my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) mentioned—so that it is possible to drill down to the necessary data and discover new threats from people who were previously unknown and identify patterns of behaviour. That would then exclude innocent citizens and facilitate more targeted searches.
The effectiveness of collecting bulk data is borne out by the fact that it has been used in every major counter-terrorism operation in the past decade. It has prevented 95% of cyber-attacks and disrupted 50 paedophiles. It is clear that the UK does not undertake mass surveillance, first because of the existing legal framework in which the intelligence services already operate, and secondly because of resource constraints. I know that the Bill Committee heard evidence about that.
I want to speak briefly about the wrong hands argument to which the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) referred. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) quite rightly said that if we worried about the wrong hands everywhere, we would never pass any legislation. Only the security and intelligence agencies will be given the powers set out in the Bill. Those are people who have an interest in disrupting plots and bringing suspects to justice. Very little evidence is being brought forward to suggest that they are motivated by prying into innocent citizens’ private lives or that they use information wrongly. Millions of us, including all of us sitting here, handle sensitive data every day and are subject to rules, and to a large extent we obey that. Are we honestly saying that intelligence agents, having gone  through rigorous vetting and appraisal, are less trustworthy than our bank managers, our GPs’ receptionists and our council officials?
The safeguards in the Bill pertaining to bulk powers are manifold and robust: the Secretary of State has to authorise bulk warrants; there is a double-lock authorisation procedure; the warrants are time-limited; there is a code of practice for the security and intelligence agencies on handling the data; and of course there is the review, which right hon. and hon. Members have expanded on at great length.
In conclusion, the proposed amendments would remove from the Bill the powers that are necessary for our security services to react to the evolving dangers that face our constituents today, here and now. Our security services do that while respecting our nation’s values. For that reason, I will oppose the amendments.

Tom Elliott: I welcome the opportunity to speak in this debate and to follow the hon. Member for South Ribble (Seema Kennedy). I fully support this legislation. If anything, I am beginning to worry that it is already being watered down. I want to make it even stronger. That is why I oppose the Scottish National party’s amendments. I heard the point made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) about health records; I appreciate that thought process and will support it if relevant amendments are proposed.
I have to say that I and some of my colleagues from Northern Ireland, and indeed on other Benches, have lived through the troubles and seen what terrorism has done. But we face a different type of terrorism now, and a different type of world criminality, much of which is conducted through technology—for example, via mobile phone signals and satellites and on the internet. We now have a totally different perspective. We therefore need a different mechanism, and we need it to be proactive, which is what I believe the Bill will do. It is about being much more proactive.
With regard to bulk capabilities, I do not see what the problem is. We have to have trust and faith in the people doing that surveillance and collecting that intelligence. If we do not have trust and faith in them to have the bulk capabilities, why do we have trust and faith in them to do other things? I think there is a real challenge out there for the wider public to realise what is actually going on in society. I do not realise everything that is happening, and I know that the wider public do not. That is why I have to have trust in those people who are carrying out these actions.
I am also aware that there needs to be a balance; I accept that. There needs to be a balance for the public, to avoid snooping and going into too much detail with these investigatory powers. However, that must be balanced against the wider public information that is required to deal with terrorism, criminality and the fraudsters in our society. For me, the priority in that balance is to deal with those people effectively. If that means people using those investigatory measures to look into some of my details, so be it. If I have nothing to hide, then I have nothing to fear. I have no difficulty with people looking at the details that are held on me, and that should be the same for the wider public if they have nothing to hide. There must be real opportunities here for the Government   and the people who are carrying out the investigatory work to deal with those details. That is why I think the amendments we are debating overstep the mark and would reduce the effectiveness of the people dealing with those causes. My speech has been brief, but I think that it has dealt with the amendments succinctly.

Suella Fernandes: It is a privilege to speak in this debate, and indeed to have participated in the Committees that have considered the Bill: I was a member of the Joint Committee that scrutinised the draft Bill in February, and I was also a member of  the Bill Committee earlier this year. I want to put on the record my appreciation of the Labour party’s constructive and fruitful contributions. This vital legislation has come far since its first iteration. It is an example of cross-party collaboration, so I am glad that party politics has been put aside in the name of national security. I urge all Members of the House to act in such a manner when we go through the Lobbies later today. However, judging by the words of the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin), I do not think that will be the case.
I rise to speak against amendment 309 and the others relating to bulk powers. The Scottish National party Members says that those powers are disproportionate, that they have no utility and that they are therefore unlawful. The amendments propose removing most of parts 6 and 7, from clause 119 onwards, and with them the three types of bulk power afforded to our security and intelligence services—bulk interception, bulk acquisition of communications data and bulk equipment interference. Those powers allow for the collection of large volumes of data and are set out in clause 119 onwards. Further warrants are required before those data can be examined. The purposes of such examination, which are set out in the Bill, may be to pursue more information about known suspects and their associates or to look for patterns of activity that may identify new suspects. Crucially, those powers are not afforded to law enforcement services.
I have a few points to make. First, these powers are founded on a clear and robust legal basis. They are all available to the agencies in existing legislation. Bulk interception is covered in section 20 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Bulk communications data are covered in section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984. Bulk equipment interference is covered in sections 5 and 7 of the Intelligence Services Act 1994. If amendment 390 and the others were passed today, we would remove the vital powers on which our agencies rely to do their jobs and we would prevent them from acting on those powers.
Secondly, these powers are not novel or a quirk of the modern age; they have been around for decades. Back in world war one, our intelligence services tracked the worldwide network of German cables under the sea by using secret sensors. They were able to intercept telegraph messages on a bulk basis, looking for patterns in communications and signals from the enemy.
When cables ended, radio surveillance was necessary to break codes during world war two. That involved bulk interception of data by hand. That work was famously based at room 40 of the Admiralty. Alan Turing and his team at Bletchley Park would never have cracked Enigma were it not for the bulk interception of  cyphers. That advanced cryptanalysis changed the course of history by enabling the allies to pre-empt enemy planning, saving countless lives and shortening the war.

Joanna Cherry: Does the hon. Lady agree that the difference is that, in the days of Bletchley Park, we were at war? We are not at war now. What we are concerned to do here is not to assist this country’s enemies, but to protect the privacy of the people who live here, who include her constituents.

Suella Fernandes: I am astonished by the hon. and learned Lady’s suggestion that we are not at war. Paris, Brussels, Jakarta—I do not need to go on. We are engaged in a worldwide conflict against Daesh, and it is a threat to our security every day and every night.

Simon Hoare: My hon. Friend is right to draw attention to the terrorists, but let us not forget those who wish to wage war on the safety of our children through paedophilia and those who wish to wage war on the safety of women through people and sex trafficking. Those important elements are at the nub of the Bill, alongside terrorism, and we should not forget them.

Suella Fernandes: I totally agree. We are waging a foreign policy and international security war, but we are also waging war on the online fraudsters and the paedophiles. We are in a constant state of threat, and it is easy to delude ourselves if we do not face that threat directly.
Big data are presented to us as a modern phenomenon, but they are actually something that has been used before and that is quite old, and they lie at the heart of our heritage on national security.
Thirdly, the utility of bulk powers is clear. In its report, the Joint Committee made that clear after taking extensive evidence. At paragraph 340, we reported:
“We are aware that the bulk powers are not a substitute for targeted intelligence, but believe that they are an additional resource. Furthermore, we believe that the security and intelligence agencies would not seek these powers if they did not believe they would be effective and that the fact that they have been operating for some time would give them the confidence to assess their merits.”
The Committee concluded:
“we are content that the safeguards proposed by the Home Office, buttressed by authorisation by Judicial Commissioners and oversight from the Investigatory Powers Commissioner will be sufficient to ensure that the bulk powers are used proportionately.”
Therefore, after taking evidence from all sides of the debate, and from all the coalitions involved in this discussion, that was the considered conclusion of the cross-party Committee.
The operational case was clearly made by the Government, who put forward clear examples of the utility of bulk powers. In 2014, analysis of bulk data uncovered a previously unknown individual who was in contact with Daesh-affiliated extremists in Syria. The investigation allowed our agents to identify that he was based overseas, which meant that they would have been unlikely to identify his patterns of movement without bulk information. They saw that he had recently travelled  to a European country and that he was planning an attack. That led to their being able to disrupt that attack.
In 2013, our agents used analysis of patterns of behaviour among paedophiles online. Our agents identified a UK national who had been visiting a website that sold images of child sexual exploitation. That website was hosted in a country that rarely co-operated with UK law enforcement agencies, rendering bulk powers absolutely essential in that investigation too. That individual was prosecuted and sentenced.
Lastly, bulk interception has been used to detect cyber-attacks against the UK, including large-scale thefts of data and serious fraud by cyber-criminals and hostile individuals. That was done using electronic signatures, which are similar to electronic fingerprints. Using those signatures, the agencies can scan the technical detail of internet communications for evidence of incoming attacks on the UK. They have been able to identify known forms of computer malware and new forms of cyber-attack. Cyberspace is so large, and technological change is so rapid, that bulk interception is the only way that our professionals are able to monitor them.
In conclusion, the terrorists, the paedophiles and the serious fraudsters all scheme in cyberspace these days. Technology that empowers us also, sadly, empowers them. Yes, we want world-class encryption and privacy, but we also want world-class security. We should trust the skill and restraint of those unsung heroes—the analysts, the cryptographers, the mathematicians and the codebreakers—who have used their genius to safeguard our security and who have maintained confidence and discretion in relation to the secrets they have seen. We, as elected Members, have a duty to explain their role to the public, but we must also trust their judgment, which is subject to weighty safeguards, checks and balances. These people have proved their heroism in our moments of need throughout history. Let us not further tie their hands and just hope that our enemies, who are plotting night and day to destroy our societies, do not, by chance, hit us; instead, let us empower our agencies. That is why I will be voting against the amendments.

Stephen Hammond: Like yesterday, I want to make my usual declaration that I am not a lawyer. It is always dangerous to follow lawyers, particularly the excellent contribution of my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes).
The amendments are clear, and I approach them from the same point of view of economic cybercrime and the importance of bulk data which I took in my comments on Second Reading and yesterday.
Understandably, the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) raised concerns. I understand the resolve of her and her party on the central point about potentially using less targeted and less intrusive means, rather than bulk data. However, the Minister rightly made the point that there is a review, and he mentioned not only the necessity of the review, but that it would look at the necessity of these powers. If we consider the bulk powers in relation to economic cybercrime, their necessity becomes increasingly clear.
Over the past few years, our economy has been transformed by advances in technology, backed by encryption, with huge changes in how business is conducted.  E-commerce is a reality not for the few but for the many. Given the parcels that arrive on my doorstep from my daughter every day, it is a huge thing that has reached everybody. More than that, there are new business opportunities for the growing IT sector. The use of big data, which my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham discussed in an historical context, is becoming increasingly evident in the context of the internet economy in looking at patterns of behaviour to determine new product design and identify new customer opportunities.
Equally, those opportunities are extended to economic cyber-criminals and terrorists. My hon. Friend the Member for Aldridge-Brownhills (Wendy Morton) spoke about 95 cyber-attacks that have been identified through the use of bulk data. To choose one specific example, Apple has publicly accepted that the existing bulk data powers detected a vulnerability in its operating systems that, had it been exploited, would have affected the modification of the software being used on iPads and iPhones. It might have been used for all sorts of purposes, but one purpose could well have been the removal of data about bank accounts and other personal data. In the open world that we see at the moment, there are myriad threats, particularly in the dark web through password-protected information. Much of what happens is valid. The existence of encryption and anonymity protocols is a huge benefit to people, but criminals and terrorists have embraced this dark world as well. The power to acquire and analyse bulk data is therefore essential. My right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) said that we have to trust our security services. Those who have some experience have very clearly made the case that we should look at the whole issue of the existence of data harvesting.
I believe that the bulk data powers are essential because they allow for intelligence-gathering on overseas subjects of interest. They identify the “needle in the haystack” threats that my hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) talked about by identifying small displaced fragments of information, establishing the investigation of links between subjects of interest, understanding patterns of behaviour and communication methods, and looking at pieces of information that are acquired through new and varying sources. Bulk interception focuses on foreign intelligence. Criminality and terrorism is international, and it is therefore only right that we should have access to the data so that we can detect aspects of that criminality. The importance of bulk data acquisition is clear. Detailed and directed searches of bulk data communications can establish the fact that there is communications content between subjects of interest and reveal where attacks are planned. Bulk acquisition can help to direct where a warrant for more individual targeted data, such as interception, is essential and complementary. It also allows for searches of traces of activity where previously unknown suspects may be taking part in patterns of behaviour that are well known but not yet identified.
The Bill codifies and pulls together the powers that are already in place and puts in place some consistent safeguards. As my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield said, none of these powers is unnecessary or disproportionate. Through the safeguards that they are putting in place in their amendments, the Government will ensure the review of valid lines of operation by Mr David Anderson. More importantly, a  number of cases will involve not just the Secretary of State but the judicial commissioner—the double lock that several Members have spoken about. In terms of the content acquired under the warrant that was initially going to look out for people internationally, if those data then pertain to people in the UK, another, more targeted examination warrant is needed. That is another protection and additional safeguard that was not there before. The statutory code of practice that is being put in place secures the safeguards that we need.
Particularly with regard to economic cybercrime, I hope that when the House considers the amendments on bulk data powers proposed by the SNP, it will conclude that Mr Anderson’s review is appropriate. Many Government Members are making an overwhelming case that these powers are necessary. I hope that the vast majority of colleagues will join us in rejecting the amendments.

Kevin Foster: It is a pleasure to speak in this debate. On Second Reading, I said that much of this can be dealt with in two ways: first, by making quite a sensationalist argument; and secondly, by looking at what is actually being proposed. Many of these powers, particularly on bulk data, are already being used, but they are now being avowed, put into legislation, and given a consistent framework. The legislation that already regulates much of this activity is from an era well before smartphones and the idea that a phone could do anything other than take a phone call. This Bill provides a much more modern piece of legislation, subject to clear safeguards.
While I appreciate the sentiments expressed by the hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Tom Elliott), I would always be tentative about using the argument, “If you have nothing to hide, you should have nothing to worry about.” I understand his point of view, certainly in terms of the bulk data powers, but we should always be rather careful about that being an argument for absolutely anyone being under surveillance at any time. That is not what is proposed in this Bill or these powers, given that there would need to be a warrant concerning how information is gathered.
It has been a pleasure to sit through the debate this afternoon, which has convinced me that the amendments are not justified and should be opposed. The speech given by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) was thoughtful. He adopted a responsible position, as a member of the Opposition, in teasing out some of the legitimate concerns about the Bill and making some genuine progress in getting reassurances from the Minister. It was encouraging to see that level of exchange on things that genuinely cause some concern.
I did not find allusions to the idea that we will take every letter from the Post Office particularly helpful or constructive. Neither did I find helpful the suggestion that if the police kick a door in, it will no longer be secure. When the police conduct a raid, they secure the property again afterwards, so that was not a particularly good analogy. I would never cast aspersions on any area of the country in particular, but it was a novelty to get a lecture on heckling from SNP Members, who regularly give me a good old heckle during my speeches. It is quite strange to be talking without being heckled, although  perhaps that will change at any moment. [Interruption.] Absolutely; I am only too happy to have it all the time. To be fair, some legitimate points have come out of one or two interventions, and we will need to work with Scottish law enforcement authorities on many of the powers that are exercised at a UK level.
A balance has to be struck. If we accept the amendments, we will remove the proposed powers completely. We will not modify them, make them slightly more secure or include extra protection. We will remove them completely, and I do not think that that is an appropriate step to take.

Anne McLaughlin: If the review shows that the bulk powers are not necessary, as the reviews in the USA showed, would the hon. Gentleman expect the powers to be taken out of the Bill?

Kevin Foster: I thank the hon. Lady for that helpful and interesting intervention. First of all, I would not want to prejudge the review. In addition, if the review came back to us and said that these powers were absolutely right, and that they were vital for national security, I hope that we could look forward to the SNP’s immediate and wholehearted support. I have a funny feeling that we might not, however.
Let us not prejudge the review. As the Front-Bench spokesmen touched on in their exchange at the Dispatch Box, it is highly unlikely that if the review stated that something specific was not needed, such a measure would be proceeded with. How do we know what an independent review will come back with? If I knew, and I stood here and said so, the next accusation would be that the review was not independent because we already knew what it would come out with. That point does not support making the amendments, which remove these powers completely.
I have been satisfied by the changes that have been made throughout the process, as the Bill has come out of Committee into Report. Judicial safeguards have been strengthened, and there is now a stronger and more consistent judicial test for review of these warrants. Powers have been increased, as have the offences that apply if someone misuses data. The Government are striking the right balance between what we need in order to get hold of data that could keep our country safe, and the legitimate expectation of privacy. If data have been collected that are of no use, they can be removed and they will not be used for purposes beyond the original basis of the warrant.
Ultimately, in any unjustified use of a warrant, the Secretary of State remains answerable to this Parliament. If, for example, someone decided for some unknown reason that it would make sense to go into detail about political or trade union affiliation, they would be answerable to this House, and a Secretary of State would be most unlikely to survive that.

Joanna Cherry: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that the Secretary of State would be answerable to the House only if such activity came to light? It might not come to light.

Kevin Foster: I take on board the point that the hon. and learned Lady makes. However, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield  (Mr Grieve) mentioned, the Intelligence and Security Committee would almost certainly oversee what was happening. As was touched on with the Minister, although the Committee is not involved in live intelligence work, it carries out reviews and, as discussed in relation to one of the probing amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend, there is an understanding of an exchange of information. I think it is highly likely that such activity would come to light eventually. Clearly, a Secretary of State who had sanctioned that would know that, bluntly, their job was over.
The powers in the Bill are proportionate to their aims. They have appropriate safeguards, and more work will be done following the review. It is wrong to prejudge an independent review by constantly asking, “What happens if they say no?” To put it the other way around, what happens if they say yes? I do not think that the amendments are right at this stage. It is appropriate to retain these parts of the Bill, and that is certainly what I will vote to do.

Lucy Frazer: I am honoured to take part in this debate, as I was to serve on the Bill Committee. I waited with much anticipation to hear my hon. Friend the Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare) quote Rudyard Kipling, but I am not sure that the quote was forthcoming. At first, I thought he might say, as Kipling did:
“A woman’s guess is much more accurate than a man’s certainty.”
On reflection, I thought perhaps he would say that,
“words are…the most powerful drug used by mankind.”
That would have been an apt quote in the context of the Bill, because communication can be revolutionary. We saw that with printing. Printing established the first mass medium for transmitting information, and some historians said that it played a role in the unrest that characterised the devastating thirty years war. They say that because although the doctrines set out by Luther in the 16th century were formulated two centuries earlier, they did not spread until the printing revolution.
We are now in the midst of a technological revolution. It has never been easier for terrorists to spread hatred and devastation across continents and recruit others to do so. Our security services need the tools to keep up with the technological developments.
I will deal with two matters: first, the background to the bulk powers and the reasons we need them; and secondly, the safeguards that exist in the Bill in respect of bulk powers.
The threats that we face are real. MI5 has said that the number of terrorism offences has risen by 35% since 2010. David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, has said that at the time of his report, MI5 explained to him that it had
“disrupted two…plots by lone actors in the past nine months”.
It explained to him that,
“identifying such individuals is increasingly challenging, exacerbated by the current limitations in their technical capabilities”.
David Anderson was saying the same thing as the director of Europol, who in evidence to the Home Affairs Committee in January 2015 said:
“Given that a majority of those communications run by these networks are moving online, there is a security gap there.”
He thinks that that is
“one of the most pressing problems that police face across Europe.”
The bulk powers are an important part of our toolkit. The Home Office has said that the bulk capability has
“played a significant part in every major counter terrorism investigation of the last decade, including in each of the seven terrorist attack plots disrupted since…2014”.
There are safeguards in the Bill. I have counted at least seven in relation to bulk interception. Bulk interception relates only to overseas communications; it needs to be activated in the interests of national security, in cases of serious crime or in the interests of the economic wellbeing of the UK; a warrant can be issued only by the Secretary of State; it can be issued only if the action is necessary and proportionate; the action of the Secretary of State is reviewed by a judge; there are restrictions on copying, disseminating and retaining the material that is collected; and there is a panoply of offences for cases of misuse.
During the Bill’s passage we have heard about additional safeguards. The Home Secretary has committed to providing a further operational case for bulk powers. We saw yesterday, with the passing of new clause 5, that the decision on whether a bulk power is allowed will be subject to the additional safeguard of a test of whether the result could be achieved by less intrusive means.
Like printing, the internet is improving our ability to communicate. We need to give our security forces the means to keep pace with these developments, because a country that cannot protect its citizens provides no freedom at all.

Stephen McPartland: I will speak to the amendments that stand in my name, amendments 153 to 160, which would remove clauses throughout the Bill that allow for the modification of bulk warrants. I will not press them because, like the rest of my amendments, they are probing amendments designed to tease out information from Ministers and ensure that there is further debate in the other place.
As I said in yesterday’s debate, I am not a lawyer, but in my humble opinion, major modifications of a warrant have the potential to completely change the key components of that warrant. I would like to understand at what point it becomes reasonable for a new warrant to be drafted.
I listened carefully to the Minister for Security yesterday and he said clearly to the House:
“I entirely accept the point that it would be completely unacceptable to have a robust system for issuing warrants and a less robust system for modifying them. Warranting has to be consistent throughout, and there can be no back-door way of weakening the process. That is not what the Government intend and not what we would allow.”—[Official Report, 6 June 2016; Vol. 611, c. 982.]
That is very reassuring and greatly welcome. I look forward to seeing how the robust system for modifications will be introduced as the Bill progresses. I accept that the Government have tabled a number of amendments to try to help in this area and, as I said, I will not press any of my amendments to a vote.
On a final point, I am not a particular fan of the bulk powers in the Bill. I have listened with great interest to the debates today and yesterday, and to the points that the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee has made about how bulk powers are used at the moment. In my view, surveillance should be targeted and the subjects of that activity clearly identified. That may well be naive in some senses, and I appreciate that there may be some areas where we require bulk powers,  to identify the haystack, as has been said. But the carte blanche on bulk powers should not be the first resort; it should always be the last resort.
There has been a lot of talk about postbags, and whether the country is at war and so on. The debate in general has been very conciliatory and Members on all sides have tried to get a Bill that, at the start of this Parliament, was very difficult to a place where most people can stomach most elements of it. I am still not in a position where I feel I can support it, but, realistically, a lot of people now feel it has been greatly improved and there is a lot of trust in the Minister for Security and the Solicitor General because of their work in listening to people and accepting amendments.
I am also very grateful that the Home Secretary has tried to alleviate concerns and agreed to an independent review of the bulk powers in the Bill, led by David Anderson, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. I look forward to his recommendations and what comes forward from them.

Thomas Tugendhat: It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Madam Deputy Speaker, particularly as you are appropriately attired in something that may indeed be collecting bulk data.
We are talking about amendments that would fundamentally undermine the very Bill that we have come to support, and would change the very tone of  the debate. I speak very much in support of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), who has gone through various aspects in quite significant detail, explaining to us time and again why the controls over the collection of bulk data are entirely appropriate. I also speak in support of the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), who has been through the Bill with the eye he has as a former Director of Public Prosecutions, seeing both the loopholes and the potential abuses, and covering them off.
I also speak in support of the Solicitor General, who has done exactly the same for us, and the Minister for Security, who has brought forward a Bill that answers the very questions that this state must always ask itself: how we guard our citizens and keep them safe while also keeping them free. This Bill does exactly that.
My first encounter with bulk data collection came in the constituency of my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, where the Defence School of Languages was sited. I was going through vast amounts of Arabic text. Although I was doing so in a most junior and rather ineffective manner, I learned how it was done properly. I was only a student; the masters have learned from that great Scots mathematician John Napier, who in the 17th century developed the logarithm, and whose lesson to us all, through mathematics, is how to build the pattern, understand the shape and break the code. That is why bulk data matter. We cannot build patterns without data and without volume, and we cannot make shapes without substance.
The bulk data are not themselves intelligence. As an intelligence officer in Her Majesty’s armed forces I was very proud to work on intelligence. It is not the raw product. It is what is analysed, what is useful and what decisions can be made from. That is not the bulk or the mass—the intelligence is the product. I am sorry to say  that there appears to be a slight misunderstanding as to what is the intrusion. The intrusion is surely not the clay from which the form is made, but only the detail on the individual that could be used against them. The Bill does not allow that without the tightest of safeguards, both from former judges and from serving Ministers.

Joanna Cherry: Is the hon. Gentleman aware that once the bulk data are collected by warrant there is an intermediate stage in which they are analysed in the way that he describes, but there is absolutely no legal regulation of how that analysis is carried out? That is our objection. How can I make it any clearer?

Thomas Tugendhat: The hon. and learned Lady speaks with her usual eloquence, but I am afraid I am going to refer her to schedule 4, part 1, which is a table containing a list of authorities and officers. The people who analyse are listed there. They are inspectors and superintendents of the Prison Service; lieutenant commanders and commanders of the Royal Navy; majors and, as in my case, very junior lieutenant colonels of the Army; squadron leaders and wing commanders; general duties officers of grade 4 and above; and Secret Intelligence Service officers.
There is a list—a catalogue—in schedule 4 of people in our country, men and women across these islands, whom we have trusted with the intelligence procurement for our nation to keep us safe. It is they who will be doing the analysis, under supervision. It is only when they have got something that is worth taking that they will be allowed to use it. That is the provision we are talking about and the type of supervision. People will not be allowed simply to collect and analyse. They will be allowed to collect and analyse only under warrant. That is absolutely essential.

Joanna Cherry: I repeat again: does the hon. Gentleman accept that no warrant is required to carry out the initial computer analysis? Does he understand that that is what those of us who were on the Bill Committee and who have worked on the Bill for months uncovered? Unlike some of his colleagues, who shout from a sedentary position that we do not understand this, we do understand it—we have been analysing it for months. Does he understand that there is no regulation by warrant of the analysis carried out by the individuals that he describes? That is the nub of the matter.

Thomas Tugendhat: The hon. and learned Lady is, I am afraid, picking on a hole in the Bill that is simply not there. [Interruption.] It is not there because the collection of bulk data is entirely categorised by the Bill. The Bill supervises entirely the ability to collect bulk data. The analysis is then done by trusted officers of the state. To accuse them of anything other than the highest forms of integrity would be an extraordinary statement to make in the House.

Gavin Newlands: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Thomas Tugendhat: No, I am afraid I will not. I have given way enough.
It would be baffling to look at that list and accuse people of such integrity of having anything other than the best intentions. The important thing, however, is that we not only trust them, but supervise them. We trust but verify, as the old diplomatic phrase goes. The verification comes from the commissioners, which were listed yesterday, with their explanations, which the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) was talking about yesterday. The supervision also comes from the Minister, and ultimately and eventually from the House.
I am therefore reassured that the Bill is not a snoopers charter or a grubby attempt to procure the information of the private citizens of these islands. On the contrary, this is an extremely effective Bill. It has been through months of discussion, and hours of detailed and deliberate interrogation. It has satisfied the extremely demanding standards of the Chair of the Intelligence and Security Committee, and the exemplary work of the former Director of Public Prosecutions, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, whom I am pleased to see on the Opposition Front Bench.
The Bill comes to the House as a nigh-on complete work. Even so, the Government have considered and accepted amendments and further changes. We have not only a final but a polished copy of a Bill that is designed to do exactly what this country vitally needs.  It does exactly what the Government are here to do. It keeps the people of these islands safe, whatever their background, origins, occupation or duties.
Fundamentally, it also protects the freedoms that we enjoy. Those freedoms are not, as the Americans put it, free. They are fought for every day, by the people on the list in schedule 4 that I have identified—our armed forces and our intelligence services. That is why I am so proud to be here today to speak up for the intelligence services who have asked for those powers; for the armed forces who require them; for the police who use them; and most importantly for the Government and, in this case, the official Opposition, who have so carefully crafted a legal document that will hold water today and for long into the future.

John Hayes: What an interesting and important debate we have had. This group of amendments addresses bulk powers. It is right that we should consider these matters in considerable detail because, as has been said by Members from across the Chamber, they are matters of profound importance and public concern. The public want to be assured that the safeguards we put in place for these vital powers are right, adequate, properly considered and properly reviewed. Many hon. Members have contributed to the debate. Tellingly, the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson), my hon. Friend the Member for South Ribble (Seema Kennedy) and the hon. Member for Fermanagh and South Tyrone (Tom Elliott) spoke with personal experience of terror.
We all know the scale and nature of the threat we face, but though we know it, that does not mean that it should not be explored again and again in this House. For to explore it is to realise what we need to counter it. That is precisely what was done in speeches by hon. Members from all sides of the House. The threat is real, imminent and unprecedented in character. Our opponents are increasingly adaptable and flexible. Although their aims may be barbarically archaic, their means are up to date. They are entirely modern. They are prepared to  use every device and every kind of communications medium to go about their wicked work, which is precisely why the Bill does what it does, why bulk powers matter and why the amendments that stand in the name of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), which I will deal with in a moment, are not ones I can accept—that will not come as any surprise to her, by the way.
An argument has been made that the operational case for bulk powers needs to be fleshed out more fully. Hon. Members will know that the Government did just that when they published the operational case for bulk. That informed the Committee consideration, which has been referred to several times during our short debate today, and has been a helpful way of establishing why bulk powers really count.
We are dealing with powers that have played a significant part in every major counterterrorism investigation over the past decade, including in each of the seven terror attacks disrupted since November 2014. These powers enabled over 90% of the UK’s targeted military operations during the campaign in south Afghanistan, and they have been essential to identifying 95% of the cyberattacks on people and businesses in the UK discovered by the security and intelligence agencies over the past six months. My hon. Friend the Member for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat) is right to say that this is about real life operational necessity. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Fareham (Suella Fernandes) on the role she played both on the Joint Committee and the Bill Committee. The threat she described so vividly is, as she said, worldwide and of a kind that would allow us to do nothing other than take the necessary steps to counter it in the defence of our freedoms.
I was perhaps a little unkind to the hon. Member for Glasgow North East (Anne McLaughlin) who spoke for the Scottish National party, although I make no apology for reprising what I said. Frankly, her contribution missed the point. The point is not whether the powers are necessary, it is whether we can put in place sufficient safeguards to ensure that they are used only when, how and where they should be. That was the point made by the Chair of the ISC and by the ISC when it had the chance to consider these matters. As the Chair of the ISC said, it then also had a chance to reconsider them, having been given further information of a secure kind—that is its function after all—and its members were persuaded that the powers were indeed necessary. It is right to have an informed, thoughtful debate about safeguards, checks and balances, and constraints, but we cannot have a grown-up debate about whether the powers count, because they are not new; they are existing powers. The Bill simply introduces additional safeguards, which I would have thought any reasonable Member would welcome.

Joanna Cherry: I gently suggest to the Minister that, as we have seen already this afternoon, patronising those of us who have taken the trouble to scrutinise the Bill, speak on it in detail and try to understand it does not get us anywhere. If the Government’s operational case for investigatory powers is so convincing and overwhelming, why have they now conceded the need for an independent review?

John Hayes: Let me repeat two things I said yesterday. First, the members of the Bill Committee all made a useful contribution, and the hon. and learned Lady is of  course one of them. Secondly, the Government, in wanting to get the Bill right, are prepared to listen and learn, as Governments should be. I have been in the House for a number of years, and there has not been a single piece of legislation that has not been better for having received proper scrutiny, that has not altered during its passage and that has not been a better Act as a result of consideration by the House. We should be proud of that. I was simply saying that to focus on some of the detail around safeguards seems to be absolutely right, whereas the debate about the necessity of the powers has already been had. I think there is a general acceptance that the powers are necessary.

Joanna Cherry: No, it has not.

John Hayes: I do not know if the hon. and learned Lady was listening, but I read out three things: 90% of operations in Afghanistan, 95% of cyber-attacks, every single major counter-terrorism investigation over the last decade. I cannot be plainer about the necessity, but because the Government are so determined to ensure adequate safeguards, we have agreed to a further review. As the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), generously said, the review is to be completed in exactly the form that emerged as a result of the discussions between the Opposition and the Government—an illustration of the House behaving at its best. The review, chaired by David Anderson, will be able to look not just at utility—the point I made to the Chair of the ISC—but at necessity, and it will be independent.

Anne McLaughlin: So the Minister is saying that all these counter-terrorism activities were helped by bulk powers, but now we are going to have a review to see whether that is true. As I said, there were two independent reviews in the US. The NSA argued—much as he is arguing now—that all 54 counter-terrorism events had relied on bulk powers, but both independent committees said, “Absolutely not. Not at all. There were other techniques.” What will he do if this review finds the same as the two reviews in the US? Will he then remove the bulk powers from the Bill?

John Hayes: It is a bit rich to say, “We want a review and we want the Government to listen and agree”, and then, when they do listen and agree, to say, “You haven’t agreed enough or soon enough.” I accept that the review should be entirely independent—I made that clear in my letter to the shadow Minister. I accept that it will be for David Anderson to decide exactly how he goes about his work. I have further accepted today that he should look at international comparisons, which I think is perfectly reasonable. It will be for David Anderson to decide whether he does that; if he wants to, that will certainly be within his scope. This will be an independent review, with as much information as possible made public, and it will be able to range, in the way the hon. Lady has described, across these powers.

Dominic Grieve: I have no doubt at all that the review done by David Anderson will be valuable and I hope it will also inform the House about how bulk powers work. In that context—and because I have picked this up—there has been a suggestion that the examination of material under a bulk warrant is somehow a free-for-all that is   left to the discretion of the official, and it plainly is not. It is subject to the operational purposes in clause 125, and if they are departed from, the official concerned would be acting unlawfully.

John Hayes: My hon. and learned Friend the Member for South East Cambridgeshire (Lucy Frazer) made the point, which my right hon. and learned Friend has now amplified, that these powers are subject to a range of safeguards. Let me be clear: the analysis of data intercepted in bulk is subject to automated filtering to ensure that data not of intelligence value are automatically discarded. This is a safeguard set out in the code of practice. There are rigorous safeguards in the Bill for examination, and the suggestion that there are not is, frankly, simply wrong and based on a confusion between the collection of material, as my right hon. and learned Friend has implied, and its examination.

Lucy Frazer: rose—

John Hayes: It is right, therefore, that we emphasise—as my hon. and learned Friend, who is about to intervene on me, did—that the safeguards are clearly set out both on the face of the Bill and in the supporting material; and, indeed, that they have evolved as a result of the scrutiny we enjoyed in Committee and through the pre-legislative scrutiny.

Lucy Frazer: My right hon. Friend is responding to a point, which the SNP has made on a number of occasions, about the US. Does he, like me, remember when the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) put that point to David Anderson on the very first day of our Committee? He said:
“It is difficult, of course, to read across from section 215 in the US to what we have here, which is rather different…I cannot speak for the US…different power, different circumstances”.––[Official Report, Investigatory Powers Public Bill Committee, 24 March 2016; c. 8, Q7.]

John Hayes: My hon. and learned Friend, with an assiduity that is matched by her intellect, has identified the fundamental flaw in the argument of our critics, which is that those who have looked at these matters most carefully have concluded both that these powers are necessary and that the safeguards we are introducing in this Bill—and by the way, these powers have existed for a long time; this is the first chance we have had to debate the legislative safeguards—are not only numerous but rigorous, in the way she has described. That was precisely the point that David Anderson made.
However, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras, in Committee and since, has said we need to do more. There are two ways for Governments to handle Oppositions, just as there are two ways for Oppositions to handle Governments: we can either do it antagonistically or we can do it co-operatively. The way I go about my work is inspired perhaps by Samuel Johnson—the great Dr Johnson, the man who said, by the way, that the devil was the first Whig, and I agree with him on that. Samuel Johnson said:
“Life cannot subsist in society but by reciprocal concessions.”
This Bill has been a model of that kind of reciprocal approach. And by the way, these concessions have not been climbdowns. They have not been given reluctantly,  they have not been turnarounds and they have not been in any sense wrung out of the Government. Nevertheless, they have been given on the basis of the proper pressure exerted by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras and other hon. Members for the Government to do more. Good government is about listening and learning, as I said yesterday, and that is precisely what we have done in respect of this review. I look forward to it and I anticipate its outcome with the same kind of interest that I know the hon. and learned Gentleman and others share.

Keir Starmer: I am grateful to the Minister, and I feel that I should put on record my gratitude to him for the way in which he has dealt with the demands that I have made on behalf of the Labour party. They have been considerable demands.

John Hayes: I thank the hon. and learned Gentleman for his support. I know that the Government Whips will take careful note of it. [Laughter.]
We have listened to the call for independent validation. David Anderson QC will undertake the review, so I will say no more about that.
We have debated at some length, today and previously, the amendments tabled by the Chairman of the Intelligence and Security Committee, my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), which contain a number of proposals. I am grateful for his contribution to the debate, generally and, more specifically, today. I am pleased that my right hon. and learned Friend has explained the purposes behind new clause 3 and amendment 24. The Government certainly accept in principle the argument that we should provide further restrictions on the use of class bulk personal dataset warrants. We also accept much of the detail contained in the ISC’s draft clause, including reference to the need for restrictions relating to sensitive personal data.
I have dealt with the issue about which—as my right hon. and learned Friend knows—we are least happy, namely the timescale within which these matters are reported to the ISC. I think that more could be done, and I think that a protocol of the kind that my right hon. and learned Friend described in his brief contribution might provide a way of doing it. We will take that suggestion away and do further work, in the spirit to which he referred.
My hon. Friend the Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), who is no longer present but who is an old friend of mine, raised issues relating to modifications. I want to make it absolutely clear that in all modifications, a warrant will require the same double lock. Yesterday and in Committee, the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras argued that a double lock that applies when a warrant is originally sought must apply to modifications. I entirely accept that point. My hon. Friend made it again today, and I can assure him that the double lock will apply to bulk powers as well.
The hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras raised the issue of medical records. It is right for particularly sensitive data to be handled in a particularly sensitive way, and I am pleased that he Gentleman noted the Government amendment which, I think, deals with that. We will consider the technical points that he raised about social care and mental health, but I am confident that we can find a way forward.
I do not want to delay the House unduly—as you know, Madam Deputy Speaker, that is not my habit, and we have other important matters to consider—but I do want to say that one of my regrets is that we have not had more Proust today, or during our consideration of the Bill more generally. Marcel Proust said:
“The only real voyage of discovery consists not in seeking new landscapes, but in having new eyes”.
The consideration of this Bill has been extensive. Three reports before its publication in draft, three parliamentary Committees once the draft Bill was published, and a very thorough examination in Committee following Second Reading have allowed us to have “new eyes”, and to see more clearly both the need to secure our people and counter the very real threats that we face, and the need to deal with the checks and balances which ensure that the powers we give those who are missioned to keep us safe are used proportionately, and only where necessary. Achieving that balance—a balance that lies at the heart of the Bill—has required the House to take a balanced approach. As I said a few moments ago, Parliament is at its best when it puts national interest beyond party interest, and this is common ground for the common good.

Anne McLaughlin: I have to say that the Minister’s tone does not really reflect that which some of his hon. Friends used when addressing this debate. I have felt completely patronised at times today, because people on the Government Benches have been shouting, “You don’t understand this Bill.” Just because we take a different view or come at things from a different angle does not mean that we do not understand. The right hon. Member for Rutland and Melton (Sir Alan Duncan) shakes his head, but it was offensive to have to listen to that nonsense, particularly when it was directed at my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), who is a learned QC and certainly does know what she is talking about.

Alan Duncan: Will the hon. Lady give way?

Anne McLaughlin: No, I will not take any interventions—[Interruption.] Okay, patronise away.

Alan Duncan: May I just say—[Interruption.]

Eleanor Laing: Order. We will listen to Sir Alan Duncan.

Alan Duncan: May I just say to the hon. Lady and her hon. Friends that there was no intention whatsoever to be patronising? If she wants to take it in that vein, may I apologise and do so graciously? Our view is simply that bulk interception and bulk powers involve a poor use of the word “bulk”. The intrusion on the individual compared with the collective gathering of information is misunderstood in many cases. That is our point, and I hope that she can accept it in that spirit.

Anne McLaughlin: I most certainly will accept the right hon. Gentleman’s apology, but I reiterate that just because we come at this from a different angle does not mean that we are wrong. These are our opinions, and Government Members have their opinions.
I also want to mention the hon. Member for North Dorset (Simon Hoare), who was utterly offensive in his suggestion that we in the SNP quarter—[Interruption.] And the Lib Dem quarter, and everybody else on this side. The hon. Gentleman suggested that we do not care about terrorism or about people affected by paedophilia. Of course we care! He suggests that we do not just because we do not believe that this is the way to go about tackling those things, but we are not the only ones who believe that. It was really, truly offensive and below the belt, and I think the hon. Gentleman should apologise. I will accept it in writing if he is not going to do it here.

Simon Hoare: You’ll have a long wait.

Anne McLaughlin: I’ll wait a long time, will I? Okay.
To sum up, we will be pressing the amendment because we have heard nothing today that reassures us. The legislative process in the House of Commons is coming to an end, but how can we be expected to vote when there is to be a review? On that note, I appeal to dear and learned friends in the Labour party to think again about trusting this lot with the review, because not one Government Member—I know that the Labour party has not done this either—will say what they will do if the independent review shows that the bulk powers are unnecessary, as has been shown in the United States—[Interruption.] No, I gave the Minister an opportunity, but instead of answering the question, he took an intervention from the Government Benches. He has not said what the Government will do if the review shows what he is not expecting it to show.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The House divided:
Ayes 66, Noes 285.

Question accordingly negatived.
More than three hours having elapsed since the commencement of proceedings on consideration, the proceedings were interrupted (Programme Order, 6 June).
The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83E).
Clause 121

Power to issue bulk interception warrants

Amendment made: 42,page98,line13, leave out subsection (5).—(Mr John Hayes.)
This amendment is consequential on new clause 5.
Clause 138

Power to issue bulk acquisition warrants

Amendment made: 43,page110,line5, leave out subsection (4).—(Mr John Hayes.)
This amendment is consequential on new clause 5.
Clause 148

Service of warrants outside the United Kingdom

Amendments made: 44,page116,line9, leave out
“on a person outside the United Kingdom”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 45.
Amendment 45,page116,line9, at end insert—
“( ) A copy of the warrant must be served in such a way as to bring the contents of the warrant to the attention of the person who the implementing authority considers may be able to provide assistance in relation to it.”
The amendment makes it clear that, where a person is required under clause 147 to provide assistance in relation to a warrant, a copy of the warrant must be served in such a way that the person is aware of the contents of the warrant and so can provide that assistance.
Amendment 46,page116,line10, leave out “the person” and insert “a person outside the United Kingdom”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 45.
Amendment 47,page116,line23, after “person” insert “outside the United Kingdom”.—(Mr John Hayes.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 45.
Clause 156

Power to issue bulk equipment interference warrants

Amendment made: 48,page122,line42, leave out subsection (4). —(Mr John Hayes.)
This amendment is consequential on new clause 5.
Clause 164

Modification of warrants

Amendments made: 127,page127,line16, after “modification”, insert
“adding or varying any operational purpose”.
This amendment restricts the application of clause 164(4) to cases where a major modification of a bulk equipment interference warrant adds or varies an operational purpose. It is consequential on amendment 128.
Amendment 128,page127,line20, at end insert—
“( ) A major modification adding or varying any description of conduct—
(a) must be made by the Secretary of State, and
(b) may be made only if the Secretary of State considers—
(i) that the modification is necessary on any of the grounds on which the Secretary of State considers the warrant to be necessary (see section156(1)(b)), and
(ii) that the conduct authorised by the modification is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct.”—(Mr John Hayes.)
This amendment provides for both a necessity test and a proportionality test to apply in relation to a decision whether to make a major modification of a bulk equipment interference warrant by adding or varying a description of conduct.
Clause 170

Safeguards relating to examination of material etc.

Amendment made: 129,page133,line25, leave out “section” and insert “Part”.—(Mr John Hayes.)
This amendment is consequential on amendment 130.
Clause 173

Chapter 3: interpretation

Amendment made: 130,page134,line32, at end insert—
““protected material”, in relation to a bulk equipment interference warrant, has the meaning given by section170(9);”.—(Mr John Hayes.)
This amendment provides for the definition of “protected material” given by clause 170 to apply for the purposes of the Part.
New Clause 14

Health Records

“(1) Subsections (2) and (3) apply if—
(a) an application is made by or on behalf of the head of an intelligence service for the issue of a specific BPD warrant,
(b) the purpose, or one of the purposes of the warrant, is to authorise the retention, or the retention and examination, of health records.
(2) The application must contain a statement that the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the warrant is to authorise the retention, or the retention and examination, of health records.
(3) The Secretary of State may issue the warrant only if the Secretary of State considers that there are exceptional and compelling circumstances that make it necessary to authorise the retention, or the retention and examination, of health records.
(4) Subsection (5) applies if—
(a) an application is made by or on behalf of the head of an intelligence service for a specific BPD warrant,
(b) the head of the intelligence service considers that the bulk personal dataset includes, or is likely to include, health records, and
(c) subsections (2) and (3) do not apply.
(5) The application must contain either—
(a) a statement that the head of the intelligence service considers that the bulk personal dataset includes health records, or
(b) a statement that the head of the intelligence service considers that it is likely that the bulk personal dataset includes health records and an assessment of how likely this is.
(6) In this section, “health record” means a record, or a copy of a record, which—
(a) consists of information relating to the physical or mental health or condition of an individual,
(b) was made by or on behalf of a health professional in connection with the care of that individual, and
(c) was obtained by the intelligence service from a health professional or a health service body or from a person acting on behalf of a health professional or a health service body in relation to the record or the copy.
(7) In subsection (6)—
“health professional” has the same meaning as in the Data Protection Act 1998 (see section 69 of that Act);
“health service body” has the meaning given by section 69(3) of that Act.”—(Mr John Hayes.)
This amendment requires an intelligence service to take special steps when making an application for a specific BPD warrant relating to health records. In addition, where the purpose, or one of the purposes, of the warrant would be to authorise the retention, or the retention and examination, of health records, the Secretary of State may issue the warrant only if he or she considers that there are exceptional and compelling circumstances.
Brought up, and added to the Bill.
New Clause 18

Persons who may apply for issue of warrant—

“Each of the following organisations may appoint a designated senior officer responsible for applying for a communications data retention warrant—
(a) a police force maintained under section 2 of the Police Act 1996,
(b) the Metropolitan Police Force,
(c) the City of London Police Force,
(d) the Police Service of Scotland,
(e) the Police Service of Northern Ireland,
(f) the British Transport Police Force,
(g) the Ministry of Defence Police,
(h) the Royal Navy Police,
(i) the Royal Military Police,
(j) the Royal Air Force Police,
(k) the Security Service,
(l) the Secret Intelligence Service,
(m) GCHQ, and
(n)the National Crime Agency.” —(Stephen McPartland.)
This new Clause will restrict access to communications data to the Intelligence Agencies and law enforcement only.
Brought up, and read the First time.

Stephen McPartland: I beg to move, That the clause be read a Second time.

Eleanor Laing: With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
New clause 19—Local authority authorisations: notification of chief executive—
“Where, on an application under sections 66 to 69, the relevant judicial authority approves an authorisation (including a Judicial Commissioner approval by order under section 68), the designated  senior officer must notify the chief executive of the local authority, or subscribing authority, of that approval, or those approvals as the case may be, prior to that authorisation taking effect.”
Amendment 320,in clause 53, page42, leave out lines 14 and 15 and insert
“Subsection (2) applies if a designated senior officer of a relevant public authority considers—
“(a) that a Judicial Commissioner may, on an application made by a designated senior officer at a relevant public authority, issue a communications data access authorisation where the Judicial Commissioner considers—”.
See amendment 327.
Amendment 321,page42,line21, leave out paragraph (b)(ii).
See amendment 327.
Amendment 322,page42,line26, leave out
“The designated senior officer may authorise any officer of the authority to”
and insert
“A communications data access authorisation may authorise the designated senior officer or a telecommunications operator to”.
See amendment 327.
Amendment 323,page42,line39, leave out “authorised officer” and insert “designated senior officer”.
See amendment 327.
Amendment 286,page43,line39, after “detecting”, insert “serious”.
This amendment inserts a higher threshold for accessing communications data.
Amendment 287,page43,line39, after second “preventing”, insert “serious”.
This amendment inserts a higher threshold for accessing communications data.
Amendment 324,page43,line41, leave out paragraphs (c) to (e).
See amendment 327.
Amendment 288,page44,line1, after first “or”, insert “serious”.
This amendment inserts a higher threshold for accessing communications data.
Amendment 289,page44,line1, after “any”, insert “serious”.
This amendment inserts a higher threshold for accessing communications data.
Amendment 290,page44,line2, after “any”, insert “serious”.
This amendment inserts a higher threshold for accessing communications data.
Amendment 291,page44,line2, after third “or”, insert “serious”.
This amendment inserts a higher threshold for accessing communications data.
Amendment 325,page44,line13, at end insert—
“(7A) An authorisation may be considered necessary as mentioned in subsection (7)(b) or (7)(f) only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed.”
See amendment 327.
Amendment 292,page44,line18, at end insert—
“(9) Serious crime in subsection (7)(b) above means—
(a) any crime where a person guilty of the offence is liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term of imprisonment of [a maximum of] 6 months or more; or
(b) a crime which causes serious damage to a person’s physical or mental health.”
This amendment defines the higher threshold, inserted by other amendments to Clause 53, for accessing communications data.
Amendment 326,in clause 54, page44,line19, leave out clause 54.
See amendment 327.
Amendment 13, page44,line28, leave out subsection (3)(b) and insert—
“(b) the investigation or operation concerned is one where there is an exceptional need, in the interests of national security, to keep knowledge of it to an absolute minimum,
(ba) there is an opportunity to obtain information where—
(i) the opportunity is rare,
(ii) the time to act is short, and
(iii) the need to obtain the information is significant and in the interests of national security, or”.
On behalf of the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament, to amend the Bill to ensure that the exceptional national security-related circumstances under which there does not need to be a separation between those requesting and those authorising requests for communications data, is narrowly drawn.
Amendment 293,page45,line13, at end insert—
“(7) For the avoidance of doubt, an internet connection record does not include the content of any communication.”
An amendment to clarify the description of internet connection records.
Amendment 327,in clause 55, page45,line16, leave out paragraph (a).
Amendment 4,page46,line40, leave out clause 58.
These amendments provide that in order to access communications data, a relevant public authority must seek a warrant from a Judicial Commissioner rather than undertake a system of internal authorisation. These amendments would require that there is reasonable suspicion of serious crime for a warrant authorising communications data acquisition.
Amendment 164,in clause 58, page46,line41, leave out “maintain”.
See amendment 163.
Amendment 165,page46,line41, leave out “operate”.
See amendment 163.
Amendment 166, page47,line1, after “officer” insert “in exceptional circumstances”.
This amendment restricts the use of the filter to exceptional circumstances. This will ensure that the use of the filter does not become routine practice or the default mechanism for obtaining communications data.
Amendment 161,page47,line7, leave out “arrangements” and insert “regulations”.
See amendment 163.
Amendment 167,page47,line18, at end insert—
“(c) obtaining the approval of a Judicial Commissioner to the filtering regulations in the same way as if the data was to be obtained by a targeted interception warrant as set out in this Act.”
This amendment requires use of the filtering arrangements to obtain data to be approved by a Judicial Commissioner. Filtering requires higher authorisation standard, as it has much greater powers to detect across many datasets and with high efficiency, being more akin to bulk acquisition than to individual requests for data.
Amendment 168,page47,line19, leave out subsection 3.
This amendment stops the user of the filter for general purposes - such as support, maintenance, oversight, operation or administration of the arrangements - not directly related to the core investigative  functions of public bodies. It also removes the use of the filter to support the general oversight functions of the Investigatory Powers Commission.
Amendment 162,page47,line19, leave out “arrangements” and insert “regulations”.
See amendment 163.
Amendment 163,page47,line27, leave out “arrangements” and insert “regulations”.
These amendments would make the filtering arrangements to be governed by a statutory instrument subject to all normal transparency and processes of judicial review.
Amendment 169,page47,line32, leave out “must consult” and insert
“shall obtain the prior approval of”.
This amendment creates a duty to obtain prior approval from the Commissioner for the filtering system. By asking the Commissioner for prior approval of any plans, the assessment of necessity and proportionality would be much more likely to be robust. Any abuse and expansion of scope and abilities of data mining would be more likely to be restrained. The Commissioner would also have the ability to ensure that requirements they might seek are properly considered at the start.
Amendment 170,page47,line35, at end insert—
“(5A) Nothing in this section shall be used in respect of information which can be reasonably obtained by any other means under this Act.
(5B) Nothing in this section shall be used for the bulk collection of information.
(5C) The powers under this section shall only be used by the Secretary of State when no other power under this Act or other statute can achieve the same objective.”
This amendment restricts the use of the filter to those purposes the government has put forward. Given the lack of clarity on what the filtering arrangements are and whether they will become the normal way to acquire communications data of any type, this amendment seeks to restrain the power so that it is used as narrowly as possible.
Amendment 171,page47,line35, at end insert—
“(5A) The Secretary of State shall at least once a year make a report to Parliament detailing the filtering arrangements made under this clause.”
This amendment would require the Secretary of State to make an annual report to Parliament explaining what the filtering arrangements consisted of and were being used for. This would improve public scrutiny and reinforce the provision in clause 58(4).
Amendment 5,page47,line36, leave out clause 59.
Amendment 6,page48,line16, leave out clause 60.
Amendment 172, in clause 60,page49,line29, at end insert—
“(10) All filtering arrangements under this Act shall not endure more than six months.
(11) The Secretary of State shall not use any power under Part 3 of this Act unless such power cannot be exercised under any other statutory provision.
(12) The Secretary of State shall ensure that the filtering arrangements are always used exceptionally and with regard to privacy rights.
(13) The Secretary of State shall from time to time consider the proportionality and necessity of all filtering arrangements in place.
(14) The Secretary of State shall terminate any filtering arrangements which are not proportionate or necessary.”
This amendment requires filtering arrangements to be renewed every six months; makes them a power of last resort; requires assessment of necessity and proportionality; requires termination of arrangements which are not truly needed.
Government amendments 49 and 50.
Amendment 143,in clause 68, page54,line14, leave out “not”.
Amendment 144,page54,line15, at end insert
“unless an application without such notice is required in order to avoid prejudice to the investigation.”
Amendment 145,page54,line15, at end insert—
“( ) Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 shall apply to an application for an order under this section as if it were an application for an order under that Schedule.”
This amendment seeks to ensure that the same level of protection is provided for journalists’ sources under the Bill as is currently provided in PACE.
Government amendments 51 and 52.
Amendment 300,in clause 73, page58,line33, at end insert—
“(4) In proceedings against any person for an offence under this section in respect of any disclosure, it is a defence for the person to show that the disclosure was in the public interest.”
An amendment to introduce a public interest defence for disclosures regarding the obtaining of communications data.
Amendment 207,page205,line6, leave out schedule 4.
New clause 26—Retention of communications data—
“An operator who has not been designated as the operator of an electronic communications network or service according to section 34 of the Communications Act 2003; or whose service has fewer than 50,000 subscribers, shall not be required to comply with a retention notice under Clause 78.”
The new clause excludes the providers of rural or community access communications services and small service providers from the obligation to collect and retain data, in accordance with policy statements made by the Home Office.
Amendment 328,in clause 78, page61,line5, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”,
See amendment 350.
Amendment 329,page61,line5, after second ““notice”)” insert
“on an application made by a designated senior officer at a relevant public authority”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 330,page61,line7, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 331,page61,line9, at end insert—
“(1A) A notice may be considered necessary only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed in relation to the grounds falling within section 53(7).”
See amendment 350.
Amendment 332,page61,line38, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 3,page62,line22, leave out “therefore includes, in particular” and insert “does not include”.
Amendment 294,page62,line23, at end insert—
“(10) A retention notice must not require any data which is, or can only be obtained by processing, an internet connection record to be retained for any purpose other than the purpose specified in section 54(4).”
An amendment to restrict the retention of internet connection records.
Amendment 333,in clause 79, page62,line26, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 334,page62,line35, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 336,in clause 80, page62,line40, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner” on both occasions.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 337,page63,line7, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 338,page63,line8, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 339,page63,line9, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 340,page63,line10, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 341,page63,line19, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “designated senior officer at a relevant public authority”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 342,page63,line24, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “designated senior officer at a relevant public authority”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 343,page63,line25, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 470,page63,line31, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 471,page63,line33, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 344,in clause 83, page64,line13, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 345,page64,line14, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 346,page64,line15, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 347,page64,line23, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 348,page64,line38, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
See amendment 350.
Amendment 350,page64,line40, leave out “Secretary of State” and insert “Judicial Commissioner”.
These amendments provide that judicial authorisation is required for retention of communications data. These amendments would require that there is reasonable suspicion of serious crime for a warrant authorising retention of communications data.
Amendment 301,in clause 84, page65,line26, at end insert—
“(4A) Subsections (2) and (3) do not apply to a disclosure made in the public interest.”
An amendment to introduce a public interest defence for disclosures regarding the retention of communications data.
New clause 15—Review of operational case for bulk powers—
“(1) The Secretary of State must appoint the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation to review the operational case for the bulk powers contained in Parts 6 and 7 of this Act.
(2) The independent reviewer must, in particular, consider the justification for the powers in the Act relating to—
(a) bulk interception,
(b) bulk acquisition,
(c) bulk equipment interference, and
(d) bulk personal datasets.
(3) The independent reviewer must, so far as reasonably practicable, complete the review before 30 November 2016.
(4) The independent reviewer must send to the Prime Minister a report on the outcome of the review as soon as reasonably practicable after completing the review.
(5) On receiving a report under subsection (4), the Prime Minister must lay a copy of it before Parliament together with a statement as to whether any matter has been excluded from that copy under subsection (6).
(6) If it appears to the Prime Minister that the publication of any matter in a report under subsection (4) would be contrary to the public interest or prejudicial to national security, the Prime Minister may exclude the matter from the copy of the report laid before Parliament.
(7) The Secretary of State may pay to the independent reviewer—
(a) expenses incurred in carrying out the functions of the independent reviewer under this section, and
(b) such allowances as the Secretary of State determines.
(8) The independent reviewer shall complete further reviews on a five-yearly basis and the provisions of this section other than subsection (3) shall apply.
(9) In this section ‘the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation’ means the person appointed under section 36(1) of the Terrorism Act 2006 (and ‘independent reviewer’ is to be read accordingly).”
This amendment provides for an independent review of the operational case for the bulk powers in the Bill, and further periodic reviews, to be undertaken by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation.
New clause 17—Review of the Operation of this Act—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall appoint an Independent Reviewer to prepare the first report on the operation of this Act within a period of 6 months beginning with the end of the initial period.
(2) In subsection (1) ‘the initial period’ is the period of 1 years and 6 months beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.
(3) Subsequent reports will be prepared every 2 years after the first report in subsection (1).
(4) A copy of the report is to be laid before Parliament, with provision made for a debate on the floor of both Houses and then approved by resolution of each House.”
Because the Bill deals with National Security and changing technological capabilities, it should be subject to greater scrutiny by both Houses. This amendment will call for an Independent Review to take place and be approved by Parliament within 2 years of the Bill becoming law and then every two years.
New clause 22—Primacy of judicial commissioner’s approval—
“No authorisation sought for a warrant to intercept or obtain or examine primary or secondary communications data, whether targeted or in bulk, under this Act may be considered by a Minister unless it has first been approved by a Judicial Commissioner.”
New clause 25—Review of the Operation of this Act—
“(1) The Secretary of State shall appoint an Independent Reviewer to prepare the first report on the operation of this Act within a period of 6 months beginning with the end of the initial period.
(2) In subsection (1) ‘the initial period’ is the period of 4 years and 6 months beginning with the passage of this Act.
(3) Subsequent reports will be prepared every 5 years after the first report in subsection (1).
(4) Any report prepared by the Independent Reviewer must be laid before Parliament by the Secretary of State as soon as the Secretary of State is satisfied it will not prejudice any criminal proceedings.
(5) The Secretary of State may, out of money provided by Parliament, pay a person appointed under subsection (1), both his expenses and also such allowances as the Secretary of State determines.”
This new clause provides that the review of the operation of the Act shall be carried out by an Independent Reviewer.
New clause 27—Protection for journalistic sources, materials and activities—
“(1) Save in the exceptional circumstances identified in subsection (2), the regimes provided for by Parts 2 to 7 may not be used to access, obtain, record, hold, consider, analyse, disclose or otherwise deal with information, material or data—
(a) of, or concerning the activities of, journalists, or
(b) if the purpose of so doing is to obtain information identifying a journalistic source.
(2) The exceptional circumstances referred to in subsection (1) are—
(a) the case is one of great emergency,
(b) immediate action is necessary, and
(c) the relevant investigatory powers under the regimes provided by Parts 2 to 7 can be used lawfully having regard to the provisions thereof.
(3) In any case where the regimes provided for by Parts 2 to 7 are disapplied by subsection (1), any person who could otherwise have sought to use one of the investigatory powers specified therein may apply to a judge for an order allowing that person to access, obtain, record, hold, consider, analyse, disclose or otherwise deal with such information, material or data in a way provided for by Parts 2 to 7.
(4) An application for an order under subsection (3) shall be made on notice to the journalist or journalists affected unless the judge determines that an application without such notice is required in order to avoid prejudice to the investigation.
(5) Paragraphs 7 to 9 of Schedule 1 to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 shall apply in relation to the service of a notice of application for an order under subsection (1) as if the application were for an order under Schedule 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.
(6) Criminal Procedure Rules may make provision about proceedings under this section where the judge determines that an application without such notice is required.
(7) A judge may only make an order under subsection (3) if the person making the application has convincingly established that—
(a) the order is directed to one or more of the legitimate aims specified in Article 10.2 of the Convention,
(b) there is an overriding public interest necessitating the order,
(c) reasonable alternative measures to the order do not exist or have been exhausted, and
(d) the order is proportionate to the legitimate aim or aims being pursued.
(8) The costs of any application under subsection (3) and of anything done or to be done in pursuance of an order as a result of the application shall be in the discretion of the judge.
(9) In this section—
(a) ‘source’ means any person who provides information to a journalist;
(b) ‘information identifying a source’ includes—
(i) the name and personal data as well as voice and image of a source;
(ii) the factual circumstances of acquiring information from a source by a journalist;
(iii) the unpublished content of the information provided by a source to a journalist; and
(iv) personal data of journalists and their employers related to their professional work;
in so far as this is likely to lead to the identification of a source.
(c) ‘the Convention’ means the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; and
(d) ‘judge’ means a circuit judge or judge of the High Court.”
Amendment 206,page172,line24, leave out clause 222.
See new clause 17.
Amendment 494,in clause 223, page173,line18, leave out paragraph (i) and insert—
“(i) is about an entity to which a telecommunications service is provided by that telecommunications operator and relates to the provision of that service,”.
This amendment clarifies that the definition of communications data should apply to the providers of the relevant telecommunication services, rather than allowing an organisation to be required to provide data about services it does not provide.
Amendment 496,in clause 225, page177,line27, at end insert—
“‘national security’” means the protection of the existence of the nation and its territorial integrity, or political independence against force or threat of force”.
This amendment would provide for a definition of national security under “General definitions”, to apply throughout the Bill.
Amendment 495,page177,line36, at end insert—
“‘professional legal adviser’ means a person who is—
(a) an Advocate
(b) a Barrister
(c) a Solicitor.”
This amendment provides a definition of a “professional legal Adviser” which is important for clarification in relation to Clauses 25, 100, 135 and 171.

Stephen McPartland: I speak in support of all the amendments that I have tabled in this group. First, new clause 18 and amendment 207 are designed to try to restrict the powers in the Bill to the intelligence agencies and law enforcement only. Schedule 4 currently includes the Food Standards Agency and the Gambling Commission, and I am not clear what evidence there is for including those organisations and granting them access to such intrusive powers when other organisations will not have that access.
The Bill gives incredibly wide-ranging powers and there is clear nervousness about that on both sides of the House. I completely respect the integrity of the  security services and the police, but a lot of the fear seems to stem from the behaviour of some local authorities in the past and how they have used anti-terrorism powers to spy on people to see whether or not they have been recycling correctly and so on. As a result, those local authorities are not included in the Bill.
Let me give an example from Hertfordshire. The child protection unit of Hertfordshire County Council does not have access to communications data or the powers in the Bill in order to catch paedophiles, but the Gambling Commission and the Food Standards Agency would do so. I am unclear why a body that we would want to have access to such powers so that it can catch paedophiles and break up rings around the world cannot have access, when organisations such as the Gambling Commission or Food Standards Agency can have access.
I want to understand that difference. In the oral evidence sessions, when Ministers were questioning witnesses and when witnesses were providing evidence, there was a lot of talk about intelligence agencies, paedophilia and the problems in that regard. Ministers made it clear that a range of organisations had made robust cases to be included. The amendments are intended to tease out of Ministers why those cases were accepted when others were not. Frankly, I would much rather that Hertfordshire County Council’s child protection unit had access to some of the powers in the Bill than the Food Standards Agency, the Gambling Commission or some other organisation. The purpose of my amendment is to try to identify why we are where we are at the moment.

Robert Buckland: My hon. Friend and I have indeed spoken about these matters in some detail. I recognise his abiding concern and that of others with regard to this issue, which is why I will commit to publishing a detailed case for the minor public authorities ahead of these provisions being further considered in the other place. I hope that gives him some reassurance about the points that he has consistently raised.

Stephen McPartland: I am grateful to the Solicitor General. That is evidence of the work of the two Ministers over the past 12 months in negotiations with me and Opposition Members throughout to try to make the Bill workable for all of us. As I said, all my amendments are probing amendments and none are designed to be pressed to a vote. Their purpose is to gain information. I accept the Solicitor General’s undertaking and thank him.
Amendments 161 to 172 deal with the filtering arrangements in the Bill. The Home Office describes the request filter as a safeguard designed to reduce the collateral intrusion produced in searching for small, specific pieces of information in a large dataset. However, its very nature means that the request filter allows huge automated searches of very large datasets, which is a highly intrusive search facility. The Bill at present contains no restrictions, so any organisation listed in schedule 4, such as the Food Standards Agency and the Gambling Commission, will have access to the request filter. My amendments try to restrict the use of the filter to  exceptional circumstances, placing it under the control of the judicial commissioner, like other bulk powers, and providing greater scrutiny of how it is used and by which organisations.
The fact that we have almost no information on who will be in charge of building the request filter, other than that it will be operated by a third party on behalf of the Secretary of State, fills me with great fear. It makes me question whether the request filter will ever exist in reality, because Governments of all colours throughout the ages have been rubbish at commissioning and running large IT projects and delivering them on time, on budget and in working order.
The request filter means that some third party organisation builds a system and collects data from the communications service providers. It then analyses the data inside that system and passes that analysis over to the police. The police are not given direct access to the information, which I think the Minister has referred to as a safeguard, but I wonder why the police are not allowed access to the information, whereas a third party organisation is allowed. We do not know who those third parties are. The whole filtering process needs to be looked into and restrictions placed on it if it is not removed from the Bill completely, because we do not know enough about the mechanics of the system—who is going to build it or pay for it, how it is to be operated and what safeguards will be in place? For me, that is a huge problem.
The last group of amendments in my name arises from the fact that the Bill deals with national security and changing technological capabilities, so it should be subject to greater scrutiny by both Houses. New clause 17 and amendment 206 call for an independent review to take place within a couple years. I know that there have been numerous calls in the House for procedures to take place every 12 months or every two or three years, but under changing technological circumstances there are technologically- minded people in the House and outside who can already get round some of the provisions of the Bill. We are legislating only to catch up in some areas.
In other respects it will be difficult for the Bill to be made to work. On internet protocol 4 there is no possibility of identifying an individual IP address. For someone who is driving round the M25 and using a mobile phone, the IP address is the individual telecommunications towers as they move around the M25, so it would be impossible to identify what they were doing as long as they stayed mobile. Internet protocol 6, however, provides an IP address for each individual device. Internet protocol 6 is a long way off, so it seems to me that some of the provisions will not work technically. It is already possible to get around them. They are based on advances that may occur in 10 or 15 years’ time, but the technology will have moved forward so quickly that the provisions probably will not catch up then anyway.
There are a number of Tor browsers, as they are called, which allow an IP address to be masked. People can download a simple app on their iPhone or other device which, when they access the internet, will show their IP address as based in Munich or somewhere else, not in the UK. It is very simple to get round such details.
Finally, I understand the effort that Ministers have made to work with the Opposition and concerned Members in all parts of the House to try to ensure that the Bill gets on to the statute book by December. I appreciate that there is a sunset clause and that we must do something—we cannot do nothing. It is horrible that we live in a society in which these situations are emerging. For me, these are probing amendments designed to highlight specific areas of concern that need further scrutiny. I hope that they may be of interest to Members of the House of Lords and that they will consider the issues I have spoken about regarding the filter. I hope that the Government will take the amendments in the spirit with which they are offered, which is as probing amendments; not to be pushed to a vote, but as the basis for more negotiation.

Andy Burnham: This final group of amendments covers three of the seven substantial concerns that I set out in a letter to the Home Secretary after Second Reading: first, protection of journalistic material and sources; secondly, the definition of internet connection records, and the threshold for their use; and thirdly, the independent review of the operational case for bulk powers. Let me take each in turn.
I will deal with journalistic material and the protection of sources briefly, as the matter was debated at length yesterday. Protecting the ability of whistleblowers in private or public sector organisations to speak to journalists without fear of identification is one of the important checks and balances on state and corporate power. Many journalists and the National Union of Journalists have real concerns that clause 68 weakens the existing protections in law for journalistic sources operated under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984. They point to an incident in 2014 when police secretly accessed the mobile phone records and call data from a national newspaper, bypassing the PACE protections. Rightly, there are now worries that that has set a new precedent. Furthermore, they feel that the Bill might be about to enshrine that new precedent in law.
Under PACE, journalists are notified when the authorities want to access material and sources, so that they have the ability to challenge that in open court. The worry is that the Bill removes those protections. The National Union of Journalists makes the point that there is no real difference between physical notebooks and communications data held electronically; both could reveal the identity of a source. Labour shares those concerns; they were ably raised by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) in Committee, and they were also raised on Second Reading.
The Government have gone some way towards addressing our concerns, tabling amendments 51 and 52, which we welcome. The amendments will ensure that judicial commissioners, when considering a warrant, must give weight to the overriding public interest in a warrant being granted for the use of investigatory powers against journalists and that they must ensure that that is in keeping with wider and more general privacy points. That is a significant move. It takes points that would otherwise have been in codes underpinning the Bill and puts them on the face of the Bill.
Labour will accept these amendments, but we will do so while being clear that they do not go far enough. Indeed, they cover only the award of warrants, not  general access to communications data. We therefore support the amendments tabled by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) on behalf of the Joint Committee on Human Rights—amendments 143 to 145—which seek to extend the same level of protection to journalists as is currently the case under PACE.
We accept that this is a difficult area to get right, particularly when the definition of who is and who is not a journalist is changing in the digital world. We accept the difficulty facing Ministers. However, we think that the general principle, enshrined in PACE, of allowing journalists to challenge in open court any attempt to access material that could reveal sources is a good one. It would allow those public interest arguments to be heard and tested in court. We hope that the Government will today commit to working with us and the NUJ to find a wording that in the end does the job.

John Hayes: The right hon. Gentleman has made his case in a measured way. He acknowledges that it is difficult to define journalists because the modern media include many bloggers who are part time, occasional and so forth. However, he is absolutely right that a solution needs to be found, and I am happy to say that we will look at this issue with him and others in greater detail as the Bill enjoys its passage through this House and the other place.

Andy Burnham: I am grateful for what the Minister has said. It must be possible to find a definition that excludes casual or voluntary bloggers from individuals who make their living from writing or who work for organisations regulated by the Independent Press Standards Organisation or other regulators.

Joanna Cherry: I and my hon. Friend the Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North (Gavin Newlands) have added our names to the amendments tabled to clause 68 by the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman), and we will give them our support if they are pushed to a vote. However, does the right hon. Gentleman agree that it is regrettable that the opportunity has been lost at this stage to have uniform protection across the face of the Bill for communications with journalists, lawyers and parliamentarians?

Andy Burnham: I made a similar point yesterday, when I said that it would have been helpful had we made more progress on these issues, and perhaps I can push the Minister on this, because I know he is meeting the Law Society and the Bar Council later this week.
The truth is that this raises quite complex issues. With all three professions, a slightly different set of issues arises, and we should not rush to legislate. We should move on the basis that we know what we are trying to achieve, which is to protect the ability of the public to go to an MP without fearing that there is any compromise on a private discussion. We want legal privilege—the privilege that belongs to the client—to be protected. We also want journalists to be able to protect their sources, as they want to do. If we work with the Government on that basis in good faith, I believe that we will be able to come to the right position.

Alistair Carmichael: May I, through the right hon. Gentleman, tell the Minister that, when he says   he will speak to people in the House and others, those others really must include the National Union of Journalists?

John Hayes: indicated assent.

Robert Buckland: indicated assent.

Alistair Carmichael: Those are the people who will be better qualified than anyone else to define what a journalist is, and they do have something of a pedigree—going back to 1936—in terms of the definitions.

Andy Burnham: The right hon. Gentleman makes an important point, which I saw was accepted on the Government Front Bench. He has tabled a detailed amendment on this issue, and he is right to do so and to press the Government on this. All of us have to apply our minds to getting these definitions right for all three professions. There is still an open question, as we discussed yesterday, about Members of Parliament and the right level of scrutiny for any warrant against them, but there is equally more work to do on other fronts.
We should not pass a Bill that weakens these professions—as I said yesterday, this is not about preserving the special status of the individuals who work in them, but about protecting the public and their ability to raise issues through those individuals.

John Hayes: I have committed to writing to the NUJ and the Society of Editors, which I have met already. I have been waiting to do so until today’s debate so that my letter can be informed by it. However, I will happily write to them tomorrow, very much on the basis of taking these matters forward.

Andy Burnham: I very much appreciate what the Minister has said. I think that any colleague in any part of the House who has read the NUJ’s briefing for today’s debate will struggle to disagree with anything in it. If we want this Bill to leave Parliament with a high degree of consensus across society, it is right that these professional bodies feel, in the end, that the Bill is something they can support. That is a prize worth working for. Given his comments, I get the feeling that the Minister agrees.
Let me turn to the area where I have the greatest anxiety, and on which I am looking for considerable comfort from the Government—internet connection records. The hon. Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland) made some strong points about the bodies that can access them, and I would certainly want to support him in his endeavours in that direction. I want to raise issues relating to the definition of internet connection records and the threshold for their use.
When the Home Secretary introduced her draft Bill in a statement to this House in November, she correctly said that ICRs would cover sites visited, not pages looked at, but then went on to say that the ICR
“is simply the modern equivalent of an itemised phone bill.”—[Official Report, 4 November 2015; Vol. 601, c. 970.]
In my view, that comparison is neither helpful nor accurate. If a person’s itemised phone bill were to be leaked, it would not make a great deal of sense, and to most eyes it would simply be a jumble of numbers, but if an ICR were to be leaked, it would reveal a lot more  personal information that could potentially be used against people. ICRs therefore need a higher standard of protection than ordinary communications data.
I recognise that in a world where voice conversations over the phone are becoming less common, there is a need to move in this direction and allow the authorities to hold different forms of information. In order to deal with the changing nature of crime, police and security services need to have new tools at their disposal, and clearly the ICR is one such tool. It is also the case that information of this kind can prove vital in locating missing children in the crucial early hours of their disappearance. However, there is still a lack of clarity about what exactly can and cannot be included in an ICR, and a risk that if that is not clearly spelled out, there could be drift over the years—they could change and mutate, and become much intrusive. As they are a new construct, it would help to build public trust if the Bill contained a clear definition of ICRs and what they can include.
The Government’s position is that the draft code of practice makes it clear that URLs are not communications data and therefore, by definition, cannot be included. That is helpful to some degree, but it is not the same as having a single, clear definition in one place in the Bill. Our amendment 293 simply states that an ICR cannot include content. That is consistent with the position that Ministers have outlined throughout the Bill’s passage. Such an amendment would remove any lingering ambiguity. I urge the Government to accept it, or at least to commit to tabling one of their own that achieves the same thing.
Having made that point about the definition of internet connection records, I now wish to make it clear that my concern is less with the holding of data and more with the criteria under which they can be accessed. In general, communications data should not be capable of being accessed to investigate any crime, regardless of how serious the offence is and the impact on victims. For instance, we cannot justify intrusive powers for a minor driving offence, low-level antisocial behaviour or failure to pay a fine, but that, in effect, is what the Bill as drafted permits. There should be a clear and simple threshold for the use of communications data—namely, serious crime punishable by at least six months in prison, or crime where significant mental or physical harm could be caused. As I said, given the more intrusive nature of internet connection records, the threshold for their use should be even higher than that.
I understand the complexity inherent in getting the definition of that threshold right. I would not wish to rule out the use of internet connection records for cases involving online grooming, the sending of sexual communications to a child, online fraud or the location of a missing or suicidal child. I think we would all say that internet connection records should be used for those purposes, as the Home Secretary said in her response to my letter, but we need to agree a definition of serious crime that captures those activities without widening the net too much and allowing ICRs to be used in connection with the investigation of much more trivial offences.
Today, I am looking for an agreement in principle with the spirit of what I am saying: that there should be a general serious crime test for comms data and a higher threshold on top of that for the use of internet connection  records. I will listen carefully to what the Minister has to say on that, but unless I am satisfied, I am prepared to press our more general amendments to a vote.

John Hayes: I am sorry to interrupt the right hon. Gentleman in his flow. I have listened carefully to what he has said, and it has been the subject of discussion, as he knows, in Committee and elsewhere. I do not want to anticipate my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General in his summing up, and I mean him no discourtesy, but as the Bill Minister and the Security Minister, I commit to doing what the right hon. Gentleman asked. I do so because it is really important that we have a threshold that works, particularly on ICRs.
ICRs are, as the right hon. Gentleman says, qualitatively different. He is right about cases of harassment, and so on and so forth, which is why the matter is challenging and complex. He has made a powerful case here, following the powerful case made by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer), and I will bring the matter back to the House during our proceedings on the Bill in the form of an amendment, in the spirit that he has described.

Andy Burnham: I said at the start that I was looking for considerable comfort, and I think I have just received it from what the Minister has said. To be clear, I was saying that there should be a threshold of six months for the use of communications data, and a higher threshold on top of that for internet connection records. As the Minister just acknowledged, there is a qualitative difference between the two. If that is what we are agreeing, and if we are also agreeing that there should be no restriction on the use of internet connection records for the other serious purposes that I have outlined, the Opposition can probably move forward on that basis without pressing our amendments to a vote.
This is the area in which the Bill has the ability to lose public trust if we do not get it right, because it could affect every single citizen in the land. I am sure that as constituency MPs many of us have dealt with situations where an individual falls out with the police at a local level, and they perceive that they are being investigated for all kinds of things and that all aspects of their lives might be turned upside down. We have to put in place appropriate protections that would not allow personal information to be handed over freely in relation to more trivial offences.

Suella Fernandes: The provisions on ICRs are designed to resolve two problems. First, our law enforcement and security personnel cannot carry out IP address resolution—identifying which device is communicating with which device—without the new powers. Secondly, even with the originating and destination IP addresses, it may not be clear which website or communications service has been accessed. The evidence from the professionals to the Joint Committee was clear: ICR retention is imperative to enable IP address resolution for investigations.

Andy Burnham: I am grateful to the hon. Lady for making a point that will enable me to be absolutely clear about what I am saying. I am not arguing against the retention of the data, as I think I made clear at the beginning. I am not arguing against ICRs per se. I acknowledge that they could be a very important tool. In an age when communications have migrated online and people have fewer voice telephone calls, this information  could be crucial in detecting serious crime. I am saying that while we should legislate to allow the data to be held, we must also legislate to put in place a very precise threshold, so that the circumstances in which those data can be accessed are explicitly clear. There is not a broad reasonableness or necessity test. What I am saying is that we need a very clear definition of what level of crime permits the authorities to access those records.
I believe that if we find that definition—I feel that the Minister has given a commitment that we will get it—it will enhance public trust in this legislation. In my view, it will knock out completely that lazy label of “snoopers charter”. That is why it is so important that the Government nail this point before the Bill concludes its passage.

John Hayes: The right hon. Gentleman has looked at these matters very closely, as is illustrated by the fact that he has rightly said that there are some crimes, such as harassment, stalking and so on and so forth, that would not neatly fit into a simple category. He is also right that the threshold must be robust. This is not about minor crimes and it is not about snooping, as the less well-informed critics have sometimes described it. I have given the commitment that we will work with him and others during the passage of the Bill to move an amendment to address this issue. He was right to raise it today. He has asked for a commitment and he is getting one.

Andy Burnham: We have learned to admire the Minister greatly through this process, and we have learned that when he says something, it happens. I am reassured by the words that he has just put on the record.
If it helps—perhaps it does not, but I will say it anyway—I would favour quite a high test for ICRs, and significantly higher than six months. Alongside that, it might be possible to itemise the other individual occasions on which they could be used, be it online grooming or missing persons. The danger with trying to capture it all in a single time period is that we might open the net to other offences that we would not want to be included. I fully acknowledge that this is a complex area. That is why I want to give the Ministers leeway to see whether, working with us, they can find the right definition.

Andrew Murrison: The Joint Committee spent a lot of time on ICRs and IP address resolution; then along came clause 222, which gave us some comfort because the matter can be reviewed in five years. Some of us are of the view that ICRs will not, in any event, prove to be as useful as we might hope and as Ministers certainly hope. The Danish experience was that they were not useful and their collection was therefore dropped. It is quite possible that that will come to pass here, and that in five years’ time we will review this matter. Does the right hon. Gentleman agree that clause 222 persuades some of us who are a bit doubtful about the utility and value of ICRs that we should allow the provision because it will be reviewed in five years’ time?

Andy Burnham: The review is clearly a good idea, but it is also a good idea to tighten the definition and the threshold now, because we need to ensure that there is a degree of public confidence in what is being done here. I fully accept that the review is important. The point is that although ICRs in themselves may not necessarily  solve a crime, they may let the authorities know where to go to ask for more intrusive information. They will identify the app, service or whatever it is that is being used, which might allow further lines of inquiry.
I would not be casual about this point—not that I am suggesting the hon. Gentleman was being so. If we were to publish somebody’s 12-month website visiting record, which effectively is what an ICR is, it would reveal a large amount of information about them. It would give a pretty decent profile of what kind of person they were and some of the information could be highly personal. That is why I say that we need to legislate with great care in this area if we are to carry the public with us.

Kenneth Clarke: The right hon. Gentleman is making good progress in getting very welcome undertakings from the Minister to review this whole business, in particular on serious crime and on the creation of ICRs; will he confirm that his concern also extends to the accessing of communications data by a huge range of public bodies, including every local authority? When he is discussing this matter in the near future he will have better access than anyone else, or at least than most other people, so will his concern extend not only to defining serious crime but to looking at clause 53(7)? In that subsection, any crime is relevant, as is any occasion of preventing public disorder, which could extend to difficult neighbour cases. It also allows collection of data
“for the purpose of assessing or collecting any tax, duty, levy or other imposition, contribution or charge payable to a government department”.
It seems to me that the word “serious” should be put in all that, or else certainly some threshold should be. It is extremely all-embracing, and allows a district council anywhere to start getting access to communications data. Will he take those points into account as well?

Andy Burnham: I will certainly take the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s points into account. He is making the same case as we are in our amendments. To be clear, those amendments would create a general seriousness test for all communications data collection, which would have to be passed before any of those data could be released. The test created by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) in amendment 292 relates to offences for which the sentence is imprisonment for more than six months. We felt that that was proportionate. It begins to meet some of the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s concerns, as it would knock out some of the lower-level offences he has just described.
Given what the Minister has said, I do not intend to press that amendment to a vote, but it is the bottom line from where we start. On top of the general six months test for all communications data, we want a higher threshold for the more personal data in an internet connection record. I am glad that the right hon. and learned Gentleman intervened because we have now made that explicitly clear to the House.
I turn now to the independent review of the operational case for bulk powers, which allows me to finish on a more positive note. All the bulk powers in the Bill—bulk interception, bulk equipment interference, bulk acquisition, bulk personal datasets—give rise to privacy concerns  because of the more indiscriminate way in which they might be used. That is why it is important that they are granted on the basis of what is strictly needed rather than what it would be helpful to have, a point made by the Intelligence and Security Committee in its extremely valuable report. The Joint Committee on the draft Bill also recommended that there should be an independent review of the bulk powers. It was a point upon which I laid great emphasis in my letter to the Home Secretary, and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras has done the same throughout the passage of the Bill.
We are extremely pleased that the Government have agreed to that request. We agree that David Anderson, the independent reviewer, is the right person to lead the review. I understand that, following correspondence between my hon. and learned Friend and the Security Minister, terms of reference have now been agreed and the review can start in earnest. It will be concluded in time to inform proceedings in the other place. Crucially, it will consider the necessity of the powers and whether the same result could have been achieved through alternative methods. It will also have a balance of security expertise and human rights expertise. This is a significant move by the Government and will ultimately help build public trust in the Bill.
To hark back briefly to the debate on the last group of amendments, it is too early to say what we will do on the back of the review. We will have to see what it concludes, but our working assumption is that it will be incumbent on Members on all sides of the House to respond to the review and if necessary reassess their position on the back of it.

Alistair Carmichael: Does the right hon. Gentleman share my concern that at the Dispatch Box the Security Minister initially said the review would focus on necessity, but when winding up the last debate would not concede in any way, shape or form that the powers were not necessary? Does that not raise some concern in the right hon. Gentleman’s mind?

Andy Burnham: There is an exchange of letters between the Security Minister and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras, which I hope is in the public domain, and which I believe allays the fears of the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael). To be clear, it was a sticking point for Labour that the review had to consider necessity and not just utility. That is enshrined in the terms of reference, so I hope I can reassure him on that point.
Clearly, there is further to go on journalistic material and internet connection records, although it appears from what the Minister has said this afternoon that we are heading in the right direction. I stress again that progress on the ICR points that I have made are a personal red line.
That said, I thank the Home Secretary, the Solicitor General and the Security Minister for the constructive way in which they have approached our discussions. Because of the consensus we have been able to find, the legislation is more likely to succeed and to stand the test of time.

Dominic Grieve: I say to the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) that, as far as the review is concerned, I have no doubt that the Intelligence and Security  Committee will respond positively and provide input if David Anderson wants to discuss those matters with us. I certainly look forward to seeing his conclusions in the review on bulk powers, which I hope will be helpful to Parliament in identifying what improvements we can make.
Amendment 13, which is in my name and those of my colleagues on the Intelligence and Security Committee, concerns clause 54, on the additional restrictions on the grant of authorisations of communications data. In the Committee’s report into privacy and security published in March 2015, we recommended that, just like the police, the intelligence agencies should always ensure a separation of roles between those requesting access to communications data and those who provide the authorisation. Previously, that has not been the case. I am grateful that the Government accepted that principle, and that it is enshrined in clause 54(1). That is an important safeguard that the Government have added to the Bill.
I hope the Minister will forgive me, but notwithstanding that, the Committee, having looked carefully at the Government’s amendment, believe that, although it is 90% of the way there, 10% might do with some improvement. The Bill provides that there may be exceptional circumstances in which a separation is not required. I entirely accept that that is the case. There will be a small and probably very infrequent number of such examples where there is an imminent threat to life, which is provided for in clause 54(2) and (3). However, clause 54(3)(b) simply cites
“the interests of national security”,
which I should tell the Solicitor General is rather a broad concept, particularly as it features in all sorts of places in the Bill and can be extended to encompass almost anything that falls within the agencies’ remit.
The Committee believe that it is too vague and potentially too broad. Therefore, in amendment 13, we have proposed a measure that tries to narrow the matter down without in any way affecting operational effectiveness. The amendment would limit exceptional circumstances to those where the operation is so sensitive that knowledge of it must be kept to an absolute minimum, or where there is an unplanned, time-critical but very significant opportunity to obtain information that might be lost owing to any delay in obtaining a separate approval.
The Committee very much hopes that the Government are in a position to accept the amendment.

Robert Buckland: There is more debate to be had about whether the phrase “absolute minimum”, as opposed to plain “minimum”, should be used, but I am happy to assure my right hon. and learned Friend that, in principle, we accept the amendment. We will commit to returning with a technically adequate amendment in the other place.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Solicitor General for his comments and I will not take up any more of the House’s time. I think that “minimum” might well be acceptable. The key thing is the next subsection, which I think tries to encapsulate very clearly the sort of exceptions we are talking about.

Joanna Cherry: The right hon. and learned Gentleman and I may be on different sides of the House, but I have the highest regard for the clarity and erudition with  which he approaches matters. The Intelligence and Security Committee, which he chairs, said in its recommendations on the draft Bill that the Bill did not make it clear that getting internet connection records
“through a specific request to a Communications Service Provider under Part 3”
is not the only way in which the agencies may have access to internet connection records. He said that that was “misleading” and that
“the Agencies have told the Committee that they have a range of other capabilities which enable them to obtain equivalent data”
to internet connection records. He said the Bill should make that clearer. Has the Bill been amended to his satisfaction on that point?

Dominic Grieve: The hon. and learned Lady raises a relevant point. The Bill has not been amended, but we received sufficient assurances from the Government that the way in which the system would be operated, in terms of the internal workings of the agency, would be such as to meet the concerns we expressed. Indeed, the Solicitor General or the Minister may be in a position to confirm that. On that basis, despite the fact that we raised the point, we did not table an amendment on it. The hon. and learned Lady is quite right to pick it up. I have not wanted to detain the House for too long, otherwise I could take her through a list of areas on which, having had further discussion, we decided amendments were not required. She is right to focus on that and I hope very much the Minister is able to provide some confirmation. I am grateful to her for having raised it.

Gavin Newlands: Along with my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), I represented the SNP in Committee. I am grateful for the opportunity to take part on Report.
I have many concerns about the Bill, and my hon. Friends have already outlined a number of areas where the SNP is sceptical about the Government’s case. This is a wide-ranging and complex Bill and time constraints prevent me from speaking to everything I would like to. However, I will focus my contribution on communications data and internet connection records. The measures in the Bill are not limited to internet access, email or telephony and include, explicitly, communication without human intervention. As it stands, the definition of communications data can tell us an awful lot about someone’s life. Stewart Baker, former senior counsel to the NSA in the United States, states that the content of a person’s communications data is redundant when we consider the amount of metadata that is already collected.
Communications data can be key in obtaining leads, solving crimes or preventing crime. However, I have a real issue with the length of the list of public bodies that would be able to access such personal and sensitive information on an individual without sufficient oversight in place. As we heard at the end of the previous debate and again at the start of this debate, from the hon. Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), schedule 4 currently provides for a list of bodies that would be able to access retained data, including a range of regulatory bodies. Among them are the Food Standards Agency,  the Gambling Commission, the Office of Communications, and the Health and Safety Executive. No fewer than 47 bodies are listed, a reflection of the tightly drawn nature of the Bill—or otherwise. That suggests that access to communications data may be granted for a range purposes, which will almost certainly be disproportionate and inconsistent with the guidance offered by the European Court of Human Rights.
It is only appropriate that the correct level of protection and oversight is in place. The SNP tabled amendments 320 to 327 and 328 to 350 to ensure sufficient judicial oversight. The relevant public bodies must seek a warrant from a judicial commissioner, replacing the Secretary of State in the process where necessary. They also ensure that a threshold of reasonable suspicion would be necessary before a warrant is issued.
The arguments on judicial warrantry have already been rehearsed at length and I do not intend to detain the House long on this issue, particularly as my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West speaks with a lot more authority on that subject than I do. Suffice it to say, I think hon. Members should pause and reflect on the lack of oversight. Decisions concerning necessity and proportionality can only be made properly by someone who is truly independent from the operations of the organisation.
Clause 54 contains the first mention of internet connection records. Subsection (6) defines ICRs in such general terms as to render the definition pointless. In that regard, I welcome some of the comments from the shadow Home Secretary and the Minister in their courting across the Dispatch Box a little earlier.
As we have heard, the Government intend to serve notices on service providers to retain a rolling record of each and every website visited by everyone in the UK for 12 months. The SNP has listened closely to the Government’s case for ICRs, but despite having sat through all the Committee sittings, we remain deeply unconvinced about their merit. These concerns are shared by those working in the sector and, as we read this weekend, by some Tory Back Benchers who claim that the provisions provide too many organisations with too many intrusive powers. I could not agree more.
The industry has indicated a willingness to work with the Government to help implement ICRs, but the trouble is that the industry does not know what ICRs are, and it looks like the Government still do not know either. The lack of detail is not good enough, given that the Government are asking us to sign off on legislation that will have a significant impact on the industry and will impinge on the personal privacy of all our constituents. The Internet Services Providers’ Association says:
“The Investigatory Powers Bill deals with highly complex technical matters, however, our members do not believe that complexity should lead to a Bill lacking in clarity.”
For me, this sums up the situation perfectly.
The information likely to be contained in an ICR is extremely intrusive data that could be used to profile or create assumptions about an individual’s life, connections and behaviour. For example, it might reveal deeply personal information, such as visits to pregnancy advice, mental health or gay websites. The Government did not  always favour such intrusive policies. In 2009, during consideration of a European directive, the current Immigration Minister said:
“Our consideration of the regulations comes against the backdrop of an increasingly interventionist approach by the Government into all of our lives, seemingly taking the maxim ‘need to know’ to mean that they need to know everything. Certainly, we need to know what the Government’s intentions are in relation to the creation of a new central database, which would create a central store of our electronic communications.”—[Official Report, Fourth Delegated Legislation Committee, 16 March 2009; c. 6.]
In response to this point, the Solicitor General pointed out that the provision was not remotely like the 2009 directive—which, incidentally, the Minister voted against—because the retained data would not be in Government hands and that the arm’s length approach was a key difference.

Alistair Carmichael: The point about the arm’s length retention gets to the heart of the matter. The concerns expressed by the Opposition Front-Bench team all surround the question of a threshold, but the threshold will never be of any significance to those out there waiting to hack into this information, as we have seen only too clearly with the recent experience of TalkTalk.

Gavin Newlands: I could not agree more with the right hon. Gentleman. I will come to that point shortly.
The question of who retains the information is secondary to the fact that it will be retained and accessible in the first place. The Government have, true to form, merely contracted out data retention to the private sector. Many people share unease about the security of this information. As we have seen recently, private providers are susceptible to sophisticated hacking operations. The consequences, should this information get into criminal hands, are deeply worrying. Indeed, the Joint Committee on the Draft Communications Data Bill shared similar concerns when it said that storing weblog data, however securely, carried the risk that it might be hacked into or fall accidently into the wrong hands.

Andy Burnham: I am listening carefully to what the hon. Gentleman is saying, and he is obviously aiming some of his comments in Labour’s direction. In a world where people are making fewer voice telephone calls—and if he is proposing that he would not want to collect this data—how would he propose the authorities go about locating a missing child in the early hours after the disappearance?

Gavin Newlands: rose—

John Bercow: Order. I wish to say, before the hon. Gentleman develops his case, that although I absolutely understand that he speaks for his party from the Front Bench and is entitled to develop his case, I would gently point out that another seven Members wish to contribute, several of whom sat on the Committee, and I most certainly wish to include the Chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It is not a criticism, but I am sure he will tailor his contribution to take account of that fact.

David Winnick: On a point of order, Mr Speaker. Will there be time for us to have a Third Reading debate and for those of us opposed to the Bill to show our opposition?

John Bercow: It depends on how many Divisions there are. As the hon. Gentleman will know, only one hour is allocated for Third Reading, and votes will eat into that, so it is a function of the demand for votes. I am sorry that I cannot give him a more precise answer, but I always have his interests uppermost in my mind, and I will try to accommodate him and others.

Alistair Carmichael: Further to that point of order, Mr Speaker. The House agreed a timetable motion yesterday, since when substantial amendments and concessions have been made by those on the Treasury Bench. The Bill is very different now. Can you confirm for me that it would still be within the Government’s competence to bring forward an amended timetable that would allow us to have Third Reading on another day?

John Bercow: The answer to the right hon. Gentleman, who has considerable experience in these matters, not least from when he was on the other side of the fence, as a very senior Whip, is that it is always open to the Government to table an alternative programme motion. That is not a matter for the Chair. The amendments were, of course, all on the paper at the point at which the House agreed the programme motion.
I ought just to say for the avoidance of doubt that the hon. Gentleman who has the floor is not in any way being criticised; I simply wanted to make him aware of the level of demand. I think we ought now to proceed. I would happily sit here all night for colleagues to debate these matters, but I rather doubt there would be the same enthusiasm among Government Whips for such a proposition.

Gavin Newlands: Thank you very much, Mr Speaker; I have almost forgotten what the intervention was—[Interruption] I do not doubt that, but to answer it, we do not know what ICRs are at the moment. They are not clearly defined—the shadow Home Secretary made that point himself earlier; nor do we know how effective they will be. People in the industry tell me that current technology, such as Tor, virtual private networks and what have you, may render them useless. We do not know what ICRs are at the moment, so I have to be honest with the shadow Home Secretary: I do not have all the answers.

Joanna Cherry: My hon. Friend sat on the Bill Committee with me and will remember that we heard evidence that if, for example, he wanted to see whether a missing child had been on Facebook, all that the internet connection record would show was whether they had been on Facebook, not whom they had been in contact with. Does he therefore agree that the utility of internet connection records for tracing missing children, which we all recognise is of the utmost importance, is perhaps being rather overblown?

Gavin Newlands: I wholeheartedly agree with my hon. and learned Friend.
Before I was intervened on the first time, I was saying that the Joint Committee on the draft Communications Data Bill said that
“storing web log data, however securely, carries the possible risk that it may be hacked into or may fall accidentally into the wrong hands, and that, if this were to happen, potentially damaging inferences about people’s interests or activities could be drawn.”
It is clear that the intelligence services and the police need powers that befit the digital age in order to keep us safe and to catch perpetrators. However, when seeking to introduce powers as intrusive such as ICRs, it is incumbent on the Government to ensure that their case is watertight. As my hon. and learned Friend said in Committee, we very much hope to be an independent country writing our own security policy, so we do not take our opposition to such measures lightly.
In drafting such a proposition, with such a loose definition, the Government are asking us all to trust them and to sign a blank cheque to allow the wide use of such powers without knowing what their full impact, costs or consequences will be. The Home Office has said that companies will be reimbursed for the additional costs placed on them, but that commitment does not appear in the Bill. The Government have earmarked £175 million to reimburse companies for the costs of meeting their new responsibilities. However, most in the sector believe that is a vast underestimation of what the true costs will eventually amount to. Owing to uncertainty about the extent and definition of ICRs and the extension of communication service providers that will be affected by the proposed provision, the cost is difficult to estimate, but industry figures have told me that they expect it to be anywhere between £1 billion and £3 billion.
I appreciate that the Minister, in a letter to the Committee, reiterated the Government’s intention to bear the cost of implementation, but without clearer information we cannot expect Parliament to sign a blank cheque. Between £175 million and £3 billion is a rather large range, and at a time when disabled people are losing benefits and the WASPI women cannot get the pension they were promised, this seems a rather anomalous and large black hole in potential Government spending. I have said in the past that the Government know the cost of everything and the value of nothing, but in this case they do not even know the cost.
This is a global problem and as such requires a global solution, and it is important that we reflect on what other countries have done to address the issue and that we learn any lessons from their experiences. It is unfortunate, therefore, that a similar scheme of logging data in Denmark has recently been abandoned. That scheme operated for seven years, and although I accept that there were differences in that scheme, there were many similarities. Upon its abandonment, the Danish security services expressed their view about the difficulty of being able to make proper and effective use of the large amount of data that had been gathered. It seems that, instead of spending their valuable time locating criminals, the security services will spend most of it working on spreadsheets and filtering out the useless from the useful. It should be noted that the Danish ICR model was proving too expensive and the cost spiralled out of control, that Australia considered the proposal but decided not to pursue it, and that, as we have heard, the United States is rescinding many of its intrusive powers and moving in the opposite direction.
It is for those reasons that we believe the case for ICRs has simply not been made. The Government have failed to convince us, and those working in the industry, that ICRs are necessary, proportionate and in accordance with the law. We tabled an amendment to remove them  from the Bill, but it was not accepted, which leaves us no option but to vote against the Bill in its entirety. That is not a step that we take lightly, but, ultimately, it is a necessary step.
In the event that we are unsuccessful in bringing down the Bill, we will still attempt to ameliorate aspects of it in order to protect smaller companies, especially those that supply lifeline and low-profit services to rural communities. New clause 26, which I tabled along with SNP colleagues, would exclude the providers of rural or community access communication services and small service providers from the obligation to collect and retain data. I have mentioned the deep concern in the sector about the expense that the Bill will impose on industry. I am sure that the Government will not want to put any businesses in a perilous situation, particularly those that operate with smaller cash flows and tighter margins in rural Scotland in order to provide a vital service for their local communities.
The Committee was provided with written evidence stating that smaller internet service providers were still subject to the same demands as the much larger organisations that operate on the world stage. Organisations such as HUBS are supplying vital internet connections to some of the most remote communities. If the Government railroad these clauses through the House without proper regard for the impact they will have, they will seriously endanger those small businesses and restrict internet use for some of our rural communities.

Andrew Murrison: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Gavin Newlands: I am afraid not, because I do not have time. Plenty of other Members want to speak.
You will pleased to hear, Mr Speaker, that I am nearing the end of my speech. [Hon. Members: “Hear, hear.”] Thank you.
We live in a digital age. I therefore welcome the Government’s proposed digital economy Bill, and, indeed, the Chancellor’s commitment to match the Scottish Government’s commitment to universal broadband provision. The digital economy Bill is intended to make the United Kingdom a world leader in digital provision. However, according to many in the industry, this Bill will completely undermine that goal before the draft Bill has even been printed.
It is only right and proper for the Government to consider and propose new powers that our security agencies can use to keep us safe, but in many parts of the Bill the Government fail to make the case that the powers they want to introduce will be effective, are necessary, are in line with our right to privacy, and cannot be challenged in the courts. It is for those reasons that the SNP are still unconvinced of the merits of the Bill, and will vote against its Third Reading later this evening.

Will Quince: I rise to support new clause 19, which stands in my name. It is a scoping amendment, which I do not intend to press. A large number of amendments have been tabled so I will be extremely brief, but I want to pay tribute to my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General, who has been incredibly receptive to the concerns that I have raised throughout this process.
We all remember the examples of local authorities using powers inappropriately, whether that has involved rummaging through our bins or spying on paper boys to determine whether they have the right to work. I welcome the steps that the Government have taken to try to address that, including the creation of a new criminal penalty for the misuse of these powers. However, I believe that more needs to be done to ensure that the wider public can be confident that we will not see a repeat of history, and will not see councils misusing the powers in the future.
New clause 19 would introduce a requirement that when a judicial commissioner approves an authorisation for telecommunications data for a designated senior officer of a local authority, that senior officer must notify his or her chief executive before the authorisation has taken effect. I believe that that will help for two reasons. It will discourage over-zealous officers from applying for authorisations if they know that their chief executives will see those authorisations before they take effect, and, in the event that a council officer is found to have misused the powers, the chief executive will be accountable. Chief executives will never be able to say that they did not know what was happening in their authorities.

Robert Buckland: I have listened carefully to what my hon. Friend has said. The Government wish to consider the matter further, and return to it in the other place. I hope that that gives my hon. Friend some reassurance.

Will Quince: I am greatly comforted by that response, and, in the interests of time, I am happy to sit down now.

Harriet Harman: I rise to support amendments 143, 144 and 145, which were tabled in my name and those of the other members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and relate to the protection of journalists’ sources. Since they were tabled, they have been supported by Labour’s Front Bench and the SNP, for which I am grateful.
Yesterday, we considered additional protections for MPs and lawyers and the question of legal professional privilege. Journalists are in the same group. We extensively considered protections for everybody against the abuse of power and the invasions of privacy by the state, which is right, but there are particular issues about protecting a part of the constitution from abuses of power by the Executive. The legislature obviously holds the Government to account, so it is wrong for the state to abuse its power to prevent us from doing that. The same goes for lawyers and the rule of law. Journalists are in a parallel situation in that it is vital in our democracy that the media are free to hold the Government to account, which is an important aspect of the right of freedom of expression that is guaranteed in article 10 of the European convention on human rights.
I appreciate from the start that there is a difficulty here. It is easy to work out what a lawyer is. It is easy to work out what an MP is. It is not quite so easy with journalists. Some people are evidently journalists and some people are evidently not journalists, but some people might or might not be journalists, so I say “Good luck” to the Solicitor General with that one.  However, that difficulty must be surmounted, because we must ensure that the press’s ability to go about their business and to hold the Government to account is protected.

Robert Buckland: The right hon. and learned Lady is absolutely right to talk about the difficulty of definitions, but we should be focusing on journalistic material. That is the question at hand and that is what the Bill addresses. Focusing on that might actually help us to come to a solution.

Harriet Harman: It sounds as though the Minister is well under way to solving that problem, so that is encouraging.
My next point was considered by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and has been echoed throughout the House. We do not want the provisions in this legislation to contain less protection for journalistic material than the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 did. That Act relates to a very different world and refers to the journalist’s notebook, whereas we are considering communications data, but a key point is that the relevant journalist or media organisation is given notice when a warrant is being applied for so that they can make representations as to why one should not be granted in order to protect their sources. We are not talking about journalists who are up to their necks in criminal activity—that is not the issue. The issue arises from applications for material that relates not to any criminal activity but to a journalist’s work. Can we ensure that journalists are put on notice, because of the special status of journalistic material, so that the authorising authorities have the benefit of hearing from journalists or media organisations before a warrant is granted?
I appreciate that the Minister has already responded to those issues and has put in additional protections, such as taking the non-statutory code and putting it on the statute, but the issue of notice still remains, which is why we tabled our amendments and why they have gathered support. I welcome the Minister’s confirmation that he will look further at the matter, but other members of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in the House of Lords, and many other Members of the Lords, will want to consider it. Nobody wants an unjustified fettering of the ability of the security services and the police to keep us safe. The point in the intervention of my right hon. Friend the Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) was absolutely spot on. We are all in favour of the same thing here, but we must ensure that, at the end of the process, we have the right balance not only for journalists but in many other respects.

Victoria Atkins: I shall speak to new clause 18 and amendment 207. I note that these are probing measures tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), and I also note the assurances given by the Solicitor General. However, given the concerns raised by the SNP, I thought it may be helpful to give some examples of how the organisations in schedule 4 need these powers and how they contribute towards the criminal justice system in our country.
We are speaking about communications data, not about bulk warrants or intercept warrants; we are discussing the who, what and when of communications between suspects. The criminal justice system sees thousands of prosecutions brought each year by the organisations  listed in schedule 4. The Department for Work and Pensions prosecutes benefit fraud, and I am sure we all support it on that. It conducted approximately 600,000 investigations last year, and communications data can be invaluable, particularly in dealing with conspiracies to defraud, in showing links between conspirators and the timing of their communications.
New clause 18 excludes one of the largest and most important investigating agencies: Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. It investigates a huge range of offences, from tax fraud to cigarette smuggling and the criminal exploitation of HMRC’s repayment system. The seriousness of some of these offences can be summed up in the offence that I prosecuted many times on its behalf: cheating the Revenue, which attracts a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The Joint Committee heard evidence from HMRC that last year it made 10,000 requests for communications data, which supported 560 investigations, in cases involving a loss to the Treasury of £2 billion. If that is not a serious investigating organisation that deserves our help in investigating and prosecuting criminal activity, I do not know what is.
The injustice does not end with HMRC, and I will give just two more examples, as I am conscious of the time. The Financial Conduct Authority regulates the financial markets, and the banking, financial and insurance industries, among others. In a £10 million insider dealing fraud case, in which I was instructed, we were able to build an electronic reconstruction of a day in the life of an insider dealer. It went from the moment when a memory stick was inserted into a computer to download the price-sensitive information, to the handover of the stick to a co-conspirator at another bank, to the material being uploaded on to webmail and messages being sent out to the defendants to get trading on these stocks. The FCA operates in the digital world, by definition, and it made more communications data requests last year than 20 police forces that are cited in new clause 18.
The second example, mentioned by the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North (Gavin Newlands), is the Health and Safety Executive. It prosecutes employers who kill and maim employees and members of the public in the workplace. These are highly specialised cases, which could encompass any workplace, from building sites to chemical factories and care homes. Last year, the HSE conducted 3,280 investigations, resulting in 535 prosecutions in England and Wales.
I know that these are probing measures and that my hon. Friend the Member for Stevenage is raising important issues, particularly on access for child protection units and others, but we must not lose sight of the important role that many of these organisations play in the criminal justice system and their need for their power to prevent and detect crime.

Several hon. Members: rose—

John Bercow: Order. I would like to call the Solicitor General no later than 5.48 pm, and there are three people whom I wish to accommodate before then—Members can do the arithmetic for themselves. We have just under nine minutes to go. I call Matt Warman.

Matt Warman: I rise to talk briefly about both journalists and internet connection records. I have heard an awful lot of comments about  journalism, and I agree with all of them. Indeed, had the Government not moved some of the material from the codes of practice into the Bill, I might have struggled to support it. At every stage, we will struggle to construct anything useful unless we define what a journalist is, and I find it hard to see how that is possible. In this modern age, I am painfully conscious that, in some senses, we are all journalists ourselves. Almost all of us write columns for our local paper. Arguably, we could all be regarded as journalists simply because we commentate via Twitter on what is going on in politics. I struggle to see what more the Government can do—as much as I would like them to do it and as much as I would like to support new clause 27. Unless we come up with a workable definition of what journalism is, I struggle to see how we will make what I regard as genuinely very necessary and very helpful progress on a hugely important issue.
On the second point on internet connection records, it strikes me that although they have frequently been compared with a telephone record or an itemised phone bill, it is simply not a sensible comparison in the modern world when we make far fewer voice calls. That sense of an ICR telling us simply that a user has gone to Facebook misunderstands the fact that knowing that someone has gone to Facebook if they are a missing person, for example, allows us then to go to Facebook and make that crucial next step to find that person. Although an ICR does not tell us a huge amount of information, it tells us enough. We in this House have a duty to do everything that we possibly can in this regard and to bear it in mind that it is not us but communications providers who hold that information. I very much welcome what the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) said about having concerns about access, rather than about the principle of what I hope we can all agree is a potentially vital tool in this vital battle against both crime and missing persons.

Several hon. Members: rose—

John Bercow: Order. In fact four colleagues rather than three wish to speak.

Alistair Carmichael: I rise to speak to the amendments standing in my name, particularly amendment 3. The hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North (Gavin Newlands) said that the amendments tabled by the SNP that sought to remove internet connection records from the Bill had not been selected. I notice that he and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) have also added their names to amendment 3. It was not my intention at the start of this debate, but I have heard so little by way of comfort from the Government Front-Bench team that I intend to press amendment 3 to a vote. It is surely unacceptable, at this stage in proceedings, that we still have no proper definition of what exactly is an internet connection record. Others have touched on that during the course of our debates.
It is 15 years to the day since I was elected at the 2001 general election. I have seen a few things in this House in that time, and one thing that I have learned to recognise is a well-rehearsed line exchanged between the two Front-Bench teams. I think we saw that when the shadow Home Secretary was getting his assurances from the Minister for Security. I have to say that he has  got assurances which, frankly, miss the whole point. The assurances on threshold, for example, do absolutely nothing to address the problems that are inherent in the riskiness of retaining such data in the first place. I cannot improve on the definition or the expression that was used by the Joint Committee when it reported on the draft Bill. It said that the collection of internet connection records would be a
“honeypot for casual hackers, blackmailers, criminals large and small from around the world, and foreign states.”
David Anderson QC described the expanded data collection by internet service providers as “overstated and misunderstood”—to the point and understated. There is no other “Five Eyes” country in which operators have been forced, or are being forced, to retain similar internet connection data. That surely tells us all that we need to know. The case has not been made. It is always open to the Government to come back on some future occasion to make a case and to put these provisions in another Bill. They have not made the case, and the provisions should not be in this Bill.

James Berry: That was a very disappointing reaction from the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) to what I thought has been the very constructive way in which the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) has dealt with the Government both today and yesterday.
I support the Bill and the amendments that the Government have accepted, and I draw the House’s attention to the fact that I have represented the police on a number of occasions. What has always struck me in cases about warrantry is that if the police want to search someone’s house, their shed or even their car, they have to go and get judicial authorisation from a magistrate, yet for more intrusive and covert surveillance they did not have to do that. That is why the Bill is a welcome step towards proper independent scrutiny of the intrusive powers of the state. I am also pleased that the Bill brings up to date the powers that the police have long had and been granted by this House on the interception of mail and phone calls, bringing them into the digital age in which most criminals today operate.
In the time available, I want to speak briefly about communications data, because in my experience as a barrister, and as my hon. Friend the Member for Louth and Horncastle (Victoria Atkins) ably demonstrated, communications data are essential to many cases. In some cases in which I have been involved, it has been the main evidence and in some the only evidence that led to the perpetrator being identified and ultimately convicted. It is essential in identifying the perpetrator, the link they have to the co-accused and the links they have to the victim.
It is telling that in the last decade every single security service counter-terrorism case involved communications data and 95% of serious and organised crime investigations in which the CPS was involved concerned locations data. Those facts speak for themselves. Opposition Front Benchers have been very constructive in dealing with this and in the amendments they have tabled, and those on the Government Front Bench have responded in the same way. For these reasons—I will not add to the very good reasons already given by my hon. Friend  the Member for Louth and Horncastle—I support the Bill and the amendments that the Government have accepted.

Chris Philp: I want to speak briefly about clause 68, Government amendment 51 and amendment 145. Clause 68 is welcome and delivers the manifesto commitment to introduce judicial oversight of these investigatory powers over journalists. As the noble Lord Falconer has pointed out, no such protections exist under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. These new requirements for judicial consent by the commissioner are very welcome.
I very much welcome Government amendment 51, which explicitly acknowledges the public interest in protecting a journalist’s sources and makes it clear that the commissioner must weigh that against any other public interest, which must be overriding. I hope that gives the right hon. and learned Member for Camberwell and Peckham (Ms Harman) at least some comfort. Were we to adopt her amendment 145, I think the implication would be that the judgment would have to be made in open court, and given the difficult and potentially wide definition of journalistic material that now exists, that might impose a rather onerous requirement. Were the Government so minded, they might at some later time fine tune clause 68 to say that if the judicial commissioner found the situation slightly ambiguous, they could go to the journalist to seek clarification; if there were cases in which they were finding it difficult to make that judgment, they could seek further and better particulars. However, I think that Government amendment 51 is extremely helpful in addressing many of the concerns expressed about that important issue.

Robert Buckland: It is a pleasure to speak at the end of a wide-ranging but important debate about the new power on internet connection records. It is right to remind ourselves of the context of the debate. Only last week, two individuals received significant prison sentences in Britain’s biggest known gun smuggling operation. It was analysis of communications data that provided vital evidence in that case. It allowed the investigative team to attribute telephone numbers and SIM cards to the defendants and to identify key locations.
However, communications data are changing. The world in which the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) and I started out practising is no longer the world as it is today. Telephone calls are very often not the means by which criminals and terrorists conduct their activity. Much of that has moved on to the internet via WhatsApp, via internet chatrooms and via the electronic internet communications that have become the mainstay of many criminal enterprises. It is vital that the legislation that we pass in this House not only attempts to keep pace with this breathtaking change, but tries to get ahead of it as far as possible.

Joanna Cherry: The Solicitor General will be aware of an exchange that I had earlier with the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) about the fact that there are other ways in which law enforcement agencies can obtain internet connection records. Does the Solicitor General agree that that includes getting the data retrospectively for specific targets from operators who already temporarily store such data for their own  business purposes? It would therefore be misleading to imply that the provisions in the Bill are the only way of getting at internet connection records for the purpose of solving specific crimes.

Robert Buckland: I take what the hon. and learned Lady says advisedly. It is not good enough to rely purely on third parties to provide the sources of evidential leads. Government must take a lead in this. We are not in the scenario of building our own database, which has rightly been rejected as unfeasible and an unacceptable increase in state power. This is about requiring third parties to retain for up to 12 months information that could provide the sort of evidential leads that up till now have conventionally been provided by observation evidence and via telephone and SMS evidence that is increasingly becoming obsolete. This is about the Government doing their duty to the people whom we serve and to the country that we are supposed to defend, and doing our duty to protect our citizens.
I shall deal as best I can with the amendments in turn. I am grateful to my hon. Friend the Member for Stevenage (Stephen McPartland), who spoke to the issue of the request filter. That is a filter that will be maintained by the Secretary of State. It does not hold data of itself; it is a safeguard. It is there to prevent collateral information being provided to the public authority. It is an innovation and it specifically limits the communications data retained to only that which is relevant.
I would argue that the measure is essential because it serves the interests of privacy that have formed such a part of the debates in this House, and it will help to reduce error. The filter will accept only communications data disclosed by communications service providers in response to specific requests from public authorities, each of which must be necessary and proportionate. Any irrelevant data that do not meet those criteria will be deleted and not made available to the public authority. My hon. Friend has tabled probing amendments, and I know that that is the spirit in which he has initiated debate.
On the question of review, I am entirely sympathetic with the desire for ongoing review of the Bill’s provisions, but that is already provided for. The operation of the Act is to be reviewed by the Secretary of State after five years, which is entirely appropriate. This Bill will need some time to bed in, and time will be needed to see what effect it has had. My concern is that a two-year review runs the risk that we will not be in a position to properly assess its impact. For those reasons, I urge hon. Members who have tabled amendments relating to the review to accept the argument that I submit and to withdraw the amendments.
We have had much debate about journalists. Quite rightly, we have sought to focus on journalistic material because there is a danger in this debate, as with MPs and as with lawyers, that we focus upon the individual and the role, as opposed to the interest to be served. Journalists serve a public interest—the vital importance of freedom of expression in our society, freedom of speech, freedom of thought, and that vital aspect of journalism, the non-disclosure of the source of journalists’ material.
The Government are very cautious and careful about the way in which we seek to deal with these matters, which is why we have tabled the amendments that have already been spoken to by other Members. The placing of the stringent test in amendment 51—the public interest in protecting a source of journalistic information—is further evidence of our continued commitment to protecting the freedom of the press and freedom of expression in our country. As my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security and I have already said, we have listened to the strength of feeling on the matter and will consider whether further protections, over and above the significant protections that already exist under PACE in relation to journalists themselves, are appropriate where the collateral effect of warranted intrusion discloses their sources.
Let me therefore deal with the question of ICRs and their definitions. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Security, in an intervention on the shadow Home Secretary, has set out clearly the Government’s position on how we would view the threshold. The right hon. Gentleman quite rightly accepts that this is not an easy task and that we must get it right. We do not want to exclude offences such as stalking and harassment, for example. We want to ensure that the threshold is robust but actually makes sense in the context of the new powers of ICRs. I look forward to that work being ongoing.
Let me deal with the question of definition. I can be clear today once again that the Bill does not require companies to retain content, but I am willing to consider any amendments that further improve definitions in the Bill, as another opportunity for meaningful dialogue to take place so that we get the definition absolutely right. I know that that is a concern not only of the shadow Home Secretary, but of other right hon. and hon. Members.
Let me move on to the SNP amendments. I am grateful to the hon. Member for Paisley and Renfrewshire North (Gavin Newlands), who has been consistent in his argument today, as he was in Committee. With respect, however, I have to say that that consistency is misplaced. There is an important issue here about access to communications data that I think would be jeopardised in a way that would be prejudicial to the public if judicial commissioners became involved. I do not think that there is any utility or public interest to be served by the introduction of judicial commissioner approval for communications data acquisitions, because we are talking about a great volume of material. Also, the highly regarded single point of contact regime has already provided expert advice and guidance to authorising officers, and that is placed as a mandatory requirement in the Bill.
There are many other amendments that I could address, but time does not permit me, save to say that our commitment to protecting the public and ensuring that our legislation is up to pace with modern developments is clear, so I urge right hon. and hon. Members to support our amendments.

Stephen McPartland: I am grateful to the Solicitor General and to the Minister for Security for the time that they have given me over the past 12 months, to work with me on these amendments and in our negotiations. I am very happy to withdraw my new clause and not to press my other amendments, as they are probing amendments that were not intended to be pressed to a vote. I beg to ask leave to withdraw the motion.
Clause, by leave, withdrawn.
Clause 53

Power to grant authorisations

Amendment proposed: 320,page42, leave out lines 14 and 15 and insert
“Subsection (2) applies if a designated senior officer of a relevant public authority considers—
(a) that a Judicial Commissioner may, on an application made by a designated senior officer at a relevant public authority, issue a communications data access authorisation where the Judicial Commissioner considers—”.—(Gavin Newlands.)
See amendment 327.
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The House divided:
Ayes 68, Noes 285.

Question accordingly negatived.
Proceedings interrupted (Programme Order, 6 June).
The Deputy Speaker put forthwith the Questions necessary for the disposal of the business to be concluded at that time (Standing Order No. 83E).
Clause 68

Commissioner approval for authorisations to identify or confirm journalistic sources

Amendments made: 49,page54,line10, leave out
“made an order under this section approving”
and insert “approved”.
This amendment removes the need for a Judicial Commissioner to make an order when approving an authorisation under Part 3 to identify or confirm journalistic sources.
Amendment 50,page54,line12, leave out
“an order under this section approving”
and insert “approval of”.
This amendment is consequential on amendment 49.
Amendment 51,page54,line25, at end insert—
“( ) In considering whether the position is as mentioned in subsection (5)(a) and (b), the Judicial Commissioner must, in particular, have regard to—
(a) the public interest in protecting a source of journalistic information, and
(b) the need for there to be another overriding public interest before a relevant public authority seeks to identify or confirm a source of journalistic information.”
This amendment requires a Judicial Commissioner to have regard, in particular, to the public interest in protecting a source of journalistic information when deciding whether to approve an authorisation under Part 3 to identify or confirm a journalistic source.
Amendment 52,page54,line27, leave out “make an order quashing” and insert “quash”.—(The Solicitor General.)
This amendment removes the need for a Judicial Commissioner to make an order when quashing an authorisation under Part 3 to identify or confirm journalistic sources where the Commissioner has refused to approve the grant of the authorisation.
Clause 78

Powers to require retention of certain data

Amendment proposed: 3,page62,line22, leave out “therefore includes, in particular” and insert “does not include”.—(Mr Alistair Carmichael.)
Question put, That the amendment be made.
The House divided:
Ayes 69, Noes 282.

Question accordingly negatived.
Ordered,
That clause 94 be transferred to the end of line 38 on page 76.—(The Solicitor General.)
Ordered,
That clause 117 be transferred to the end of line 36 on page 74.—(The Solicitor General.)
Third Reading

Theresa May: I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
The first duty of Government is the protection of their citizens, and the first duty of Parliament is to hold the Government to account for the way they protect those citizens. This landmark Bill will ensure that our police and security and intelligence agencies have the powers they need to keep us safe in an uncertain world. It provides far greater transparency, overhauls safeguards and adds protections for privacy. It also introduces a new and world-leading oversight regime. It is a vital Bill—on that, we are agreed across the House.
It is only right to afford such an important Bill proper scrutiny. Three independent reviews informed the Bill’s drafting: the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, David Anderson QC: an expert panel convened by the Royal United Services Institute; and the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament. It was then scrutinised by not one, but three parliamentary Committees. We have now had a further report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which said:
“We welcome the introduction of a Bill as representing a significant step forward in human rights terms towards the objective of providing a clear and transparent legal basis for…investigatory powers”.
The reports produced on the Bill, when piled up, reach nearly 1 foot high of paper. It has proceeded through the House of Commons on the normal timetable and with the usual forensic line-by-line scrutiny applied by the House. I thank the right hon. and hon. Members who sat on the Public Bill Committee; those who sat on the Joint Committee that gave the Bill pre-legislative scrutiny with Members from another place; the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Science and  Technology Committee for their reports; the right hon. and hon. Members of the Intelligence and Security Committee, who scrutinised the more sensitive aspects of the Bill; and all those right hon. and hon. Members who contributed on Report. The scrutiny that they have given the Bill may well be unprecedented.
I extend particular thanks to the Security Minister, the Solicitor General and the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) for the detailed way in which they have worked on the Bill. I also thank the hard-working team in the Home Office who have supported the Bill, and all those who supported the Committees.
It is because the Bill is so important that it has received unprecedented scrutiny. It provides a clear and comprehensible legal basis for the powers used by our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. It introduces the most fundamental reform in investigatory powers since the avowal of those agencies with the introduction of judicial authorisation of the most sensitive powers. It puts the Wilson doctrine protections on to the statute book for the first time; creates one of the most senior and powerful judicial oversight posts in the country with the creation of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner; and brings the powers of our police and security and intelligence agencies up to date, making them fit for a digital age.
I have always said that I am willing to listen to constructive contributions from those on both sides of the House to get the Bill right, which is why the Government returned with amendments that I am grateful the House passed on Report. We have strengthened safeguards for journalists, for MPs and for the use of medical records, and added protections called for by communications service providers. Reflecting the cross-party support for the Bill, I am pleased that we have been able to agree the Opposition amendment to put beyond doubt the protections for trade union activity. We have welcomed amendments from the ISC to add clarity and strengthen safeguards.
Perhaps the most important change to the Bill is the new privacy clause, which places the protection of privacy at the heart of the Bill. The manuscript amendment that we tabled and passed yesterday will ensure not only that privacy is at the heart of the Bill, but that privacy must also be central to the decision to authorise the use of the most sensitive powers.
It is because we continue to listen that we have committed to make further changes when the Bill enters the Lords. Responding to another suggestion from the official Opposition, we will introduce a threshold for access to internet connection records, to put beyond doubt that those vital powers cannot be used to investigate minor crimes. We will introduce an amendment to respond to the Opposition proposal on the important appointment of the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. We have also committed to implement a number of further reforms proposed by the ISC.
I look forward to the continued careful scrutiny the Bill will receive in the other place, but the key message their lordships should take from the last two days of debate is that this House supports the Bill. We have before us a world-leading piece of legislation, which has been subject to unparalleled scrutiny, and which now, I hope, commands cross-party support. Being in government means taking the difficult decisions about the most  fundamental questions that democratic societies face. It means striking the right balance between the need for privacy and the right to live in safety and security.
Being a responsible Opposition means scrutinising those decisions thoroughly, but fairly. I commend the Opposition for the constructive approach they have taken to these most important issues. I commend all those who have contributed to the scrutiny that we have seen today and throughout the passage of the Bill. I commend this vital Bill to the House.

Andy Burnham: I was first elected to the House 15 years ago to this very day. In that time, debates on security and privacy have produced some of the most fractious exchanges I have seen. It is treacherous territory littered with past failure. Too often, such debates are pitched as a clash between two absolutes of privacy and security, where there can be no compromise and only one winner—witness the Apple versus FBI debate in the US.
I have always started from the point that people should not be forced to choose between the two. We all have an interest in maximising both our personal privacy and our collective security. We have to work to find the best point of balance between the two. Over the past three months, this House has got closer to finding that balance than ever before. We have elevated the debate above simplistic loyalties to the security or privacy lobbies. As a result, we are now significantly closer to developing the balanced, modern, world-leading framework, which the Home Secretary spoke about, for the use of investigatory powers that this country needs in the digital age.
I echo the thanks the Home Secretary gave to right hon. and hon. Members of this House and its various Committees: all Members who have contributed in the past two days; the members of the Public Bill Committee; the Chairs of that Committee, the hon. Member for Mid Bedfordshire (Nadine Dorries) and my hon. Friend the Member for Ynys Môn (Albert Owen); and the Clerks and the Public Bill Office for overseeing such a high quality process.
The Bill leaves this House in a much better state than we found it. That is due in no small part to the forensic mind and engaging approach of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer). By setting out clearly after Second Reading our seven substantial concerns, we have been able to bring a focus to this debate that I think has been to the benefit of this House. I am pleased to say that we have secured major commitments on all seven concerns, in particular on bulk powers, the independent review, the privacy clause, judicial oversight and the double lock, and trade unions. Thanks to the constructive work of Labour, there are stronger safeguards in the Bill that protect people’s privacy and their human rights. I say this to those who might be planning to vote against the Bill tonight: a vote against it is to deny people those safeguards and to leave on the statute book a much weaker piece of legislation that does not afford those protections.
Our consideration has also been helped by the way in which we, as a country, continue to shine a light on some of the darkest chapters in our past. We continue to learn of instances where the power of the state has  been unfairly used against ordinary people. By being prepared to open up about that and be honest about how we were governed and policed in the past, I believe we are now beginning to make better legislation in the present. I pay tribute to the Home Secretary for the courage she has shown in being prepared to do that, but I say again that she should be prepared to carry on going wherever that evidence takes us. Following the Hillsborough verdict, I believe that that trail now leads very firmly to Orgreave, and, following the court settlement last month, to blacklisting.
I will continue to press the Home Secretary on those matters, but I congratulate her on how she and her Ministers have handled discussions on the Bill. The Security Minister, or Brother Hayes as we might now call him after his starring role in today’s papers, has brought all his considerable experience and personality to bear in moving the Bill forward. It is all the better for it. Although he probably does not want me to mention him, I feel the need to mention the hon. Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Simon Kirby), who has been the most helpful Government Whip I have ever come across.
Let me be clear: the Bill is not there yet. We need further changes on internet connection records—the Home Secretary alluded to that—and on the protection of journalists and their sources, and on legal privilege. However, if the Government continue with the same approach as the one they have adopted in recent weeks, I have every confidence that we will get there. We must do that for those who depend on the Bill we are debating. The police and security services do incredibly difficult work on our behalf and we thank them for it. Their job has got harder as both the level of the threat has risen and the nature of communication has changed in the modern world. To fail to respond to that would be a dereliction of our duties to them; it would also fail our constituents. The Bill is ultimately about their safety, the safety of their families and their privacy. I think we can look ourselves in the mirror tomorrow and say we have done our level best to maximise both.

Joanna Cherry: I start by placing on record my thanks to all the organisations that have supported and advised the Scottish National party during the passage of the Bill. I said at the outset of the debate yesterday that I made no apology for tabling so many amendments and I stick by that. This is one of the most lengthy and complex Bills that the House has debated for many years. The powers it seeks to give to the state are immense and far-reaching. The Bill is of huge constitutional significance, yet we have had fewer than two full working days to debate it on Report. Accordingly, the number of amendments that could be put to a vote was just a very small proportion of the number tabled.
The SNP wants to give the security services necessary and proportionate powers to fight terrorism; we wanted to support those parts of the Bill that maintained and codified law enforcement’s existing powers; and we would have been happy to support an enhanced oversight regime. However, so long as the Bill allows such significantly unfettered collection of, and access to, communications data, including internet connection records, we cannot give it our support. Neither can we support a Bill that sets out such far-reaching powers to acquire the personal  and private data of our constituents, while a proper case for the necessity of those powers has yet to be made out.
We have been happy to support some Government amendments, including new clause 5, which appears to recognise the importance of taking into account the right to privacy and other human rights, but such concessions as the Government have made have been vastly exaggerated by both the Government and, I am sorry to say, the main Opposition party. There has been a great deal too much mutual congratulation. Only the SNP and the Liberal Democrats have been concerned enough to put opposition amendments to votes. Were there really no issues that the Labour party considered worth putting to a vote?
We were pleased to offer our support to the Labour party on its amendment protecting trade unionists going about their lawful activities, but what about other activists and campaigners? What about non-governmental organisations and whistleblowers? The SNP’s amendments were also designed to protect them. Why were they not supported? The main Opposition party seems content to take Government assurances at face value and to leave matters to the Lords. The SNP believes that these issues should be debated in full and resolved on the Floor of this Chamber, which is democratically elected and accountable to the public, not in the unelected, unaccountable Lords. [Interruption.] I would appreciate it if those who have been absent for most of the debate would stop chuntering from the Front Bench. I am angry with people who treat these matters so lightly.
I want to take bulk powers as an example. All parties now accept that the case for bulk powers has not been made and that it needs an independent review. We sought to get the bulk powers taken out of the Bill until such time as a case had been made. It is possible that a case for the necessity of bulk powers will not be made. As we have heard in detail, America has recently retreated from the necessity to use bulk powers. What happens if the case for bulk powers is not made? Neither the Minister nor the official Opposition would answer that question. Because the SNP amendment to take bulk powers out of the Bill until such time as a case has been made was defeated, those powers are still in the Bill. When the independent operational case is published, it will be the House of Lords, not the Commons, that will scrutinise and debate it. I am proud to say I consider that a travesty of democracy.
There is huge public concern about the implications of the Bill. The public—our constituents—are concerned about their privacy and right to data security. It is disappointing, therefore, that the House has in effect abdicated its responsibility properly to scrutinise the Bill to an unelected Chamber. The interests of our constituents have not been well served by the system, and it simply reinforces me in my view that the interests of my constituents, the people of Scotland and the people of these islands are not always best served by the way we do things in this House.
For all those reasons, the SNP will take a principled stand and vote—[Interruption.] I know it is hard for Government Members to recognise the notion of a principled stand, but they will see one in action in about 10 minutes. For all the reasons I have outlined, the SNP  will take a principled stand, reflecting the views of many people across these islands and their concerns about the Bill, and vote against it tonight.

Matt Warman: It has been my privilege to serve on not one, not two, but three Committees examining this Bill. Whether it is the Joint Committee, the Bill Committee or the Select Committee on Science and Technology, they were just three examples from a huge number and an unprecedented level of scrutiny that this hugely important Bill has received.
In the Bill Committee, on which I served with the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), we saw a remarkably conciliatory approach from those on the Front Bench. I also thought it was a genuine privilege to be in the same room as an Opposition who took a view that went so far above party politics, because this is a Bill that is above party politics. That is because what our constituents worry about, even more than the vital privacy concerns that the SNP has persistently raised, is the threat that we face in a global and unstable world. The threats that we have seen on the Committees examining this Bill are greater than they have ever been before and they need to be tackled in a fundamentally different way from that provided for in the broken legislation that is currently in force.
I would therefore argue, and I hope the whole House would agree, that this is legislation that transcends party politics and goes beyond what we have seen from the legislation that exists today. What is demanded from us in this House is legislation that understands and is adaptable to technology that is unlike that in the world that the previous legislation was built to combat. I believe sincerely—from a principled position, I could even say—that, whether on ICRs, protection for journalists, bulk powers or bulk datasets, this Bill struggles and finds the balance that we all need to keep our constituents safe. That is why I will be voting for it this evening.

David Winnick: I accept, of course, the changes that those on the Labour Front Bench have got from the Government—it would be churlish of me not to say so—and although I voted in all the Divisions with her, I dissociate myself from some of the remarks made by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), representing the Scottish National party. I am sure that those on my Front Bench work on the basis of trying to get the best possible arrangements for this measure, and I accept that.
Unfortunately, I do not accept that this Bill is necessary. It would have been even worse if the measures I have mentioned had not been included, although I suspect that the original Bill that came to us on Second Reading would still have been supported by virtually every Conservative Member. As far as I am concerned, the Bill is unacceptable. Despite the changes, it remains the position that internet service providers and others will be compelled in certain circumstances to retain every person’s communication data, texts, emails and, indeed, browsing history. I find that far too intrusive and indiscriminate. It should not be part of such legislation.
It is the first time this has happened. I find it unfortunate that such a measure can be put before the House of Commons, even more so when I take into consideration what happened when the Labour Government were in office and the manner in which the Tory Opposition at every opportunity said that they had such a deep concern for civil liberties. This Bill is hardly an example of such concern.
We are told that the review of such bulk powers—which, as I have said, are totally unacceptable—is to be done by the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation. That is fine, but should it not have been done before the measure came before the House of Commons? Why should it have to wait until the Bill goes to the unelected House of Lords? Why should we not have the conclusions of any such review?
Let me say that literally no one in this House has a monopoly when it comes to wanting to prevent terrorism. All of us deplore the slaughter of innocent people—the manner in which, for example, 7/7 occurred, in which 52 people were slaughtered and so many were injured, and of course the terrorism that goes on abroad. All of us want not just to condemn such terrorism, but to take effective measures to stop it happening in Britain and elsewhere. However, I do not believe that this is the way to achieve that. If I did, I would support the Bill with no hesitation whatsoever, whether I was in the majority or the minority: that would not concern me in the least.
It is interesting to note that, as I pointed out on Second Reading, a former technical director of the United States National Security Agency—who presumably had a fair amount of knowledge of such matters—argued, in an article in The Times, that bulk collection simply did not work. It did not work, Bill Binney said, because dealing with such vast details defeated the purpose. He made the good and valid point that what was required was the targeting of suspects and their social network—the targeting of those who, in the eyes of the security authorities and the police, were likely to cause damage and murder in our country.
I greatly regret that I cannot support the Bill, and believe that it should be defeated. I do not know what the House of Lords will do, but if the Bill is passed there, I hope that it will incorporate amendments that will make it somewhat more acceptable. However, one thing is certain: when I look back on my many years in the House of Commons, if I live long enough to reflect on votes in which I have participated, I shall be pleased that I voted against this Bill. It will give me some satisfaction that I voted against a measure that intrudes on civil liberties on such an extensive scale.

Several hon. Members: rose—

Natascha Engel: Order. We have 14 minutes, and about six Members wish to speak. I hope that that will be borne in mind.

Dominic Grieve: It is always a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Walsall North (Mr Winnick). We have co-operated on civil liberties matters in the past, and the hon. Gentleman has shown great courage in many of the approaches that he has taken, including those to legislation when his own party was in government. I hope he will accept, however—just as I accept the principles that underpin his opposition and, indeed,  that of the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry)—that those of us who will support the Bill on Third Reading are not acting in an unprincipled fashion.
As was pointed out by the right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham), the simple fact is that this is not just some opportunistic gimmick employed by the Government in an attempt to acquire more power. The existing legislation was doing positive harm; indeed, allowing it to remain would have been far more likely to undermine civil liberties than ensuring that it was properly replaced. It seems to me that, during its passage in the House of Commons, the Bill has been immeasurably improved. I am grateful to my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary for listening and responding to the concerns expressed by the Intelligence and Security Committee and for accepting virtually all our amendments, although I recognise that we shall need to negotiate on some areas of detail.
The ISC has always taken the collective view that this legislation is necessary, and that that necessity applies to bulk powers of collection. We look forward to and will accept David Anderson’s report, and will consider whether there are indeed any alternatives that might be advanced, but I have to say that, on the basis of everything that we have seen up to now, we believe that bulk powers are needed, although sensible and proper safeguards are required to ensure that they cannot be abused. The Bill contains such safeguards, and I believe that when it comes back from the other place, it will be in an even better condition. Parliament, it seems to me, has been doing its job rather well.
If I have any complaint to make about the Bill’s passage, it is this: the quantity of amendments tabled on Report has rendered the Order Paper entirely inadequate. Until we have an Order Paper that marries the amendment numbers to page numbers—which is vitally needed—we shall be wasting a great deal of our time in the Chamber faffing around when we might have been doing other things. I hope that that complaint is passed on. I might even suggest that someone should consult GCHQ if there is a difficulty in finding the necessary formula on a computer to do the page numbering and the amendment numbering at the same time.
With that thought, I just want to say that it has been a privilege to participate in the passage of this Bill, and I hope that when it comes back to this House we will be able to reassure the hon. Member for Walsall North and the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West that they have a piece of legislation that will actually stand the test of time and be a credit to this House.

Alistair Carmichael: I recall that the first Public Bill Committee on which I served was on the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, when the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) led for the Conservatives. I seem to recall that he made the same point about the Order Paper in 2001. Despite the modernisation that we have seen over the past 15 years, it remains a piece of work that is outstanding.
My party voted against this Bill on Second Reading, and it is a matter of profound regret that I will be doing the same again tonight on Third Reading. Notwithstanding  the progress that has been made, the Bill is still not yet fit for sending to the other place.
The right hon. Member for Leigh (Andy Burnham) reminded us that it was 15 years ago today that he and I were elected to this House. I have seen a lot happen in that time, and I like to think that I have learned a thing or two, one of which is that when Government Ministers and Government Back Benchers shower the Opposition Front Bench with praise, it is time to head for the hills because we are going to do something that is seriously bad and dangerous.
The first time that the right hon. Gentleman and I saw that in this House was in the run-up to the Iraq war in 2003 when the Conservatives, then in opposition, said that they would take the Government position on trust. Later on, they said, “Of course, if we had known what we know now, we would not have supported them at the time.” They could not have known then what they knew later, because they never asked the questions. It is not the job of the Opposition to take the Government’s views on trust, but that is what they are doing. I do not question their principle, but I am afraid I cannot share their judgment.

Andy Burnham: The right hon. Gentleman seems to be advocating an argument that we can only achieve progress by being oppositional or party political. Surely there are occasions when we can do more by working across the House. We have shown that on this issue and on others, such as Hillsborough and other past injustices.

Alistair Carmichael: I do not need to take any lessons about working with other parties from the right hon. Gentleman. I did that for five years in a coalition Government when the Labour Front Bench could do nothing but tribally oppose.

George Howarth: Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

Alistair Carmichael: No, I am sorry. We have a shortage of time, so I am not taking any more interventions—[Interruption.] It will not be worth listening to; will the right hon. Gentleman just sit down, please?
We are told that a review is coming from David Anderson QC. We anticipate further amendments regarding the definition of internet connection records. We still await further detail on how the thorny issues of legal privilege and journalistic sources will be protected. That all adds up to a picture of massive doubt, and massive questions remain about the efficacy and necessity of the powers that the Government are bringing forward tonight. It would be an abdication of our responsibility as Opposition MPs to vote for it, and I will not be party to that abdication.

Victoria Atkins: It has been my privilege to serve on the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Bill Committee. I want to challenge gently the tone adopted just then by the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), because I felt during the Joint Committee and in Committee that the people   whom the Bill seeks to protect and those who sadly fell on 7/7 and in terrorist atrocities since were haunting me and many other members of those Committees.

Alistair Carmichael: Will the hon. Lady give way?

Victoria Atkins: No, I am going to finish this point. What is more, I met the police officers and members of the security services who hold our safety in their hands, and they do that for reasons of good faith, not bad faith. I regret the tone that has been taken, but I am conscious of the time—

Alistair Carmichael: rose—

Victoria Atkins: I am not going to give way. The Joint Committee heard from 59 witnesses in 22 public panels. We received 148 written submissions, amounting to 1,500 pages of evidence. We visited the Metropolitan police and GCHQ, and we made 87 recommendations, more than two thirds of which have been accepted by the Home Office.

Alistair Carmichael: Will the hon. Lady give way?

Victoria Atkins: No, thank you. The Bill Committee considered nearly 1,000 amendments, and in it the Government were led with style and eloquence by my right hon. Friend the Minister for Security and my hon. and learned Friend the Solicitor General. It was a pleasure to hear the forensic examination of the Bill by the hon. and learned Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Keir Starmer) and contributions from the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry). The scrutiny, care, considered argument and good will of those involved in the past seven months has improved this Bill. I have absolutely no doubt that it will help the security services, the police and other law enforcement agencies to protect us and to prosecute those who mean us harm. It is world-leading legislation and I commend it to the House.

Andrew Murrison: I certainly rise to support this measure, which has improved enormously during its passage. I cannot think of a measure in my 15 years here that has been more thoroughly scrutinised than this one. Our constituents are going to be very pleased with what we have been doing over the past weeks and months. I have to say to the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael), whom I respect very much, that one thing our constituents dislike most about this place is the perpetual protest in opposition, which we hear too often, particularly from his party. It does him no good. This Bill is—

Alistair Carmichael: Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

Andrew Murrison: Certainly not. This Bill has been characterised by consensus, and I have been heartened by the constructive attitude that the Labour Front Benchers have taken to this measure, moving from a position of abstention on Second Reading to one of support now. It does them a great deal of credit and has made this Bill very much better. The double lock was a turning point in this measure as far as I am concerned, but may I also say that the privacy clause, new clause 5,  is essential for many of us? The Home Secretary pointed that out. We have not had an opportunity to debate it very much today, but new clause 14, on health matters, has also been particularly important for a number of us who had concerns.
Clause 222 has not been debated at great length, but again it is vital because it allows us in five years’ time to come back to this measure to see what more needs to be done and what might be removed. That is particularly relevant in the context of ICRs. We have heard that one outstanding issue relates to the definition and use of ICRs, and I know that the other place will debate that at some length. My right hon. Friend the Minister for Security has referred to it and he is right to do so. I firmly believe that we will want to come back to it in any event in five years’ time, as technology will have changed so much in that period.
In summary, I very much welcome this measure—it is absolutely right. I am convinced that that overwhelming majority of our constituents will be pleased with the assiduity we have applied to this measure and, in particular, with the consensual nature of our debate. It is a great measure. It will give our constituents the protection that they undoubtedly need, while safeguarding their historic liberties.

Natascha Engel: For the remaining one and half minutes, I call Suella Fernandes.

Suella Fernandes: I will be short and to the point, Madam Deputy Speaker.
I rise to speak in support of this Bill, as it is a hard-won fight for all of us, and something of which this whole House can be proud. The nature and scale of the threat that we face today differs from the one that we faced even 12 months ago, as it is rapidly evolving and complex. I am proud to have contributed to this Bill as a member both of the Joint Committee and the Bill Committee. We made more than 100 recommendations, many of which have been adopted by the Government.
It is vital for our constituents that we pass this Bill today, and it will get my vote. I wish to put on record my thanks to the Front-Bench team, which was led by the Home Secretary and ably assisted by her turbo-charged team of the Solicitor-General and the Minister for Security who brought style, eloquence, professionalism and panache, and to our Government Whip, my hon. Friend the Member for Brighton, Kemptown (Simon Kirby). I am proud to support this Bill, and it has my vote tonight.
Question put, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
The House divided:
Ayes 444, Noes 69.

Question accordingly agreed to.

Greg Mulholland: On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. That was clearly an important vote, and one in which I wanted to take part. I turned up at St Stephen’s entrance only to be told that I was not allowed to go through to vote, with only a couple of minutes to go, because of filming in Westminster Hall. That is completely unacceptable when clearly the primary purpose of this place is to serve our democracy. Will you use your offices to look into the event and how this happened and ensure that never again will a Member of this House be turned away from an entrance and nearly prevented from voting?

Natascha Engel: I thank the hon. Gentleman for giving advance notice of his point of order during the Division. I think that everybody shares his feeling that under no circumstances should that ever happen. I am delighted that he did make it to the Division, and that there are no further Divisions this evening in which Members could be prevented from voting. We will certainly ask the Serjeant at Arms to investigate and get back to us in order to make sure that that never happens again. I thank the hon. Gentleman for his point of order.

PETITION - CAR PARKING FACILITIES AT WATERMEAD COUNTRY PARK, LEICESTER

Keith Vaz: The petition concerns car parking facilities at Watermead country park in Leicester. It has been signed by 146 local residents. The signatures were collected by local volunteers Nik Pattni, Kam Kanabar, Kit Kotak and Jat Parmar. I also want to thank Councillors Rita Patel, Ross Willmott and Piara Clair and other local residents for their support.
I went down to Alderton Close and saw the congestion that local residents have had to put up with. Last Sunday the situation got so bad, with those who cannot park in Watermead country park deciding to park in this quiet cul de sac, that the police had to be called. The residents therefore want urgent measures to be taken.
The petition states:
The petition of residents of Leicester East,
Declares that additional car parking facilities for Watermead Country Park users are required urgently as during bank holidays and hot days the car park capacity for Watermead Country Park is insufficient for the number of visitors to the park; further that, once the car park is full, Watermead Country Park users park on Alderton Close; further that this blocks the residents’ drives and restricts the movement of cars entering and leaving the area as vehicles are backed up along the road; and further that local police have been called on numerous occasions to diffuse the situation between residents of Alderton Close and Watermead Country Park users.
The petitioners therefore request that the House of Commons urges the Government to encourage Leicester City Council to extend the parking facilities at Watermead Country Park in Leicester.
And the petitioners remain, etc.
[P001698]

Comparative Healthcare Economics/NHS Finance

Motion made, and Question proposed, That this House do now adjourn.—(Charlie Elphicke.)

Andrew Murrison: I need to start by confessing an interest as a doctor. We are now 18 months into the five year forward view, and the big question really is: what next? “What next?” really means bringing English healthcare outcomes up to the standard enjoyed in peer group European nations, and I am afraid that means much more money. I hope that, in the next few minutes, I can suggest how we might go about achieving that.
The average age of Members of Parliament is 51. That means that most Members of this House have tipped, or are tipping, into the demographic twilight zone in which the incidence of common and chronic diseases begins to accelerate—it is sad but true. That focuses the mind on what a successful healthcare economy looks like and what it delivers for patients.
When those 51-year-olds enter the danger zone in a few years’ time, what will success look like? Success will mean accommodating the great advances in medicine that we believe we are on the cusp of achieving, and that we hope will add years to life and life to years, and I know that my hon. Friend the Minister is particularly exercised about those matters. Success will mean dealing with the healthcare needs of an ageing demographic, an expanding population, and more chronic diseases of lifestyle, which will amount to a 3% per annum uplift in demand, according to NHS England and the Nuffield Trust. Success will mean satisfying the legitimate demands of a less deferential, consumerist, better educated society that will not be content with second best. Success will mean closing the gap between healthcare outcomes here and in northern European countries with which we can reasonably be compared, and therein lies the “What next?”
In July 2010, the Government White Paper “Equity and excellence” exposed relatively poor health outcomes in the UK, compared with other countries. Our healthcare system was delivering poorer results in terms of mortality and morbidity. The most recent OECD statistics, published last year, have confirmed Britain’s relatively poor performance across pretty well the complete spectrum of common diseases—common cancers, ischaemic heart disease, cerebrovascular disease and the rest. Crucially, the number of unnecessary deaths—mortality amenable to healthcare—is substantially higher in the UK than in neighbouring countries.
However, healthcare is not just about reducing deaths. What about other measures of quality? Measures such as post-operative sepsis, pulmonary embolism, deep vein thrombosis, obstetric trauma and diabetic complications are worryingly unimpressive in the UK, compared with countries we would consider to be in our peer group. Although the teenage pregnancy rate has improved in recent years, the UK bumps along the bottom of the EU league table with recent accession states. The list goes on.
The Swedish-based and well-respected, if drug firm-funded, Health Consumer Powerhouse has been reporting on the performance of Europe’s healthcare economies  since 2005. The UK’s position in its Euro Health Consumer Index has always been mediocre, but in January the UK was ranked 14th out of 35—just above Slovenia, Croatia and Estonia, and below European countries that most Britons would regard as peers.

Jim Shannon: I congratulate the hon. Gentleman on bringing this matter forward. This may seem a bit like politicking, but it none the less needs to be said. There is no doubt that the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership has the potential to threaten the very nature of our NHS. What is even clearer is that we are sending millions of pounds every week to the EU that could be invested in our NHS, where that money is much needed. Does the hon. Gentleman agree that there is great potential to properly resource and liberate our great NHS, were we to vote to leave the EU?

Andrew Murrison: I think the hon. Gentleman and I are on the same side of the Brexit debate, and I certainly would welcome the extra money that would be spent on the NHS in the event that we leave the European Union, so fingers crossed for 23 June.
The Health Consumer Powerhouse report highlights poor accessibility and an “autocratic top-down management culture” here, in contrast to top-performing Holland’s removal of what Health Consumer Powerhouse calls “healthcare amateurs”—that is to say, politicians and bureaucrats—from decision making. Unhappily, that sounds rather familiar. Earlier this year, Dame Julie Moore slated fellow senior NHS managers for “gross incompetence” and poor leadership.
The question is, what, apart from its management, accounts for the UK’s lacklustre ranking? Despite the UK’s innovative cancer drugs fund, Health Consumer Powerhouse found, for example, relatively poor availability of the latest oncology interventions and therapeutics, including radiotherapy. Sadly, that rings true, and we remember the high-profile case of Ashya King, the five-year-old with medulloblastoma, who was taken by his parents in 2014 from Southampton general hospital to Spain and then the Czech Republic for proton beam therapy, which was not available here.
The much-vaunted Commonwealth Fund report that some use to claim that the NHS is super-efficient and effective actually contains just one element that deals directly with health outcomes—a composite of deaths amenable to medical care, of infant mortality and of life expectancy at 60, it puts the UK 10th out of 11, the US being bottom. Tenth out of 11 sophisticated healthcare economies is not where I want the UK to be, and not where the Minister wants the UK to be either. The British public would expect us to be doing rather better against a raft of healthcare outcomes where the UK is firmly in the wake of our immediate northern-European neighbours France, Germany, Holland, Belgium and Denmark.
Can we explain why UK healthcare outcomes are not as good as those of peer group nations through differences in the level of healthcare funding? We can expect an opinion from the House of Lords, which last week set up a Select Committee under Lord Patel to examine the sustainability of the NHS—that is, the “what next?” question. I would be very surprised if it did not conclude that the answer is to bring spend up to the level enjoyed in countries such as France, Germany and Holland.  After all, closing the gap with the EU15 in health spending as a proportion of GDP was a goal explicitly set in 2000. However, Conservative Members tend to be somewhat wary of making spend a proxy for outcome. It is not enough just to write big cheques and consider the job done. Can we do better with what we have? There are apologists for our low spending on health who cite the supposed efficiency of the NHS, but simply asserting that the NHS is more efficient than health services in other countries does not make it true.
I do not know what is in the Minister’s speaking notes, but there is a very good chance that he will use the New York-based Commonwealth Fund analysis on comparative healthcare to support a contention that the NHS is very efficient and thus ameliorates the relatively low UK spend on healthcare. The report’s methodology rewards close examination. I am sure he will have read it thoroughly, but if not, I commend it to him. In my opinion, its methodology renders the sorts of deductions that have been made unsafe. The only reliable element of the analysis that is used to claim that the NHS is relatively efficient is the percentage of national expenditure spent on administration and insurance, meaning that the UK comes in at fifth out of 11. Given that the nature of our system means that insurance and transactional costs are very low, that is hardly something to crow about. Other markers of efficiency rely on patient and practitioner surveys and include items such as time spent filling out financial transaction forms. UK-relevant metrics, such as rehospitalisation rates, were found to be comparatively poor. I conclude that it would be unsafe to make claims about the relative efficiency of the NHS based on contestable reports like that of New York’s Commonwealth Fund.
Let us suppose for one moment that the NHS is fairly efficient—not very efficient, because Carter and others suggest that that would be unwise, but fairly efficient. Indeed, I have no reason to suppose that it is institutionally profligate. If it is fairly efficient, we will not be able to squeeze many more efficiencies from it beyond the Stevens assumptions, but we will still be left with relatively poor outcomes and still needing to know “what next?” Simon Stevens still believes that we can squeeze £22 billion in efficiencies from the NHS. Much of this, presumably, is predicated on productivity gains that are contingent on holding down salaries and wages—a challenge if incomes in the economy rise. This is what I think he means by “strong performance”—strong indeed, because the implied productivity gains of 2.4% are well in excess of anything that has been achieved by the NHS historically and well beyond expectations for the wider economy. It also depends on sustained spending on social services and public and preventive health. Both, in the event, have been impacted by cuts to local government funding—cuts that I supported and accept were entirely necessary to repair the public finances, but cuts nevertheless.
So “what next?” will inevitably mean a step change in input—in money—if not by the end of the five year forward view period, then without doubt during the next decade and beyond. Here again, it is instructive to look across the channel, where we find some good news for Ministers. The Office for National Statistics has just tweaked its approach to health accounting to comply more closely with that of the OECD, and obligingly, this increases the UK’s spend on public and private healthcare combined from 8.7% of GDP to 9.9%. Most  of this is due to re-badging a slice of publicly funded social care as healthcare spend. Of course, none of this accountancy changes by one penny the amount spent on care, but it impacts on the international spending league table. It means that we overtake southern European countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece. However, we still lag well behind Germany, France and the Netherlands—my chosen basket of similar European countries.
So what next? Data from the Kings Fund and the Institute for Fiscal Studies suggest that income tax must rise by at least 3p in the pound simply to offset the fall in NHS spending as a proportion of GDP predicted over the rest of the decade. But all that will do is arrest the UK’s relative downward trajectory towards being the sick man of Europe. To bring spend up to the EU15 average would now involve an 8p increase. That eye-watering sum may be toned down a little bit by the new Office for National Statistics method for calculating healthcare spend, but probably not greatly if the comparison we actually want to make is with our closest European neighbours France, Germany and the Netherlands.
So, if we accept that big fistfuls of money are needed, the question becomes, “How are we to get it?” The Labour party does not know. It has yet to say how much it thinks the NHS budget should be, despite every encouragement from me and others to do so. All we know is that the party opposed the Stevens uplift at the general election. Maybe the unaccustomed reticence about pledging money from the party of fiscal incontinence is an indication of the sheer scale of the spending challenge that even Labour has perceived in a rare lucid moment.
Although I have every confidence in my right hon. Friend the Chancellor, a precipitous growth in the economy seems unlikely, and further borrowing should not be an option. In fact, half the £350 million per week that we send to the EU—a figure, net of rebate and subsidy, that I personally rely on—would, by my reckoning, halve the difference. I fervently hope that it will be in play after 23 June, but it would still leave a gap. How will that gap be closed? It is said that if we want a social healthcare system, we must choose between Bismarck and Beveridge. For my part, I cannot see how the transaction costs implicit in insurance-based models or large-scale schemes of co-payment would improve productivity or efficiency in our NHS—this despite the fact that the UK healthcare economy is distinguished from others by the small scale of its private provision.
For me, the Bismarck versus Beveridge debate is pretty much settled. However, I would expect a commission to examine all possible funding streams, drawing on experience from other countries. I would expect it to look closer to home at incentives that can be given to encourage subscription to mutuals, such as the Benenden Healthcare Society, formed in 1905 by and for Post Office workers, whose headquarters in York I visited recently.
But affirming that the great bulk of healthcare in the UK should continue to be funded through general taxation does not just mean more of the same. A variable hypothecated tax would be an easier sell to the public than a general tax hike. Treasury officials, or course, hate hypothecation, but the Treasury has been softening its approach in recent years and we are now, of course, wedded to the far less economically literate practice of hypothecated spend as a proportion of GDP for selected  areas of public expenditure. Despite the Treasury’s reluctance, if we are talking about several pence in the pound to bring UK health spending up to the average of neighbouring similar countries, we have to find a politically acceptable and publicly palatable way of doing so. Either way, gathering a consensus on this most sensitive and complex of public policy areas, using a vehicle on a spectrum from royal commission to non-departmental public body, surely makes sense. As a model, may I suggest the influential Pensions Commission, chaired by Adair Turner, during the last Labour Government?
If the NHS is the closest we have to a national religion, its critical friends are often seen as heretics. We saw that even at the height of the Mid Staffs scandal. How, then, are we to uphold this rallying point for national morality, decency and righteousness with the more prosaic imperatives to save and lengthen life, make sick people better, prevent ill health and match health outcomes in comparable countries? I hope that the Minister will agree that the proposal for a commission and associated national conversation—made by me and others in this House, in the other place and elsewhere—has merit. I warmly congratulate Ministers on successfully arguing the NHS’s corner at a time of austerity. However, I urge the Government to give serious thought to establishing a commission that will examine how we can properly and sustainably fund healthcare and close the widening gap that exists between us and our European neighbours.

Jo Churchill: I do not think that a commission is the right way to go, but does my hon. Friend agree that we sit on a new horizon, with molecular diagnostics, personalised medicine and so on, and that it is really important that we take a broader look at what our healthcare needs will be in future and how we can embrace more self-responsibility and new techniques for ensuring good patient outcomes? I said in this place in 2010 that we were lagging behind; sadly, we still are.

Andrew Murrison: My hon. Friend is absolutely right: we are lagging behind. I hope that in the course of my remarks I have made it very clear that we are lagging behind countries with which we can reasonably be compared, particularly Germany, France and the Netherlands. The challenge is to bring our spend up to that level and to anticipate new developments and technologies. We should welcome that, because it will extend our lives and it will make us healthier for longer, but we do have to decide where the money will come from. Since the sums, I fear, will be so great, I believe that a commission would be a reasonable way to approach this matter and to have the conversation with the public about how the money will be raised.
The sands are fast running through the five year forward view hourglass. I believe it is time for Ministers to consider, “what next?”

George Freeman: I thank my hon. Friend the Member for South West Wiltshire (Dr Murrison)—my honourable and clinical friend—for bringing this debate  to the House. I am only sorry that there are not many more people here this evening, because this subject goes to the heart of the prosperity, sustainability, health, wealth and resilience of our economy and society in the 21st century. I am very grateful that he has raised it.
This subject raises, and my hon. Friend has raised, a number of important issues. I start by pointing out that our ability to fund the NHS is profoundly based on our ability to run a strong economy. Without getting distracted into discussing the merits of the case for Brexit, I would just say that it is very difficult to find any serious commentator who thinks that leaving the European single market would be good for our economic growth prospects. It would therefore have a direct impact on our ability to fund the NHS.
My hon. Friend made a number of important points. He rightly flagged up the importance of outcomes not inputs, and said that we should be driven not by inputs, but by outputs. He spoke of a better use of existing budgets, as well as the need for new money. He mentioned the importance of new care pathways that are changing the way we diagnose and treat disease, and indeed prevent disease in the first place. He also spoke of the importance of technology and productivity in allowing us to get more health for every pound that we spend. The mission that I am delighted to say sits at the heart of the new portfolio that I hold as the first Minister for Life Sciences is to accelerate the uptake of innovation in our healthcare system to help us deliver more health for every pound, and to generate more pounds from our life sciences and health technology sector to help pay for our growing health costs as a society.
My hon. Friend touched on the fact that we have always had a mixed healthcare economy in this country—a mixture of public funding, charitable funding and some private funding. That mixed economy is mirrored across Europe, with different countries having different balances. He raised the equally important issue of health and care integration, and how as an ageing society we can tackle that challenge.
In the short time available, I want to say something about international health comparisons, which my hon. Friend raised, health outcomes and what the Government are doing. He mentioned the 2010 Government White Paper, “Equity and excellence: Liberating the NHS”, in which it was acknowledged that more needed to be done to improve health outcomes in comparison to other countries. It stated:
“Compared to other countries…the NHS has achieved relatively poor outcomes in some areas. For example, rates of mortality amenable to healthcare, rates of mortality from some respiratory diseases and some cancers, and some measures of stroke have been amongst the worst in the developed world.”
I do not shy away from that. We are in the process, with NHS England, of gripping those issues.
It is true that the NHS has, at times, scored relatively poorly on being responsive to particular patient groups. We have had problems with MRSA that were worse than the European average. There is some international evidence that shows that we have much further to go on managing care more thoroughly. For example, the NHS has had high rates of acute complications of diabetes and avoidable asthma admissions.
I do not for a minute come here tonight to pretend that everything is perfect. But the truth is that it is difficult to compare like for like, as all healthcare systems  are different and there are many ways to compare them. For example, the OECD’s latest report on amenable mortality rates shows that the UK has average rates of amenable mortality in the OECD, and is not among the worst in the developed world, as has been suggested at times. The NHS has been ranked first overall in the Commonwealth Fund report. I accept my hon. Friend’s point about the report only measuring certain factors, but on quality, access and efficiency the NHS was ranked the No. 1 system in the world—I do not deny that scope for improvement was flagged in outcomes and healthy lives.
On the latest OECD data, for 2013, it is true that total health spending in the UK, inclusive of public and private spend, at 8.5% of GDP is lower than the EU15 average of 9.5% of GDP, but it is around the same as the OECD average of 8.9%, and the UK delivers above average health outcomes for an average level of expenditure within the OECD. The majority of UK health funding is through general taxation. Reviews of the evidence have shown that using general taxation as the main mechanism for healthcare funding is still fairest and most efficient. That raises the long-term point that my hon. Friend is flagging, which is that we need to think about how we want to fund the levels of healthcare that our ageing society is likely to need.
The OECD has said that no broad type of healthcare system performs systematically better than another in improving a population’s health status in a cost-effective manner. In his 2002 review, Derek Wanless concluded, interestingly:
“Private funding mechanisms tend to be inequitable, regressive (those with greater health needs pay the most), have weak incentives for cost control, high administration costs and can deter appropriate use.”
For that reason and many others this Government are absolutely committed to funding the NHS through the existing mechanism to the highest level we can afford as a society.
On health outcomes, I want to flag in particular the point my hon. Friend made about cancer. Cancer survival rates are at a record high and continue to improve, as shown by the latest figures from the Office for National Statistics in February this year. We know that we have to continue to do better. Every other country is improving, and technology is changing; that is why the independent cancer taskforce report, “Achieving World-Class Cancer Outcomes. A Strategy for England 2015-2020”—published to wide acclaim in July 2015—has pulled together a consensus from the whole cancer community. That strategy sets out a number of important measures that we are committed to and are seeing through: a radical upgrade in prevention and public health; a national ambition to achieve much earlier diagnosis; establishing patient experience on a par with clinical effectiveness and safety; and transforming the way we support people living with and beyond cancer, as there are now 850,000 people living with cancer.
New drugs on the horizon offer the prospect of actually curing cancer in some patients. That is an extraordinary breakthrough, and we are making the necessary investments to embrace genomic personalised cancer services in the NHS and ensure that commissioning, provision and accountability processes are brought up to date and are more fit for purpose. At the heart of all that is the need to adapt to the new drugs coming  through, which is why I have launched the accelerated access review to look at the way in which we assess, adopt and reimburse new medicines, and unleash the power of our NHS to provide data and genomic insights to drive the increasingly personalised and precision medicines that the cancer community is producing.
I do not want to pretend that the issues my hon. Friend has raised are not real. They are real, for a number of reasons, not least our rising population. By 2030, England’s population is forecast to reach 60.2 million, a rise of more than 6 million from 2015. Over the same period, the number of people aged 85 and over is expected to grow by more than 74%, an increase of 1 million from 1.3 million to 2.3 million. That puts huge pressure on our system of both health and care, and speaks to the importance of integration. That is why we have supported NHS England’s own five-year forward view—its own action plan; I am sure that, like me, he welcomes the fact that as a result of our reforms NHS England’s clinical and professional leaders are now able to set out their requests for how they want to manage the system, and we fund them and hold them to account in doing that. It has put in place a number of important mechanisms to change the models of care and to update how the system treats those key chronic diseases. If those services continue to be provided under the old model of 1947—silo care—they will put unsustainable pressure on our system.
NHS England is putting in place a range of measures, including the new care model vanguard sites—there are 50 of them around the country—and the Carter report on procurement. We are improving clinical commissioning group performance through the Right Care programme. We are putting in substantial extra money, including £2.1 billion in the sustainability and transformation fund, £4 billion for technology and the digitisation of the NHS, and billions for new drugs.
Crucially, we need to upgrade how the system diagnoses and treats so that we can liberate people from the 20th century model of heavy dependence on the state system to provide healthcare at its convenience, where people queue to receive healthcare. We want to move to a system in which people can live with and manage diseases better from home and be productive citizens in the economy and society. A huge amount of work is happening on new care pathways.
Integration was at the heart of my hon. Friend’s speech. We need to develop a health and care system in which we recognise that, particularly for the elderly, health and care need to be seamless. In our system today, they are not. That is why we have set up the better care fund, and given local authorities the freedom to raise extra money through the local care precept, which will in itself put £3.5 billion extra into supporting care, including £500 million for disabilities facilities, which will prevent 8,500 people from needing to go into care homes.
We are putting the money in to try to support local health and care integration, but we want to go further and faster, which we must do as a society and economy. We do not want to impose top-down solutions; we want to create situations in which local health economies can adopt the right mechanisms and the right processes for them.
In this Parliament, we have responded to NHS England’s leadership’s requests. It set out clearly before the election its five-year forward view and forecast that, by 2020, we  would be looking at £30 billion of extra health costs, of which it said £22 billion would be avoidable with technology, transformation, better care models, digitisation, smarter and remote diagnostics, and more people being empowered and enabled so that they would not have to present at GP surgeries and hospitals so often. We have backed that plan. It asked for £8 billion a year, but by 2020 we will give it £10 billion. We have front-loaded that with £3.8 billion in 2016-17, the £3.5 billion for social care and the £4 billion for technology. Nobody can say that the Government have not put their money where the NHS’s mouth is. The NHS said that that is what it needed, and we have provided it.
In giving succour to the idea of a royal commission, I would not want to undermine that very important settlement, but I recognise that the points my hon. Friend has raised go to the heart of the big health and care debate we need to have as a society. The Government  do not believe that a royal commission is the right solution, but I support the debate and want more of us to have it locally.
In the end, all hon. Members know that it is in their local health economies that the leaders who can crack this problem for us exist. We need to incentivise them. That is why the devolution plans and the integration of devolved budgets, and the measures we are considering to incentivise local health economies—we want not to reward them through tariffs for the treatment of disease, but to reward them for the prevention of disease—are so exciting. Ultimately, they provide the basis for optimism in the long term. We need to get more out of the money we spend as well as raise more money as a society. I am grateful to my hon. Friend for raising this important issue.
Question put and agreed to.
House adjourned.